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

HE COLLECTED POEMS OF ARTURO GIOVANNITTI

Preface by
Norman Thomas
and introduction by
Hellen Keller

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This article is based upon testimony presented by Herbert Hill before the Special Subcommittee, House Committee on Education and Labor, August 18, 1962.

Mr. Hill is National Labor Secretary of the NAACP and was Special Consultant to the Congressional Committee during its investigation of the garment industry.

The ILGWU Today—

The Decay of a Labor Union

Herbert Hill

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED IN THE COURSE of my investigation of the status of non-white workers in the garment industry of New York City makes it very clear that Negro and Puerto Rican workers are the victims of a broad pattern of racial discrimination and segregation and that there is a direct connection between the permanent condition of semi-poverty experienced by these workers and discriminatory racial practices. The factual record discloses that Negro and Puerto Rican members of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union are discriminated against both in terms of wages and other conditions of employment and in their status as members of the union.

There are two faces to the ILGWU. There is the public image of a union fighting against sweatshops, bringing stability to the industry, securing educational and recreational services for its members, building housing projects and generously contributing to worthy causes. This image has been carefully nurtured for many years by a very extensive and well financed public relations campaign. But there is another face to the ILGWU, one that is the daily reality for the Negro and Puerto Rican members of the union in New York City and elsewhere.

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The other face of the ILGWU is of a trade union controlled by a rigid bureaucracy that long ago lost contact with its rank and file members. A bureaucracy that has more in common ethnically and socially with the employers than with the workers it is supposed to represent.

The clearest and sharpest manifestation of this serious internal degeneration is to be found in the treatment of the non-white worker within the union.

ALL THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE indicates that in the admission of Negroes into local unions affiliated to the New York Dress Joint Board of the ILGWU there is a clear pattern of racial segregation. Thus there are virtually no Negro and Puerto Rican members in the locals that control access to the well paid jobs where there is a high degree of employment stability. These are Local 10, the Cutters local; Local 60, the Pressers; and the Pressers Branch of Local 89. It is further established that, as a matter of practice and policy, Negroes and Puerto Ricans are barred from membership in these locals and from the high paying stable jobs within their jurisdiction. Thus, for all practical purposes, Locals 10, 60 and 89 are "lily-white." Negro and Puerto Rican workers are limited to to membership in Local 22 and in the unit known as 60A, which is the "Jim Crow" auxiliary of Local 60.

The racial practices of the ILGWU are seen most clearly in the Cutters and Pressers locals. Local 60, the Pressers local, controls jobs within its jurisdiction that on an hourly rated basis are the highest paying jobs in the entire garment industry in New York City, the average wage being almost $5.00 an hour. Local 60 has an all-white membership. On the other hand, there is 60A which is simply an appendage to Local 60 with a membership almost entirely Negro and Puerto Rican. The members of 60A are shipping clerks, push boys and delivery men. These workers earn in the vicinity of $50.00 per week. Yet, 60A with twice the membership of Local 60 has never been chartered by the International as a separate local and the manager of 60, who is a presser, functions also as the manager of 60A. One must ask, why should a local of shipping clerks and push boys, whose members are paid extremely low wages, be attached as an auxiliary unit to the pressers local whose members make the highest wages in the garment industry? It is interesting to note that on occasion the ILGWU refers to 60A as a separate local although the International has never issued a local union charter to 60A and in the annual reports filed with the Bureau of Labor-Management Reports of the U.S. Department of Labor, a joint report is filed for 60 and 60A as one unit although every other local affiliate of the ILGWU files an individual report.

To anyone acquainted with the realities of the union's opera-

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tion the reason for denying a separate local union charter to 60A is that, given the ethnic composition of the membership, there would inevitably be a Negro or Puerto Rican local union manager. This is obviously unacceptable to Mr. Dubinsky and his colleagues on the General Executive Board who have resorted to the unusual practice, repeated no where else in the entire union, of joining the low paid Negro and Puerto Rican workers in 60A with the high paid pressers in Local 60.

Another example of the same discriminatory pattern is to be found in the exclusion of Negroes from Local 10, the Cutters local. Local 10 controls job opportunities in the well paid cutters' jurisdiction. Through a variety of devices, the leadership of Local 10 prevents Negroes and Puerto Ricans from securing membership in this desirable craft local. Over a period of years, Negroes, who are members of other locals of the ILGWU, have attempted to secure admission into Local 10 but are almost without exception denied membership upon a variety of pretexts. On July 2, 1962, the New York State Commission for Human Rights, which administers the state's fair employment practices statute, found "probable cause" against Local 10 in the case of Ernest Holmes, a Negro who was repeatedly denied membership in Local 10 although he worked on the cutting tables of a union shop. Furthermore, the State Commission found, after a fifteen-month investigation, that there are virtually no non-white persons in this local union. This decision also confirmed the charge made in the Holmes case and in so many other instances that private "deals" are made by the ILGWU with favored employers at the expense of Negro and Puerto Rican workers.

A device that is used by Moe Falikman, the manager of Local 10, and his colleagues to prevent the admission of non-white persons into that local union is the rigid control of admission into various training programs. Local 10 exclusively decides who shall be referred to on-the-job training opportunities created as the result of informal arrangements made by the union and employers operating with ILGWU contracts, or into the Grading School operated by Local 10 in its headquarters, or in the referral of young persons to the Fashion Institute of Technology High School. It is essential to understand that there is absolutely no objective criteria, no established standards by which a person is accepted or rejected for admission into any of these three forms of training programs. When Moe Falikman was recently questioned as to how persons are chosen for these programs, Mr. Falikman arrogantly stated, "I choose them." It is quite possible that for public relations purposes the ILGWU will produce one or two Negroes or Puerto Ricans who claim to be members of Local 10 or Local 60. But the presence of one or two non-white persons does not alter

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the racial pattern and must be regarded as less than even a token of integration, especially in New York City where Negroes and Puerto Ricans constitute so large a part of the labor force.

ACCORDING TO THE DIVISION OF LABOR RESEARCH of the New York City Department of Labor:

> The proportion of the city's population accounted for by Puerto Ricans and nonwhites increased from 13 percent in 1950 to 22 percent in 1960. Their 1960 share of the labor force was 21 percent. By 1970, based on projections of the Department of City Planning, Puerto Ricans and nonwhites will account for 30 percent of the population.

The ILGWU leadership simply refuses to adjust to these facts and continues to operate the union in the interests of a small and declining number of white garment workers with high seniority in the industry. In the Harvard University study, *Made in New York: Case Studies in Metropolitan Manufacturing* (Harvard University Press, 1959) it is noted that Negroes and Latin Americans

> [. . . were largely to be found in the less skilled, lower-paid crafts and in shops making the lower price lines, and in this industry their advancement to higher skills was not proceeding very rapidly. In the higher-skilled coat-and-suit industry the new ethnic groups have hardly made an appearance.]
>
> In short, Negro and Puerto Rican women, who are on the lower rungs of the city's economic ladder, have become important in the New York garment industry, but they work mainly in the more standardized branches, and with few exceptions, unlike the Jewish and Italian men of earlier days, they do not become highly skilled tailor-system workers on dresses or 'cloaks.' As a result, a shortage of skilled sewing machine operators is developing.

The leadership of the skilled crafts locals of the ILGWU must bear a major share of the responsibility for this development.

THE ILGWU OPERATES TWO LOCAL UNIONS in Puerto Rico. These are designated as Local 600 and Local 601 of which the entire membership are Spanish speaking Puerto Ricans. However, both of these locals are denied Puerto Rican leadership as they are managed by one Jerry Schoen, a former business agent from Local 62, who was sent from New York City by the International union to manage these two Puerto Rican locals. Obviously, the more than 8,500 Puerto Rican members of the union were not consulted as to who would be the principal officers of the locals, as Schoen was arbitrarily imposed by Dubinsky upon the Puerto Rican membership.

It is clear that Mr. Dubinsky's practices in this matter have

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little in common with the practices of modern American trade unionism.

These are but a few of the examples that illustrate the attitude of the ILGWU leadership regarding the Negro and Puerto Rican union members wherever it operates. Non-white workers are denied an effective voice in determining the union's policies and practices. Furthermore, they are denied even the slightest measure of internal union democracy that might result in a Negro or Puerto Rican rising to a position of real leadership within the union. Thus, the voice of more than 120,000 members of the ILGWU, that is, almost a third of its members, is throttled. This includes the membership in New York City where more than 52% of the workers are non-white, and this is the pattern throughout the union. Of necessity the question is asked: How are these more than 120,000 workers denied an effective voice in the leadership and policy-making functions of the union? The answers are to be found simply by a careful analysis of the constitution and by-laws of the ILGWU.

First of all, members of the union are not permitted to engage in any internal political activity, and are not permitted to have clubs, groups or caucuses within their union except for a designated period of three months before conventions every two years. How can workers gain support for choices contrary to those of the administration unless they are permitted to organize to discuss their own interests and to press for the election of candidates to union office responsive to their needs? The answer is that they are specifically forbidden to do so as the ILGWU constitution prohibits all membership caucuses, groups and clubs. (Page 52, Article 8, Section 16 of the ILGWU Constitution.) This incredible denial of democratic rights of the workers prevents the discussion of matters vital to every union member in an organized fashion and prevents the offering of rank and file candidates for union office. Mr. Dubinsky's spokesmen will answer that this is done to prevent Communists from taking over the union. This response is not worthy of a serious and dignified answer. One can only compare it to the argument that we should suspend the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights because it endangers the country in fighting subversion.

Although the rank and file membership of the ILGWU is denied the same right to internal political activity that is accepted as commonplace in the United Automobile Workers Union, the Typographical Workers Union and in other major labor organizations, the Dubinsky administration caucus functions every day using the dues money of all of its members to maintain control and to congratulate itself on its power and achievement. I propose to examine the requirements for important leadership positions in

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the ILGWU. In order to be eligible to run for President or General Secretary-Treasurer, a member must be a delegate to the convention, which immediately reduces the number eligible to approximately 1,000 out of 450,000 members. The member must be a member for ten years and a *paid officer for five years.* This means that no member who is not on the paid staff is eligible for these offices.

In order to run for the General Executive Board a member must be a delegate to the convention, a member for five years and a *paid officer for three.* This means that no member who is not a paid officer is eligible for the General Executive Board of the ILGWU. Page 14, Article 3, Section 6 of the ILGWU Constitution reads as follows:

> No member shall be eligible to hold a general office unless he or she has been a member of the ILGWU in continuous good standing, with respect to the office of vice president, for at least 5 years prior to the convention, during three years of which he has held a full time, paid elective or appointive office, and with respect to the offices of President and General Secretary-Treasurer, for at least 10 years prior to the convention, during 5 years of which he has held a full time, paid elective or appointive office.

An analysis of the composition of the delegates to the last two ILGWU conventions would show that of the 450,000 members of the ILGWU, the number of members eligible to run for the General Executive Board, given the requirements for nomination, is reduced to less than three hundred. Those eligible for the post of President or General Secretary-Treasurer are less than two hundred.

In other words, of the membership of the ILGWU, less than 1/15 of 1% are eligible to run for the General Executive Board less than 1/20 of 1% are eligible for the Presidency or the General Secretary-Treasurership.

The particular condition of the more than 120,000 Negro and Puerto Rican members of the ILGWU is even worse than the general condition. *No more than four or five non-white persons would be eligible to run for the General Executive Board of the union and virtually none at all for the top leadership positions.* This explains why there is not a single Negro or Puerto Rican on the twenty-three member General Executive Board, not a single Negro or Puerto Rican Vice President of the union and why there are no Negro or Puerto Rican local managers who are usually hand-picked by the Dubinsky controlled administration.

These fantastic restrictions on political activity within the union and the incredible eligibility requirements for top offices are obviously violations of the Bill Of Rights For Members Of Labor Organizations contained in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Section 101-A2 and Section 401-E).

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These operational procedures, together with Dubinsky's practice of requiring a signed undated resignation from all officers of the International union and from members of the General Executive Board, absolutely guarantees the perpetuation of what really amounts to one-man rule of the ILGWU. Thus, it is easy to understand how Negroes and Puerto Ricans are discriminated against and relegated to second-class membership when the rigid monolithic structure of the ILGWU is closely examined.

THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION of Negro and Puerto Rican members from effective participation in the leadership and policy making procedures of the union, together with the general suppression of democratic membership rights within the ILGWU, and the pattern of segregation and discrimination, all directly contribute to the economically disadvantaged position of Negro and Puerto Rican workers in the industry itself. Thus we find that in the locals where there is a major concentration of non-white workers, ILGWU contracts provide for only a few cents above the bare minimum required by law. For many locals in New York City, where the overwhelming membership is Negro and Puerto Rican, the wage schedules provided in collective bargaining agreements made with such locals as 23, 25, 32, 62, 66, 91, 98, 105, 132 and 142 are a shame and a disgrace to the entire American labor movement. In these union agreements, where jobs are filled largely by Negroes and Puerto Ricans, the so-called minimum wages are in fact the maximum wages. In this category are floor girls, shipping clerks, trimmers and sewing machine operators in the low priced dress field and in the so-called miscellaneous locals.

I cite the basic contract between Local 98 and the Manufacturers' Association in effect until August 14, 1963. The contract provides the following minimum wages (Pg. 7, Article 4 (a)):

Floor Girls	*$1.15 per hour*
Operators	*1.20*
Shipping Clerks	*1.20*
Cutters	*1.20*

In September 1961, the Federal Minimum Wage was increased to $1.15 an hour. The current minimum for floor girls is $1.25 an hour at the end of seven months (only ten cents above the minimum wage required by law) and $1.30 an hour for the other classification at the end of nine months.

Page 8, Article 4 (b) (i) — *The minimum scales for learner-floor girls shall be as follows:*

> During the first month of their employment, they shall be paid not less than the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one ($1.00) dollar per hour.
> Commencing with the beginning of the second month of their em-

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ployment, they shall be paid not less than five (5¢) cents in excess of the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one and 05/100 ($1.05) dollar per hour.
Commencing with the beginning of the seventh month of their employment, they shall be paid not less than ten (10¢) cents in excess of the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one and 10/100 ($1.10) dollar per hour.
Commencing with the beginning of the tenth month of their employment, they shall be paid not less than ten (10¢) cents in excess of the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one and 15/100 ($1.15) dollar per hour.

Pages 8–9, Article 4 (b) (ii) — *The minimum scales for learners-operators, learner-shipping clerks and learners at the cutting table, shall be as follows:*

Commencing with the beginning of the second month of their employment, they shall be paid not less than five (5¢) cents in excess of the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one and 10/100 ($1.10) dollar per hour.
Commencing with the beginning of the seventh month of their employment, they shall be paid not less than ten (10¢) cents in excess of the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one and 15/100 ($1.15) dollar per hour.
Commencing with the beginning of the tenth month of their employment, they shall be paid not less than fifteen (15¢) cents in excess of the then effective Federal minimum wage, and in any event not less than one and 20/100 ($1.20) dollar per hour.

In those jobs where there are virtually no Negro or Puerto Rican workers the stated minimums have no relationship to the actual wages received. The wages are much higher than the contractual minimums. In this category are the cutters, pressers and skilled sewing machine operators in the expensive lines. Thus, Negroes and Puerto Ricans today are the manpower source for the garment industry's "sweatshops," as the union does nothing to move workers from low paying jobs into the skilled classifications. There is virtually no mobility of workers within the ILGWU.

Recently I made an on-the-spot investigation of these conditions. I cite The Fine Art Pillow and Specialties Company at 37 West 26th Street in Manhattan, as a typical example of conditions in firms under contract to Local 98 of the ILGWU. Here, virtually all non-white workers, male and female, who are union members are paid $1.15, $1.20 or $1.25 an hour, the very minimum or near minimum wage required by law. This does not include those workers who are designated as "learners" who may be employed for as long as ten months under the union contract and receive less than the lawful minimum wage. An appalling fact disclosed during this investigation was that there was no perceptible difference in wage levels in Local 98 shops and in non-union shops

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in the same industry. In shop after shop visited in New York City one can observe at first hand the fact that non-white workers are invariably the lowest paid in each firm, and where the general wage pattern in a particular shop is extremely low the work force is almost exclusively non-white.

I wish to stress again that there is a direct and functional connection between the unassailable fact that Negro workers are concentrated in the low-wage sectors of the industry where there is a high vulnerability to unemployment and the fact that Negro and Puerto Rican members of the union are excluded from top policy making positions, although they comprise a very large section of the union membership. Indeed there is not one Negro or Puerto Rican local union manager despite the fact that the membership of many locals is overwhelmingly Negro and Puerto Rican, including several where the membership is almost 100% Negro and Puerto Rican.

A TYPICAL EXAMPLE of the callous and bureaucratic manipulation of workers by the ILGWU leadership is to be found in the Haffkine Company case which has become a classic example of a union "sell-out." In this case the ILGWU completely organized a group of Negro and Puerto Rican workers employed by a "sweatshop" employer whose workers engaged in a two day ILGWU strike for union recognition. However, these striking workers were turned over to a local of another international union, one well known for signing "sweetheart agreements" and generally with an unsavory reputation. This was done by Herbert Pokodner, the manager of Local 98, who in the local headquarters and in the presence of the employer and of one Julius Isaacson, President of Local 118 of the Toy and Novelty Workers Union, told the workers that it really didn't matter which union they belonged to and arranged for them to be transferred to Local 118 even though the ILGWU had just recently signed into the union all the Haffkine Company employees. This is simply one more example of how Negro and Puerto Rican workers are viewed by the officers of the ILGWU, as commodities in commerce, to be bartered off in trade between "sweatshop" employers, racket unions and the ILGWU itself. The Haffkine case is just one shocking example of the practices of those who are in the "union business" and this, too, is a face of the ILGWU rarely revealed to the public. This explains why an analysis of the data

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provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor concludes that only 11% of the unionized garment workers in New York City can realize the basic earnings necessary for the "modest but adequate" standard of living established by the Bureau for the 1960 Interim City Worker's Family Budget.

This budget is based upon a "family of four persons, consisting of an employed husband aged 38 with a wife, not employed outside the home, and two children, a girl aged 8 and a boy aged 13 who live in a rented dwelling in a large city or its suburbs." It was designed to estimate the dollar amount required to maintain such a family at a level of living described as "modest but adequate."

The budget does not portray how an average family actually spends its money; rather "it is an estimate of the total cost of a representative list of goods and services considered necessary by 4-person city families of the budget type to maintain a level of adequate living according to standards prevailing in large cities of the United States in recent years." In New York City the total cost of this budget is $5,048.

On the basis of a 52-week work year it would be necessary to earn $3.28 per hour for a 35 hour week or $2.87 per hour for a 40 hour week to earn the yearly amount stated by the City Worker's Family Budget for a "modest but adequate" standard of living in New York City. In the garment industry, women's and misses' dresses' section (that is the ILGWU Dress Joint Board) regular inside and contract shops, as of August 1960 and assuming a 35 hour week, approximately 47,644 (83%) workers earned less than $3.30 an hour. Taking a 40 hour work week base, there were 40,251 (70%) workers earning less than $2.90 an hour.

It may be assumed that the typical four person family exists among the 47,644 (83%) workers cited in the study of the New York City garment industry. It is, therefore, clear that on the basis of the City Worker's Family Budget these families cannot possibly secure a "modest but adequate" standard of living in New York City. Only 9,255 (11%) of New York City garment workers can achieve the necessary income level to reach standards established in the City Worker's Family Budget. In addition, it must be noted that the very modest figure of 11% has been reached by assuming that these workers will be employed uninterruptedly for 52 weeks. However, given the seasonal character of the New York City garment industry this is highly unlikely.

The available data clearly indicates that the wages of workers in the New York City ladies' garment industry have declined relative to the total manufacturing average. The average hourly earnings of employees in the dress industry have not kept pace with the average hourly earnings of workers in other manfacturing industries in

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the New York City area. In addition, the "customary upward push of wages upon prices" has not been evident. Indeed, a price decline has occurred.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics the garment manufacturing industry provides the single greatest source of manufacturing man-hours of employment in New York City. Thus, conditions in this industry will be a decisive factor in determining the general income level for the entire city. At the present time the annual median income for all male workers in New York City is $4,396. The annual median income for non-white males in New York City is $3,336. Thus the white male worker earns at least 30 percent more than the non-white male worker.

Extensive investigation and direct interviewing of persons in the New York City garment manufacturing industry over a long period of time clearly demonstrate that there is an attitude among the employers and among union officials that a "little bit of chiselling is okay" and most often it is chiselling at the expense of the Negro and Puerto Rican workers who are threatened with loss of jobs if they protest too much.

ALTHOUGH IT IS VERY DIFFICULT to prove in terms of substantive legal evidence, everyone connected with the industry knows of shops that do not get organized because they have bought protection from union organizing campaigns; and they know of contracts not enforced because the union business agent is regularly accepting money from the employer.

There is an atmosphere of venality and corruption that permeates the industry. Workers who take home $49.00 a week tell each other jokes about the greed of union business agents or of the ILGWU manager who places bets of thousands of dollars a day on basketball games among the "bookies" operating in the Seventh Avenue barber shops, but they feel powerless to protest against conditions. They know all too well what happens to "troublemakers." The real corruption, the real dry rot, however, is to be found in the discriminatory racial practices which victimize tens of thousands of Negro and Puerto Rican wage earners and their families.

These workers now look to their government for relief. These workers, who have already experienced such a profound sense of alienation and rejection from American society, who have been forced into a condition of silence and mute acquiescence, now ask for help from the Congress of the United States.

These are my recommendations:

First, All appropriate Federal agencies and indeed the entire community must inform the Dubinsky controlled leadership that the private bureaucratic power which has controlled the ILGWU for so many years can no longer be immune from justifiable regulatory observation by responsible government agencies.

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Second, The violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 by ILGWU, specifically Title I, Section 101, A-2 and Tile IV, Section 401-E, should be immediately referred to the proper enforcement agencies of the Federal Government, and continuing and vigorous action must be forthcoming to protect the democratic rights of ILGWU members.

Third, The protection which a union receives for "exclusive representation" rights under the National Labor Relations Act and the "contract bar" to decertification proceedings and representation elections must be examined in the light of the practices of the ILGWU.

A union that is discriminating against members and denying them basic democratic rights within the organization or is not providing at least minimal standards of performance should be denied "exclusive representation" power under the law as well as the "contract bar" provision when such a "contract bar" provides no meaningful benefits to the workers involved.

I believe that if a union is entering into agreements with employers that provide little more than the minimum wages required by law, it should not have the protection of Federal law to be the exclusive bargaining agent; nor should Federal laws protect such a union against a decertification petition by the workers involved or from an organizing campaign by another union.

The affected sections of the National Labor Relations Act should be carefully reviewed so as to require standards of performance by unions as a necessary requirement for maintenance of exclusive bargaining rights.

Fourth, I urge that the National Labor Relations Board be empowered to refuse and/or to revoke certification of trade unions as exclusive bargaining agent if these unions engage in discriminatory racial practices; and

Fifth, I urge the passage of a Federal fair employment practices act which will include trade unions as well as employers within the coverage of the law.

The rapid implementation of these and related proposals is not only necessary to safeguard the rights and protect the welfare of working people throughout the United States, but in the final analysis is in the best interest of the organized labor movement itself. The struggle against racial discrimination and for internal union democracy must be understood as an effort to stop the further stagnation and decay of trade unions and for the regeneration of the entire American labor movement.

We look forward to publishing in the next issue of NEW POLITICS *replies to Mr. Hill's articles which have been solicited from officers of the ILGWU, among others.—The Editor*

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Paul Mattick

The Economics of Cybernation



MARXISM IS OFTEN UNDERSTOOD as a "theory of underconsumption" and as such is easily disproved by the empirical evidence of rising living standards in capitalist nations. It is also seen as a theory of crises and depressions. The present possibility of overcoming, even preventing, crisis conditions seems to prove Marxism doubly wrong. However, although Marx did draw attention to the limited consuming power of the laboring population, his theory was not a theory of underconsumption; and although he saw capitalism beset with crises, he had no definite crisis theory. The absence of the business-cycle would not have invalidated his theory of capital accumulation.

For the capitalism of Marx's own experience, his economic analysis was very much to the point and for this reason found such widespread adherence. This is now willingly admitted even by his critics who argue that Marxism, though dealing realistically with capitalism's unsavory past, is no longer valid because of recent changes of the capitalist system. Certain aspects of Marxian theory—the capital concentration and centralization process, for instance —have even been incorporated into modern economic theory by changing their negative connotations to positive ones. Also the need for an "industrial reserve army" to prevent wages from encroaching upon profit is still often stressed.

Although Marx experienced unemployment as a social fact and as a weapon within capital-labor relations, he believed that full employment was as possible as unemployment. It all depended on the rate of capital formation. The displacement of human labor by the machine was what capitalist industrialization was all about, and progress was measured by it. Indeed, Marx did not criticize capitalism so much for what it was and for what it could do as for its limitations and its basic inability to develop social production beyond the need to maintain social class relations. With regard to the past, capitalism was progressive; with regard to the future, it became an obstacle to the full development of production and thereby to the elimination of economic wants.

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Marx addressed himself not to the capitalists but to the workers. In his opinion, they alone were able to end class relations by abolishing their own class position, thus clearing the way for a further unfolding of the social forces of production. This would result in further technological development leading toward the abolition of human labor or, at any rate, of unwanted and disagreeable human labor. Capitalism, by being socially limited through specific class relationships, was regarded by Marx as economically limited and an obstacle to technological advance.

On this last issue, too, Marx appears to have been wrong because of the so-called second industrial revolution, characterized by atomic power and "automation." Strangely enough, however, this new triumph over Marx's gloomy prognostications is rarely celebrated as a solution to current social problems. Rather it is seen as the harbinger of new and perhaps insoluble difficulties. Suspicion that there is a possible incompatibility between the new technology and the prevailing socio-economic relations runs through the growing literature on automation. While most of the difficulties of the capitalist system have seemingly been overcome, the problem Marx was least concerned with, i.e., permanent and large-scale unemployment, appears to be the last but also the most important of all capitalistic contradictions.

II

WE ARE NOT CONCERNED HERE with the far-flung ramifications of cybernetics, or the science of control, which affects natural processes as well as social and technological systems, but only with its current application to capitalist production and distribution. Although the type of economy defines the type of society, we will not deal with all the social implications of cybernetics but only with the narrower relationship between cybernetics and economics, that is to say, with the possible effects of the emerging technology upon existing economic and political relations.

From its very inception, the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, felt inclined to point to the social problems involved in its application to production processes. The automatic machine, he wrote, "is the precise economic equivalent of slave labor. Any labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor. It is perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment situation in comparison with which the present recession and even the depression of the thirties will seem a pleasant joke."[1] A decade later, concern with automation was quite general. There were some, to be sure, who were certain that "guided by electronics, powered by atomic energy, geared to the smooth, effortless workings of automation, the magic carpet of our free economy heads for distant and undreamed horizons."[2] In reality, however, "the United States is advancing rapidly into a national economy in which there will not be enough jobs of the conventional kind to go around."[3] President Kennedy himself declared that finding work for men must be considered "the major domestic challenge of the Sixties."[4]

There is no dearth of data on automation. Its changing statistics appear everywhere, in the daily press as well as in labor publications. These statistics simply indicate increasing productivity, production, and profitability through the reduction of the labor force. The impact of automation differs with different industries. It is particularly noticable in

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textiles, coal mining, oil, steel, chemicals, railroading, and automobiles, but it affects in increasing measure all large-scale production as well as commercial and organizational activities and to some extent even agriculture. It does away with "white collar" and "blue collar" jobs—at present more of the latter than the former. But this may change in time.

Nevertheless, automation is still in its infancy and the existing number of unemployed may not be traceable to labor displacements through automation, even though workers clearly lose their jobs because of it. That they can find no other employment may be the result of a declining rate of capital formation rather than automation. After all, there were sixteen million unemployed in America during the Great Depression. Displacement of labor by machinery has been continuous and has not prevented a steady growth of the work force. It is feared, however, that automation is so different in degree from previous technological development as to amount to a difference in kind. The social problem it poses is thought to be unique and unanswerable by analogy with past conditions.

III

EVALUATING THE PREVIOUS IMPACT of automation upon the American economy, Donald N. Michael[5] has recently attempted a prognosis of its possible social consequences within the next two decades. His study is based on a number of assumptions, all of which imply that trends will largely remain what they are now and what they have been during the last ten years. Michael employs the term "cybernation" to account simultaneously for "automation" and "computers," which usually go together in the application of cybernetics to production processes. We will not concern ourselves with all the wondrous existing and potential capabilities of cybernation. A large and growing literature takes care of that. We merely indicate what Michael considers to be the advantages and problems of cybernation.

The advantages for both business firms and governments are plainly to "boost output and cut costs," in order to remain successful in private and national competition. Whatever other advantages Michael mentions, such as "reducing the magnitude of management's human relation tasks; greater rationalization of managerial activities; freeing management from petty distractions; greater freedom in locating facilities," and so forth, are all aspects of, or different expressions for, the cheapening of production. Expressed in Michael's genteel fashion: "If the criteria are control, understanding, and profits, there are strong reasons why government and business should want to, and indeed would have to, expand cybernation as rapidly as they can."[6]

The advantages of cybernation may, however, be offset by the problem of unemployment which will eventually affect all occupations; the unskilled more than the skilled—Negro workers, consequently, more than white workers. The previous relocation from production to service industries will come to an end. "If people cost more than machines—either in money or because of the managerial effort involved—there will be strong incentives to replace them in one way or another in most service activities where they perform routine, predefined tasks."[7] As technology allows fewer people to do more work, many of the intermediary middle class management jobs will also disappear. All this while "the United

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States will need 13,500,000 more jobs in the Sixties merely to keep abreast of the expected growth of the labor force."[8]

There are, of course, answers to the projected dilemma, such as the retraining and upgrading of labor and the shortening of working hours for the same pay, or even price reductions leading to a larger consumers' demand and therewith to increased production and employment. But because all workers are affected by cybernation, Michael feels that such proposals will not solve the problem. His own suggestion is a large public works program, for "although the proportion of workers needed for any particular task will be reduced through the use of cybernation, the total number of tasks that need to be done could equal or exceed the absolute number of people available to do them."[9] He thinks, however, that such a policy would run counter to the capitalist spirit. It may, therefore, be self-defeating for free enterprise to encourage cybernation.

While the consequences of cybernation may endanger the free enterprise system, the very continuance of this system compels increased cybernation. Michael sees the dilemma clearly: while the outlook is unfavorable *with* cybernation, it is just as bad *without* it. He sees only a partial solution in greater government control and national planning. Ideology and goals must change, and a required centralization of authority "would seem to imply a governing élite and a popular acceptance of such an élite." If newly evolving behavioral standards do not complement the cybernated future, frustration and pointlessness "may well evoke a war of desperation—ostensibly against some external enemy but, in fact, a war to make the world safe for human beings by destroying most of society's sophisticated technological base."[10] Obviously, it would be a war in which the sophisticated technology would serve to destroy most of mankind.

IV

"NOTHING IS EATEN AS HOT AS WHEN IT IS COOKED," as the saying goes. Although it now appears that cybernation may be the end of us, some hope remains precisely because of its possible incompatibility with the capitalist system. If this system were to be changed, the curse of cybernation might well turn into a blessing. It has also occurred to Michael that the social system might be altered, but only to fit it to the facts of cybernation. Because an answer "must be found elsewhere than in a moratorium on its development," he thinks that cybernation itself will determine what the answers will be. And this explains the pessimistic undertone of his report, which ends with the sad statement that the persistence of prevailing social attitudes is "driving us more and more inexorably into a contradictory world run by (and for?) ever more intelligent, ever more versatile slaves."[11]

Marx's fetishistic world of capital production is here narrowed down to the fetishism of technology. But both technological development and capital formation correspond to underlying social relationships and may be altered by charging these relationships. Moreover, while cybernation enhances capital development it is also limited by capital-labor relations. This is a familiar phenomenon; monopolization, for instance, is both an instrument of capital expansion and of capital contraction and the drive for profits reduces the profitability of any given amount of capital. Without going into these rather intricate matters it should be clear that any

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prognosis with regard to the cybernation process must, first of all, raise the question as to how far this process is supportable by the existing economy. What is feasible technically may not be economically; and what may be feasible economically may not be socially. But this question is hardly ever raised, apparently on the assumption that capitalism has no inherent limits.

Such an assumption is justified by past developments. Even Lenin said that unless it is overthrown by political means, there is always a way out for capitalism. But this was before cybernation and the hydrogen bomb. Among various reasons for declaring capitalism the exclusive "open society" with an unlimited range of possibilities was the lack of relevant information. This lack still persists but no longer to the extent of total ignorance. Some economists begin to see society and its economy in flux and in real, instead of in symbolic, terms.

At the same time that Michael's report on cybernation appeared Simon Kuznets's *Capital in the American Economy*[12] was published. This work is of interest here because of Kuznets's attempt to assay prospects for the next 25 years on the basis of past trends in population, national product, and in the formation and financing of capital. Where Michael's emphasis is on technology, Kuznets's is on economics. The latter distinguishes between potential and actual technological change. Although the "concept of potential technological change is difficult to define precisely, let alone measure," Kuznets writes, "it is extremely useful, for it points to the fact that of the large flow of technological change offered, as it were, to society, only a part is embodied in the productive structure, mainly because of limitations of capital and of entrepreneurial ability."[13]

Kuznets thinks, however, that the next three decades will witness an acceleration of the rate of technological change mainly because of a quickening in the pace of scientific research. It seems certain, he says, "that the development of nonmilitary applications to nuclear physics, of electronics in automation and communications will have an immense impact upon the productive system."[14] All this will give momentum to the demand for capital funds and Kuznets thinks it not unlikely that the new technology—at any rate initially—will require capital in an amount that can be brought forth only at the expense of the national product. In other words, installation of the new technology may require a larger part of total production for new material capital equipment and leave a correspondingly smaller part for immediate utilization and consumption.

So it has always been in the ascertainable past under conditions of rapid capital formation. And even though the material requirements of capital formation may be more formidable for the second industrial revolution than they have been for the first, they may be attainable, nevertheless. The more so as the new technology may, eventually, demand a smaller amount of capital to yield a greater product than has been true for the "conventional" technology. But new capital investments must be financed. The question is, then, "whether the savings patterns in the private sector [of the economy] suggest savings proportions that will match the prospective demand for capital."

The concern is with the private sector of the economy alone, for "the government sector is not likely to have net savings in the long term

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prospect. Indeed, it may be forced to draw upon the savings of the private sector."[15] Because of an actual decline of the private sector's savings propensity, Kuznets thinks that the previously experienced "pressure of the demand for goods upon the supply of savings will persist." He suggests, cautiously, that "during the 1948–1957 decade a combination of high-level demand for consumers goods and continued high levels of government drafts for current consumption might have kept private savings and capital formation below the proportion required to increase productivity sufficiently to offset inflationary pressures."[16] Against this background, and in view of an expected growth of the non-productive population, rising government expenditures, and continued high levels of consumption, Kuznets fears that the supply of voluntary savings may not be adequate to the demand, for which reason "inflationary pressures may well continue, with the result that part of the savings needed for capital formation and government consumption will be extracted through this particular mechanism."[17]

This "particular mechanism" reduces total social consuming power to less than what it might have been were it absent, and the difference raises the profitability of capital and thereby the rate of its accumulation. This type of "forced savings" may, or may not, yield the capital required to increase productivity to the point where the demand for both goods and capital is fully matched by their supply—thus ending the inflationary pressure. The fact of inflation itself, however, indicates real difficulties in raising the rate of capital formation, which may—at least to some extent—arrest the cybernation process.

V

WHILE A LACK OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL may hamper cybernation, the same lack is also its raison d'etre. The expected rise of profitability is supposed to lead to an extension of production sufficiently large to compensate for the technological displacement of labor. This is the idea behind the argument that all technological advancement, sooner or later, creates new and additional work opportunities. It is usually illustrated with reference to definite enterprises and particular situations as, for example, by Ritchie Calder, who pointed out that "in France the state-controlled Renault Company was able to undertake, after the war, the most intensive automation of any automobile factory in Europe," in consequence of which "three times as many workers are employed now as there were before the introduction of automation." Calder thinks that this is "a good example of the repercussive effects of modern technology."[18]

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For the Renault Company this is no doubt true, at any rate for the time being. And it may well be true for many, or even all enterprises, in the expanding West European economy which has been experiencing the same process of growth that—for a variety of reasons—occurred in America a few decades earlier. But, while the rate of capital formation is now higher in Western Europe than in America, there is no guarantee that it will remain so indefinitely. Judging by past experiences, prosperity makes room for depression, and judging by more recent experiences, periods of expansion alternate with periods of stagnation, i.e., periods characterized by insufficient capital formation. Obviously, the effects of automation will be different under conditions of capital expansion than under conditions of capital stagnation. The present American situation may be, therefore, just as much "an example of the repercussive effects of modern technology" as Calder's experience with the Renault Company, or even with the whole of the West European economy.

As long as production expands and markets extend, increased automation may be accompanied by full employment. Automation may also lead to larger production and new markets despite growing unemployment. The application of automation may also require the elimination of what is called "excessive demand," i.e., wages supported by full employment which restrict the profitability of capital. It all depends on the particular situation in which an enterprise, a country, or a combination of nations find themselves. For this is a competitive world with changing opportunities. Presently, Western Europe automates with a rising, and the United States with a declining, labor force. In theory, this picture may be reversed when America arrives at a higher rate of capital formation and Europe reaches the limits of her profitable capital expansion. Or, what is more likely, here, too, Western Europe may come to emulate the United States and cybernate itself into increasing unemployment. At any rate, we may as well stick to the American scene, for as long as the West European economy does not basically differ from the American, it is bound to share the latter's difficulties with regard to cybernation and capital formation.

This is not true for the Eastern power bloc, or for economically underdeveloped nations. Although it has been asserted from time to time that backward countries "have the advantage of being able to adapt the latest equipment without having to scrap existing equipment and without being handicapped by the existence of obsolete buildings,"[19] such an advantage does not really exist. The slowly increasing industrialization of underdeveloped countries rather widens the productivity gap between "rich" and "poor" countries for the very reason that developed nations enjoy the advantages of automation. It is true, of course, that automation finds application also in underdeveloped countries—in some extractive industries, for instance—but here it supports foreign capital rather than native development. Technological development in underdeveloped nations presupposes basic social changes which are only now beginning to determine their political movements.

In the developed nations of the Eastern power bloc, as in capitalist nations generally, automation is limited by the availability of the capital necessary to install it. In distinction to the competitive Western economies, however, the centralized economies of Russia and her satellites do

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not seem to fear the consequences of cybernation. Their productivity and total production are still below those of Western nations, and automation, to the degree possible under these conditions, could not lead to large-scale unemployment. Their problem is rather how to decrease human labor by a more productive capital structure. Roughly half of Russia's population, for instance, is still engaged in agriculture and—in view of the size of the country and its population—there exists a general lack of means of production, not to speak of consumers' durables or even plain consumer goods. To be sure, there also exist highly automated industries but not as yet to an extent where they can raise the social average productivity to the level of that prevailing in the West.

In principle, of course, the centralized nature of Russian capitalism allows for a wider application of cybernetics to social and production processes than is possible in the Western economies. And this, in turn, promises a quickening of automation concurrent with the general rise of productivity. Economic planning, for example, is one of the most important areas of application of cybernetics. But while in the competitive economies "planning" implies "counter-planning," in the centralized economies planning may be unitary, nation-wide, and all-comprehensive. This is why many of the Western advocates of abundance by way of cybernation emphasize the need for national planning of both production and distribution. But by this token, the Western economies would cease being capitalist economies in the traditional sense.



VI

THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IS THOUGHT TO BE "affluent" because its living standards are higher than anywhere else. They are higher because of greater productivity. Compared with scarcity economies, it is an economy of "abundance"—but only in a relative, not in an absolute sense—for, generally, even in America no one's needs are satiated. Everybody wishes for more, if not for necessities, then for luxuries. The richer the people, the greater their wants, for security lies only in accumulation. The only real defense of well-being is greater well-being; to stay affluent, affluency must be constantly increased. But here we speak only of the capitalist class; for the majority of the population, apparent luxuries have become necessities, and for a large minority many necessities are still luxuries.

That this economy of "abundance" is simultaneously an economy of scarcity is indicated by the frantic efforts to raise the profitability of capital and to increase the rate of economic growth. But what is scarce in view of the always larger national product? The answer is obvious when the economy is recognized for what it is—a vehicle for production of profit. Production of commodities is merely the necessary medium for pro-

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duction of profits and the continuation of this process requires the accumulation of capital. Success or failure cannot be measured in terms of an abundance or a lack of commodities; they are revealed by the rate of capital formation which indicates the rate of profitability.

Most critics and well-wishers of the "affluent society" tend to disregard the nature of capitalism, i.e., the production of capital, even when they recognize its profit motive. They consider the profit incentive an instrument of production which has no other end than consumption. As this end can also be served by direct government decisions affecting the production process, they think that both these instrumentalities complement one another. And so it seems sheer stupidity to live in a society of abundance as if it were an economy of scarcity. It is, of course, beyond all reason and therefore difficult to understand that while surpluses of all kinds are rotting away for want of use, the economic emphasis should still be on more production by way of cybernation. It appears equally irrational that the "horn of plenty" is not utilized to liberate people from overwork, or to supply those who can no longer find work with decent living conditions.

In a capitalist economy of the Russian type, direct decisions (supposedly affecting the whole of society) are made with regard to the rate of expansion and the character of the material capital structure. Decisions are based on experience and if they go wrong they are rectified by new experience. Tempo and extent of industrial automation are determined by the available accumulation fund and the replacement requirements of the existing productive apparatus. This fund is known in a general way; it can be made smaller or larger in accordance with the decisions affecting the consumption fund. Although expressed in money terms, behind the monetary quantities are the arranged real relations of production, accumulation, and consumption.

In theory, and excluding natural and political catastrophes, the introduction and extension of cybernation could be an orderly process. Production could be increased to the point of abundance and labor time could be shortened, or both processes could be attended to simultaneously and thus slowed down. In practice, this is not possible given the fact that Russia is part of the world economy and competes with other nations striving for political and economic supremacy. But even though production and consumption cannot be geared to actual social needs exclusively, they are nonetheless subject to an over-all centralized control which also extends over the modifications necessitated by national competition. In brief, though subject to the vicissitudes of world politics which may alter or shatter all plans, Russia remains a state-controlled economy in so far as the internal scene is not affected by external occurrences. This is analogous to the single enterprise's strict capitalist rationality within the anarchic laissez-faire system.

It is different with the "mixed economy" of the United States. Responsibility for the state of society lies in the hands of government; private enterprise is responsible only to itself, i.e., to the profitability of the capital invested in it. There was a time when the government's responsibilities were overwhelmingly political and economic only in the sense of its support of private capital. But now it is the main function of government to secure economic and social stability. This implies in-

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terventions in the economy to counteract the cyclical movement from prosperity to depression and to avoid large-scale unemployment through government expenditures on welfare, public works, subsidies, armaments, and the expansion of government itself. The economic role of government divides the whole of the economy into a "public sector" and a "private sector."

To speak of the American economy as a two-sector economy is to speak in abstract terms. In reality, it is just one economy in which government intervenes with fiscal and monetary means. Although the government owns much real estate, a considerable amount of capital equipment, and employs a great number of workers in all kinds of occupations, it does not compete with private capital. Its considerations may be economic but they are not bound to the principle of profitability. Its enterprises do not end up in bankruptcies even though they may be discontinued when superfluous or for lack of efficiency. No matter how self supporting, or even profitable, some government undertakings are, government still requires an increasingly larger portion of the privately produced national product. The private sector differs from the public sector in that the former is profitable and expands on its own accord while the latter is non-profitable and expands at the expense of the private sector. When the private sector grows faster than the public sector, the profitability of private capital may not be affected. It is otherwise when the public sector experiences more rapid growth.

It can be argued that the government enters the economic sphere only when private capital begins to slacken and for that reason its profitability remains unaffected, for business would not be any better without government interventions. This may well be so. However, though government interference consists in putting idle resources to work, the funds for that end are themselves extracted from the private sector by way of inflation, taxation, borrowings, and deficit-financing which increases the national debt. The greater national product brought forth in this manner does not imply larger but smaller profits on the existing private capital, for it is this capital which must yield the taxes necessary to cover government created demand and to finance interest on the national debt.

Within recent decades the increased volume of government expenditures in America has involved a rising ratio of taxes to national product, and the increase of the federal debt from $16 billion at the end of 1930 to $297.7 billion at the beginning of 1962. Thus far, however, the expanding role of government, whose tax take is now about a quarter of the national product, has not led to a deceleration of the rate of overall economic growth. But neither has this rate been accelerated, even though acceleration is a pre-condition for the maintenance of a given rate of profit. Stagnation and the persistence of inflation point to the difficulty of satisfying both profitable capital formation and the growing needs of government.

Since 1955 there has been no significant expansion of capital, but because government expenditures have also remained static, the ensuing decline of profitability could be covered up by false, inflationary gains. Lack of profitability can only be overcome by an increase in productivity. A mere increase in production will not do. American industry as a whole produces close to 20 per cent below capacity. It could increase

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production by almost one-fifth without additional capital equipment and without exhausting the labor supply. To that extent it could at once decrease the government share of the total national product. But this unused capacity is considered obsolete because it is not competitive and therefore not profitable.

VII

AUTOMATION IN A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY means unemployment if Michael's prognosis is right. The process may be slowed down by a lack of savings if recent tendencies in this respect, as noted by Kuznets, should prevail. There is also the hope for new markets large enough to increase the number of employed despite automation, as has been true for some industries and even for some nations. But with industrialization fostered to some extent almost everywhere, with the return of Europe's competitive ability, and with the relative economic isolation of the Eastern power bloc, it cannot really be expected that greater productivity of American industry by way of automation will lead to significant enlargements of markets. Automation will go on and unemployment will grow though perhaps at a slower rate than the possible rate of technological change. The responsibilities of government will grow correspondingly.



In 1961, tax collections by all governments in the United States—federal, state, and local—amounted to $143.6 billion, or 27.6 per cent of total national product. Government expenditures, in the same year, amounted to $149.8 billion, of which $41.2 billion went for unemployment and social welfare spending. A doubling of unemployment with its accompaniment of general misery could roughly double this sum. To that extent, profitability gained by greater productivity would be diminished. The same would be true if government expenditures for armaments, or for any other desired and politically feasible purpose could suddenly be doubled. To be sure, automation would also cheapen the products falling to government and to that extent again ease the burden of private capital. Yet this may be offset by a faster extension of government demands on the private sector of the economy.

But this, by itself, will rather hasten than hinder the automation process. As on all previous occasions of "national emergencies," the required increase in production and productivity will be brought about by government through more inflation, new borrowings, higher taxes and, perhaps, by simply commandeering the necessary improvements and enlargements of the productive apparatus. For the only real limits of production are always the actually existing productive resources. By disregarding the profitability of existing capital—if only temporarily—it is

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always possible to enlarge production beyond that level which suits private capital best, i.e., which is at any particular time the most profitable.

However, on its own accord, too, private capital will always try to increase its productivity in search for extra profits, or just to maintain a given profitability. No matter what the social consequences of cybernation, if it helps the single firm or corporation, it will be utilized. A declining rate of savings will not stop the cybernation process of corporations with sufficient reserves to finance their technological innovations. While the value of their capital may remain the same, their productivity will have been enhanced. But if this, in turn, does not lead to the enlargement of capital, the process has not been productive in a capitalist sense, because capital must lead, via the production process, to even larger capital. There must be net investments to speak of capital formation. Without net investments, i.e., investments over and above capital replacement through use and obsolescence, production has increased at the expense of accumulation. Permanently undistributed profits are no profits and production without accumulation has not produced capital. The absence or low rate of net capital investments, although not necessarily halting the increase of production and productivity, involves the displacement of labor which could have been avoided, at least to some extent, by a rapid capital formation in conjunction with cybernation.

It can be said, of course, that undistributed profits are a sign of super-profits and leave the shareholders' personal incomes unimpaired. This is largely true, as indicated by the existing "affluency" in the sphere of consumption. However, the apparent "super-profits" are such only by virtue of government created demand. They merely illustrate the fact that government favors big business. Subsidies through government contracts and a higher productivity combined with price stability or even price increases allow for reserves of undistributed profits that find their way into more automation. Even so, the fact that there is not a sufficient rate of net investments shows that this is done at the expense of less privileged enterprises and of society as a whole.

All enterprises, whether small or big, clamor for lower taxes and higher depreciation quotas to increase their productivity and competitive ability through technological improvements. Automation speeds up obsolescence and smaller businesses, unable to introduce automatic machinery quickly enough, fall by the wayside. Thus cybernation is at the same time a capital concentration process—or, rather, it accentuates the concentration process inherent in capital competition. Capital concentration itself demands, and allows for, further extensions of automation. Short of an always increasing rate of capital formation, unemployment must grow. As the probability of such a rate is extremely low, the increase of profitability by way of cybernation may well be nullified, or at any rate significantly diminished, by the simultaneous and unavoidable increase of government expenditures to cope with cybernation's social consequences.

This may not be so, however, if the social conditions of the near future discourage both the growth of cybernation and that of the "public sector" of the economy—in other words, if society, by and large, "freezes" existing social conditions. But to do so necessitates a centralized control over the whole of the economy and all its various aspects which the gov-

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ernment does not possess. If it had this control, it would no longer preside over a free-enterprise economy. Aside from internal difficulties of a static society, its external relations preclude the maintenance of the economic *status quo*. For automation, it is said, must overcome foreign wage advantages by enhancing America's productivity. But America must compete not only in the economic sphere but also in the military, and here weapons production already depends to a very large degree on automation technology.

Still, the process and the consequences of cybernation may not be so dramatic as Michael envisions. Many enterprises that would like to automate may not be able to do so without necessarily ceasing to exist. Subsidies may be extended to these businesses such as have been granted to sections of agriculture. This is not less likely than, or different in principle from, sustaining the unemployed out of current production. In this way, part of private enterprise (in its technologically backward form) may become a part of the "public sector" of the economy. This has long been true for sections of big business. Unless the latter's privileges, such as goverment contracts, tax exemptions, and extraordinary depreciation charges are cut back, the shrinking profitable sector of the economy will have to give up a still larger share of its profits to the public sector. This would reach its "logical" end when the demands of government exceed the profit sharing capacity of private enterprise.

The actual course of developments, however, determined as it is by the interaction of diverse and contrary interests, is rarely, if ever, "logical." It may be both logically and economically possible to have a highly cybernated industry with, say, 20 million unemployed—yet, in practice this is quite improbable. Unless suppressed by terroristic measures, there would arise social movements to change this situation, either by altering the nature of society, or by varying the relationship between production and employment. Similarly, the accentuation of capital concentration by way of cybernation would most likely bring political forces into play which might well arrest this development. Against real necessities, fetishistic attitudes toward the production system and its technology will lose their sway, and people will try to change the social structure rather than accommodate themselves to it indefinitely. In the end, the question of cybernation in its degree of application will be resolved by political actions regardless of what, from the economic or technological point of view, is "logical."

But even on purely economic grounds, cybernation finds its limits where it begins to contradict the profitability of capital. Its full development would be a very long process, at any rate, as it requires the displacement of the whole existing production equipment. To throw out the whole of capital based on an old technology is to throw out the congealed labor of generations necessary for current production. To create the capital of a radically new technology also requires the work of generations. Cybernation can only be applied in piecemeal fashion regardless of the nature of society, but in capitalism it is doubly hindered because it can be applied only insofar as it safeguards and promotes the growth of existing capital. In some industries, chemicals for instance, automation has raised capital equipment per production worker five and even ten fold. Even if not all industries are able to automate to the

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same extent, capital investment per production worker is bound to rise and it will be this enlarged capital on which profits will be measured. If they are not equivalent to the new capital structure, there is no incentive for further automation. This will not stop specific industries and corporations from raising their productivity to gain competitive advantages, but as their profitability, too, is finally determined by that of society as a whole, their competitive advantages may still not insure their profitability.

Taking past developments into consideration, and judging present conditions realistically, the future of cybernation seems not at all promising except, perhaps, for selected industries, particularly those engaged in the production of armaments. Where entirely new installations are required that involve the application of the new sciences of nuclear physics, electronics, and cybernetics, these installations may, from the very start, and regardless of cost, exhibit the full meaning of cybernation. Indeed, it has been said that "those miraculous machines in which cybernetics could develop all its resources seem to be usable only as engines of death."[20]

VIII

One method of dealing with increased productivity by way of cybernation would be to cut the number of hours of work and provide people with more leisure time. Almost uniformly, however, this method is questioned or totally rejected not because of its opposition to the capitalist mechanism, but because society has "failed to develop meaningful leisure." Boredom is considered a very serious and even dangerous problem because "it still remains true that the happy man is very often the one who has insufficient time to worry about whether he is happy or not."[21] All sorts of crimes and delinquencies are attributed to increased leisure, which, then, must first be "organized" by competent authorities before it can be granted.

This silly and insincere talk can be dismissed at once. The leisure class has always found the leisure of the lower classes obnoxious and dangerous to its own leisure. Looking at the wonders of the first industrial revolution, Delacroix mused about the "poor abused people, [who] will not find happiness in the disappearance of labor. Look at these idlers condemned to drag the burden of their days and not knowing what to do with their time, which the machines cut into still further."[22] Yet, leisure is precisely what the majority of people need most and have the least of—that is, leisure without wants. The leisure of the starving, or the needy, is no leisure at all but a relentless activity aimed at staying alive or improving their situation. Without greater leisure there can be no betterment of the human condition.

This whole question cannot even arise under prevailing conditions. As an exception to the rule, and aided by special circumstances, one or another laboring group may succeed in cutting down its working time without diminishing its income. But to cut down working hours generally and maintain the same wage bill would turn cybernation into a senseless affair as far as the capitalists are concerned. The point of cybernation is precisely to reduce wage costs relative to overall costs of the "factors of production" and to recoup the higher capital costs by greater productivity. To be sure, real wages have increased and working hours

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have been cut, but always at a rate below that of the increasing productivity. Otherwise there would have been no capital formation. Theoretically, there is no reason why this process should not continue by way of cybernation. That it does not do so, in practice, is manifested by the low rate of capital formation and the fact that the decline of the labor force is not only relative to the mass of capital but also absolute.

It can be argued, of course, that there is no longer a need for extensive capital formation and that mere replacement and modernization of the existing productive apparatus suffices to satisfy all social needs. Any increase in productivity could then immediately be translated into higher wages, shorter hours, or both. While this is possible, it is *not* possible within the capitalist system, and those who seriously propose this solution must be prepared to change the system.

The capitalist "solution" to the problem of cybernation is to be found not in higher wages and a shorter work week for the laboring population but in higher profitability expressed in increased capital. If all these things coincide, so much the better; if not, capital will try to secure its profitability at the expense of labor. Each entrepreneur, or corporation, employs the minimum of labor relative to capital investment; each, of course, tries to increase this minimum by a correspondingly larger investment. They are interested—economically speaking—not in a larger or smaller labor force but in that labor force which proves most profitable. They are not, and cannot, be concerned with the national labor force; the unemployed are the government's responsibility, although it can sustain them only with funds extracted from the whole of society. To contribute least to this fund is thus another objective of the entrepreneur or the corporation.

Because society—with respect to production—is composed of numerous independently operating and competing enterprises, each following the dictates of profitability, there is no way of sharing the available work between the total labor force. There will be overwork for some, unemployment for others. Not only the employers but the more fortunate workers, too, will insist on working hours yielding wages adequate to their accustomed mode of living. Instead of shorter hours there will be growing unemployment, and the costs of unemployment must be paid by the employed. For, in the "last analysis," the total social product is divided between the owners of capital and the productive population, no matter how the owners, or controllers, of capital redivide, or are forced to redivide, their share for purposes of accumulation and the sustenance of the non-productive population. What falls to the unemployed must be subtracted from the total share falling to capital, and what falls to the unemployed cannot be given to the employed, thereby restricting, to that extent, any possible wage increases.

While wages do not rise significantly under conditions of growing unemployment, social pressures and rising productivity may prevent them from falling. If they could be lowered under conditions of rising productivity, the profitability of capital could expand at a faster rate—provided, of course, that markets would grow simultaneously, which is not necessarily the case. All that this implies—from the viewpoint of society as a whole—is that less is consumed and more is "saved," i.e., capital accumulates. To channel increased production via increased productivity into

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government created demand such as armaments and space programs would have an opposite effect, as it would increase "consumption" at the expense of "savings." This is not "consumption" in the ordinary sense, of course, but it has the same effect nevertheless. The government —being a government of private enterprise—in order not to destroy the marketability of private production any faster than has been done already, prefers to "consume" the increased production in the form of waste, rationalized as "national defense" or "scientific exploration."

Living standards already reached are difficult to undo. Except under conditions of actual warfare, any general attempt to reduce incomes to a previously existing level may lead to social strife, which, in turn, may nullify any gains made in this direction. Moreover, today's sensitive economic conditions, the dislocations of industrial production associated with a decisive shift from consumption goods to capital goods may be more detrimental to social stability than capital stagnation. This is one reason for choosing the more subtle method of gradual inflation to reduce consumption in the ordinary sense in order to "consume" more in the extraordinary sense, and yet secure the profitability of private capital.

IN SUMMARY, IT MAY BE SAID that an extensive cybernation of production seems unlikely for the very reason which makes it so attractive to capital, i.e., the prevailing insufficiency of profitability and the consequent low rate of economic growth. But even a vast increase of cybernation would lead not to an increase of consumption—to general abundance—but to an increase in waste production, the misery of unemployment, and the slow but inevitable transformation of the "mixed economy" into a state capitalist system. Meanwhile, just as underdeveloped countries live in anxiety because they are neither able to manage under the old semi-feudal conditions nor capable of entering into capitalist industrialization, so developed capitalist nations, too, live in anxiety, unable to manage under their system of production and incapable of changing their social structure to the extent necessary for a full unfolding of the social forces of production and the progressive abolition of labor.

FOOTNOTES

1 Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, New York, 1954, p. 162.
2 *Calling all Jobs*, National Association of Manufacturers, New York, October, 1957, p. 21.
3 W. H. Ferry, *Caught on the Horn of Plenty*, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, January, 1962, p. 1.
4 *The New York Times*, February 16, 1962.
5 *Cybernation: The Silent Conquest*, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1962.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
7 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
8 *The New York Times*, April 6, 1961, p. 18.
9 D. N. Michael, *Cybernation*, p. 26.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 46.
11 *Ibid.*
12 National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton, 1961.
13 S. Kuznets, *Capital in the American Economy*, p. 442.
14 *Ibid.*, p. 443.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 453.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 457.
17 *Ibid.*, p. 460.
18 Ritchie Calder, *Technology: Europe's Needs and Resources*, New York, 1961, p. 789.
19 P. Einzig, *The Economic Consequences of Automation*, New York, 1957, p. 65.
20 P. de Latie, *Thinking by Machine*, Boston, 1957, p. 284.
21 R. Theobald, *The Challenge of Abundance*, New York, 1962, p. 86.
22 *The Journal of Eugene Delacroix*, New York, 1961, p. 512.

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David Ball and Jeremy Larner

An Interview

The Mind of an Angolese Revolutionary

Introduction

AN AMERICAN STUDYING IN PARIS is soon made uncomfortably aware that the most intelligent and active of his fellow-students are all Marxists of one kind or another. But it is in his contacts with foreign students from underdeveloped nations that the American is particularly impressed both by the pervasive influence of revolutionary organizations and by a certain way of looking at the world situation which is shared by nearly every student he meets from North Africa, India, Angola, Guinea, Ghana, Latin America, etc. At the heart of this attitude is the most crucial question in world politics today—the question of whether underdeveloped countries can be effectively liberated and industrialized through social democratic reforms. The foreign student often answers this question in the negative; he feels from personal experience that nothing short of revolution is required. As he explains his position, he invariably refers to the values and assumptions of Communist propaganda. Yet his loyalty belongs to the movement in his own country, and not to the Internationale—and the ideology he is trying to construct uses Russian doctrine only as a point of departure. The resulting world-view does not vary much from student to student; and as the American listens, and reflects that from among these voices will come the political leaders of the future in Africa, Asia, and South America, he is seized by the urgent, almost panicky apprehension that the United States, through its inability to recognize the import of their grievances, is cutting itself off from a large, increasingly hostile group of fast-changing nations.

The following interview is the result of many conversations with a 24-year-old Angolese who is in his second year at one of the great Parisian Science Faculties. This student is one of the very few Angolese Negroes who is

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able to pursue his studies on the University level; as such, he has been active in the clandestine groups recently formed in Angola for the revolutionary training of future generations. His main concerns are not political, however, and he does not claim to be exceptionally well-informed about the world. "I have no ambition to be a Leader of the People," he told us; "all I want is to be a specialized worker in my own country." But in three years he will be a licensed engineer, and whether he desires it or not, that fact alone makes him a member of the future governing class of Angola; for there will be very few engineers.

The interview took place in French, which the young man speaks fluently. With allowance for the displacements inevitably connected with translations, the interviewers have chosen to let the dialogue stand exactly as recorded. We have refrained from checking facts or tightening theories on the ground that whatever misconceptions appeared were far more significant than any artificial consistency we might afterwards impose. In fact, it is noteworthy that the young man makes no particular virtue of consistency—for example, he openly applies quite different and more lenient standards to imperialism in Hungary and Tibet than he does to imperialism in Angola, Algeria and Cuba. Nor does he feel obliged to supply an air-tight logic for his ideology. He makes no bones about rummaging among political facts and ideas and choosing only those he needs; for his basic passion comes directly from his experience, and he knows that it is this unshakable quality that must make people sit up and listen when he describes the world he lives in.

DAVID BALL
JEREMY LARNER

The Interview

The Angolese student:

I want to tell you something about conditions in Angola. Angola is one of the richest countries in Africa, if not in the world: it has fertile soil, a good climate, minerals, diamonds, gold, a long coast with good natural harbors . . . Yet the life-span of the average Angolese Negro is 28 years. The Portuguese force the Negroes to grow cotton and coffee for Portuguese companies instead of food for their families. Almost all the land is owned by a handful of rich Portuguese, who often do not live there themselves. Or else it is owned by the Portuguese Catholic Church. Each day the workers are taken out to the plantations in truckloads; they work under a boss who has been paid to deliver them, paid by the head. The boss in turn pays the workers less than $1 a day; if they protest, they are beaten, not secretly, but out in the open, as you would beat a slave. The workers' wives stay in the villages while the workers work the plantations, but the women, too, must cultivate a crop, at norms fixed by the controllers. If a woman does not work hard enough to please them, she is thrown down on the ground and beaten until the blood flows.

Almost all the Angolese Negroes are illiterate; in theory many go to Church schools, but the education is such that just about nobody is able to pass the basic exams for entering high school. It was found that the Church schools use the children to work the Church farms all day, and teach them nothing but the catechism. Child-labor is common in

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Angola, and it is not unusual to see a coffee-plantation boss kick a child who he thinks is not working well.

A few months ago, there was an article on the Angolan War in *Temoinage Chrétien* (a French left-wing Catholic magazine). The article was called, *The Angolese Revolution: A Revolt of Slaves.* That's exactly what it is.

When the Angolese people asked for independence, they were told that they were Portuguese, just like anyone else—which has some truth in it, if you look at the condition of workers and farmers in Portugal. Still, in Angola there is enforced a legal distinction between "natives" and "assimilated" Negroes—in practice, between outright slaves and those with minor freedoms.

One of the Angolese Independence Movements wanted, and still wants, to set up a separate state in which there will be equality of all people, regardless of race or origin. They gave a choice to the Portuguese settlers: either join us, remain neutral, or leave. Then guerilla troops began to arm. They had some quick successes to begin with, in fact seized a number of villages and got close to Luanda. But look, we have no air-force, no artillery, no bombs, sometimes even no guns—so that when the Portuguese troops arrived fully armed with machine-guns, automatic rifles and American-made jet planes, the villages that were "won" had to be evacuated. The Portuguese method of re-taking a village is very simple: you burn it with napalm, so that all the inhabitants are burned alive. Or—as the French have done many times in Algeria—a village "suspected of rebel tendencies" will be burned, and as the people run from the fire they will be machine-gunned: men, women, children, everybody. So the rebels began to leave the villages and take to the brush. (Brush is high grass, which often reaches a height of eight feet, and covers a large part of Angola.) Over 40,000 refugees are now living in mud huts across the Congo border; they walked hundreds of miles, wounded and sick, to escape, and are now sicker and hungrier than they were before. But now that the rainy season is coming on, they are starting to fight again. In the rainy season, you can fight: the Portuguese tanks get stuck in the mud, and the brush covers you. And so we start again, those of us that are left and can walk. And you know the Portuguese claim the rebellion is inspired by foreign agents, who have subverted a basically loyal people!

You can get an idea of the determination of the rebels when you realize, not only that over 35,000 have been killed already—as against 1,000 Portuguese—but that this was no more than we expected. We had before us the example of the French in Algeria, where napalm was also used, and torture, and the same way of cleaning out villages. The Angolese have no reason to expect to get off any lighter than the Algerians, who so far have had 500,000 killed out of a population of 6,000,000, not counting those Moslems who are beginning to be killed now in Paris and other parts of France. By the way, I have seen photographs of whole Algerian villages where the people lie roasted like rows of sausages. And the French still speak of *le rayonnement de la culture française* and say contemptuously that before they negotiate, the FLN will have to leave their knives in the corridor!

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At the very beginning, however, our movement came out with a pronouncement against random killing and terror, as the FLN and the Mau Mau have practiced it. Though I must say, the Angolese can understand the feelings of the terrorists.

QUESTION: *Would you kill a baby—as the Mau Mau have done?*

I don't know what I would do. But I can understand doing it. Maybe I would, if I thought he was going to grow up just like his father, to exploit and murder my people.

QUESTION: *Doesn't that amount to condoning genocide?*

Anyone who can accuse the *rebels* of genocide has a badly twisted mind! The Portuguese are already guilty of genocide. They have been killing millions of my countrymen for generations—centuries—through malnutrition, disease, slavery. The slave trade alone reduced the population of Angola from 12 million two centuries ago to 4 million now. And remember that Angola is not naturally a poor country; like many African nations we are rich in resources. But the colonialists have milked us in the classic tradition of the *conquistadors,* thinking only of what they could get out of us.

QUESTION: *Can't the educated Angolese do anything about this peacefully? Don't they have any influence with the Portuguese?*

What educated Angolese?—*Negro* Angolese? Such as they are, they have been arrested. My brother, for example, who is a journalist, has disappeared. We think he has been arrested and taken to Portugal. Once before he was arrested, but that time he was released; this time he just disappeared. That's what the word "arrest" means in Angola—and in Portugal.

You know, you in America seem to see these colonial revolutions as steps in the march of world communism, directed by Russia or China. To me, a revolution is the attempt of a people to get rid of its Western exploiters and reach a decent standard of living. That's what happened in China, Indochina, and all the other places—what is happening today in Laos and Algeria and Angola—all the same kind of thing. I read an article in *L'Express* last summer where a U.N. economic expert said that in the Chinese revolution the Nationalists had the U.S.A. for an ally, and the Communists had hunger—and hunger won. Sooner or later, hunger always wins. . . .

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QUESTION: *Why do the colonial powers react negatively and destructively to native demands?*

Don't be naive! [Gesture of extending hand, rubbing thumb and forefinger together.] *Money!* Money in the form of markets and raw materials. For Portugal, Angola is simply a source of material wealth to be taken out of the country in the form of coffee, copper, diamonds, etc. In Cuba, it was sugar. In Algeria, oil.

QUESTION: *But couldn't the Western powers accede to native demands and still benefit from the resources?*

Sure. That's what the Belgians did in the Congo—at least in Katanga—and what the French are trying to do in certain parts of Africa—Senegal, Dahomey, and to a great extent Tunisia and Morocco. When this happens the new nation simply continues to follow the economic dictates of the colonial power, because European "advisers" remain to direct things, European engineers continue to control the mineral resources, European companies own the transportation, the telephones, etc. And at the same time the Europeans develop a new class, a native bourgeoisie who replace the ruling whites—but run things exactly as they were run before. Moise Tshombe is the number one example of this kind of "native leader." And look, in Cuba before Castro not only were the main Cuban industries—sugar, fruit and so forth—owned by Americans, but the profits from running the only *telephones* in the country went to the United States. Yet Cuba was considered to be an "independent country"! Unfortunately, a number of African nations—particularly those in the French community—are suffering that kind of "independence." . . .

QUESTION: *But does any of this justify the natives going Communist?*

[*Laugh*] What we want is national independence and an equitable distribution of the wealth of the country—we want our wealth to be distributed among the people according to their needs. We want our country to be developed in a *planned* way, with our government making and controlling the plan. That's the only way a nation's resources *can* be developed—unless you wait a few hundred years! Production of all kinds must be co-ordinated, organized and planned in the most efficient way—this means central planning. Especially we must have agrarian reform—so that the farmers will own their own land, and not the Portuguese coffee companies or the American fruit companies.

If all of this is "Communism"—then that's what we want.

QUESTION: *But doesn't Communism imply control from Moscow?*

We don't want control from Moscow or from anywhere else. Do you think that when a country fights for its freedom at such high costs over so long a time (eight years now in Algeria!)—do you think it will turn around and give up that freedom? What it wants is to work out its problems for the benefit of its people—and not for the benefit of the Russians *or* the Americans.

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I must say, however, that we have been exploited by American companies, by French companies, by English companies and of course by Portuguese companies, yet we have not been exploited by the Russians nor do I see any sign of such a thing beginning. When the Russians invite thousands of our young men to study at their great engineering schools without tuition, they ask nothing in return; American gifts always have political strings attached. The essential difference here is economic. It is no accident that since the Cuban revolution, for example, the American government has done everything possible to return Cuba to its colonial status; the sugar, fruit and cigar companies do not like to see money going out of their hands and into the hands of the Cuban people. It is inevitable that the West, as a capitalist society, must expand its economy constantly, must seek markets, profits, and raw materials among the underdeveloped nations of the world.

QUESTION: *Does not Russia, too, seek markets, profits and raw materials?*

No. Your American economy must be fed with an ever-rising production of consumer goods—cars, for instance—and, as far as I can see, fed with money put into circulation through defense contracts and foreign investments. Your economy is an expanding economy, and basically a war economy. But defense spending is a drag on Russia's economic machine; and they have no worldwide investments the way the Americans do. As a Communist society, their production is *planned:* they can gear their economy to the needs of the people as *calculated* in terms of food, shelter, clothing, medicine, scientific research and education. And—*hélas!*—defense. I must put in here that I was shocked and offended by their explosion of the superbombs—it was a stupid and brutal display of force. But that doesn't change the basic economic facts of the world situation.

Look, you can see the goal of an economy in its ethic. The ethical ideology of capitalism is selfishness. What does capitalism teach that a man should be to succeed? He has to be *malin* (*sly, wicked*), that's what! What kind of way is that? *Il faut foutre ton voisin un bon coup de pied dans le cul, hein?* and the harder the better! And by God that's what your economic system has been doing to people all over the world!

QUESTION: *Aren't you worried that accepting technical aid from Russia will eventually bring African nations under Russian domination?*

I don't believe the Russians are out to dominate anyone—they have no reason to.

QUESTION: *Their stated aim is world conquest.*

No, their stated aim is a *Communist* world. I too want to see the end of capitalism and all it stands for—but I don't necessarily want to conquer anyone.

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QUESTION: *What about the satellite nations?*

First of all, I don't know how accurate that term is. You used to call Yugoslavia a "satellite" of Russia, didn't you? Do you think she still is? Or Poland, for that matter? And how about Albania? You seem to think that because a country has thrown out its capitalists—perhaps, as in Czechoslovakia, with Russian aid—and naturally looks to the most advanced Communist nation for leadership, that it has become a "Russian satellite." The U.S.S.R. specializes in making other kinds of satellites, and . . .

QUESTION: *Wait a minute. How about Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Rumania? And Hungary?*

To be frank, I don't know much about the histories of all those countries. But it does seem to me that the aggressive actions by the Russians near their own borders at the end of World War II were clearly due to their fear of pressure from the West—a determination not to let the German invasion happen again—a very real fear considering that Russia lost 17,000,000 people in World War II. Think of it: 17 million! And now I read that West Germany is insisting that the United States supply her with independent nuclear weapons!

As for Hungary, I do not approve of Russia's action there. You must keep in the back of your mind, however, the fact that Hungary never paid her large war debt to Russia, that Hungary was one of the first fascist nations of Europe, and that there were undoubtedly strong fascist elements in the Hungarian uprising. I would like to know more about these things.

QUESTION: *Your justification of Russian aggression does not quite persuade me. And I still don't understand how there can be a "Communist world" short of Communist world conquest!*

Sorry I didn't "persuade" you. As for a Communist world: it will be achieved by the kind of uprisings we have seen in Angola, Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba, Laos and China—by the successful African revolutions in Guinea and Ghana—and soon no doubt in India, where I promise you a real revolution will erupt the moment Nehru dies. Europe will be Communist, too—consider the strength of the Socialist Party in Belgium, and the Communist Parties in France and Italy. The trend of the world today is unmistakably toward Communism; capitalism has had it. It hangs on only through the military threat of the United States, which is making a last-ditch attempt to reverse history, an attempt which only the feelings of the masses of the world can prevent from exploding into World War III.

No leader of any underdeveloped country sees any future for capitalism in the reconstruction of his country. (Except Franco and Salazar, of course.) Do you really expect that having cast out the capitalist devils a country would willingly build the same system all over again?

Not only does capitalism have no future, but it stands stubbornly in our way at the moment. I was among those naive enough to hope

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for a real change in American foreign policy with the election of Kennedy. The Cuban affair quickly dispelled my illusions, along with those of everybody else I know....

QUESTION: *Can genuine land reform be accomplished without setting up a Communist totalitarian state—by some form of social democracy, for example?*

I'm not sure what you mean by "Communist totalitarian state," but I think you see from what I have just said that it is difficult to speak of democratic processes of change and real land reform in the same breath. At least, that's true in the early stages, when the land is still held by a tenacious and often vicious minority. The point is, do you honestly think there can be democracy in a situation where 90% of the people can't read, and hardly eat enough to be able to think of anything beyond mere survival?

QUESTION: *Then you propose to replace one kind of élite by another?*

In the early stages. And yet if you look at Cuba, for example, I don't think the word "élite" will fit. It's not an élite when masses of people are given their land, when they are taught to read and write, when they are armed and compose their own army; and when, in short, everything is being done to put them in a position where they can take part in the running of their country as informed citizens with a decent standard of living. Would Franco do this? Would Salazar? For that matter, would the French do it in Africa, or the Americans in Latin America? What concern has Kennedy shown for *education* in underdeveloped countries? Apparently education is not thought to be a necessity for democracy—if your skin doesn't happen to be white.

By the way, I was shocked to learn that it costs close to $2,000 a year to go to college in the United States. How can you call *that* democracy? Is that equality of opportunity? What does the poor man do?—And I notice that the rich Americans in your Congress will not appropriate funds for education.

Those with training—not those with money—must make up some kind of élite. Our goal is to train more and more, to develop our own élite, working from a base of the whole population.

QUESTION: *When you send your élite to be trained in other countries, aren't you committing yourselves to some extent to these countries? After all, surely Russia has some motive in offering this free training...*

We will take help anywhere we can get it, but that doesn't necessarily mean we must commit ourselves. For example, the Americans want to give the Angolese rebels money and technical assistance in the hopes that we will turn our nation into a slightly more advanced version of the pre-Castro Cuba. In fact, they've helped finance one of the two Angolese revolutionary movements, though not the one that most of the people back. In the coming years we will accept American assistance, be-

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cause we think we must: they can help us more than the Russians can in every department except education. But we will hold on until we reach our goal—which, you may be sure, is not a capitalist Angola in which a new class of industrialists and landowners replace the Portuguese. Nor are we willing to end up as a trade colony of the United States.

QUESTION: *You insist that Russia does not attach strings to its aid. May we remind you once again of Hungary and other Eastern European nations which were "aided" by the Soviet Union?*

Sure, but rather than repeat what I've already told you on that score, I'll make something clear to you right now: there are two separate things —a Russophile and a Communist. Russia does many things that I do not approve of: the firing of the superbomb comes to mind again. And there was a strike among some of the peasant communities in Russia a few months ago; the authorities suppressed the strike with violence and thousands of peasants died.

QUESTION: *Where did you get this information?*

I read it in a report of the French Communist Party, entitled "Still Problems To Be Solved."

QUESTION: *If not to Russia, where then do you look for your model of Communism?*

China. The Russians in 1917 destroyed a decadent bureaucracy, but now they have replaced it with still another bureaucracy, under which the workers and peasants are still ruled from the top. Of course, they have made amazing progress: they have accomplished in 50 years what it took the West 250 to do. And I believe Khrushchev when he says that they are moving toward real Communism. But the bureaucracy is there, and will be hard to dislodge.

In China, however, the true basis of government has been created by agrarian reform. The communes belong to those who farm them, and they work out their own problems, turning to the central government only for planning and coordination. Before the Revolution, China was a country exploited by all the major European powers, overpopulated, divided by language differences, vast expanses of terrain and different customs, and united only by widespread famine under the rule of the imperialists and their native partners. Now in 11 years China has come a long way towards solving its economic problems. As in Cuba, schools have been built all over the country. The education of the masses and the enormous improvement of their standard of living go together. China has gone so far in coping with its own problems that it can now help other countries along the road to independence. The leaders of our Movement—like the leaders of other underdeveloped countries—have consulted with Mao Tse Tung about the strategy and tactics of our fight for liberation.

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QUESTION: *When you speak of China helping other countries along the road to independence, are you referring to Tibet?*

I think too little is known about that incident to condemn China. Didn't Tibet once belong to China? Don't they speak Chinese? It is possible that there was repression, as in Hungary, but what were the real sentiments of the majority of the Tibetan people? You have to see if the cry of protest comes solely from the bourgeoisie, the class that is always dispossessed by the new Popular Democracies. But I repeat that I really don't know.

QUESTION: *Regardless of the excuses you make for China's bloodbaths, can't the same objectives be accomplished by more humane means, as, for example, in India, which is industrializing in accordance with the development of social-democratic institutions?*

Ten thousand people still die of hunger each year in India. Even for those few who succeed in graduating college, it is almost impossible to find jobs commensurate with their education. The Indians have had three more years of independence than China, and yet their cultural and industrial progress is nowhere near that of the Chinese. Most Indians I've talked to agree that it is only the tremendous personal prestige of Nehru which is preventing the country from going Communist.

QUESTION: *In other words, you think Communism is in the cards for India?*

Definitely. Moreover, I think that in twenty years the whole world will be Communist. I have no doubt about it. And for the first time in human history, the problem of hunger will have been solved all over the world; there will be no more inequality of races; people will not drive Cadillacs in America while others die in mud huts in Angola.

QUESTION: *Will there be freedom of speech? Freedom of the press?*

On ne doit pas avoir le droit de dire des conneries! [One should not have the right to say stupid and harmful things.] You in the United States do not think ideas are very important. You do not think that one book more or less can change the order of things. Who listens to your intellectuals, anyway? No one, so you can let them talk all they want. But we know that books have tremendous power, that *Das Kapital,* for example, has changed the face of the world. We have no desire, after our years of bitter struggle, to see the same classes subverting our efforts and returning to their old positions of mastery. . . .

QUESTION: *If Communism is as inevitable as you say it is, how could a book or two change the situation?*

There is evil as well as good in man; the capitalist can always appeal to his selfish, aggressive, competitive instincts. Progress can be reversed, especially when the population is not thoroughly informed. Take

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a Portuguese peasant and tell him that the Angolese are a bunch of Communist devils who want to take his land, and he will believe you —he cannot read, he knows nothing of the world. How can this man be expected to judge between two ideas, between two systems. . . . My idealism has its limits; after we have carefully shown a man a way, we want to be very certain he does not lose it because some *salaud* [s.o.b.] is spreading malicious propaganda.

QUESTION: *Who is to decide which books are harmful?*

A committee of writers—perhaps with the aid of government advisers —as in Pasternak's case. What could be fairer? . . . But your emphasis on this question reveals your twisted point of view. It is amazing to me how you can be so concerned with an idea you call "liberty" when so high a percentage of the world's people is suffering in real slavery. For the laborer in Africa or South America, there is no question of free press: the problem is to keep alive. What good is your so-called free press —which prints lies whenever business interests are at stake and which I notice your president has recently asked to censor itself—what good has it done the colored two-thirds of the world? What good has it done the Negroes in your own country? Let us have a world which has economic equality and freedom from *hunger,* and then the idea of free press will have a basis in true liberty.

Until then, I am looking at your Little Rocks, your Cubas, your Dominican Republics, and I am wondering if the freedoms you talk about so much are anything more than assertions. How can you have real freedom in a society which is responsible for the oppression of so much of the rest of the world, which is moreover in the throes of panic and decay—I understand that Americans are going underground as fast as they can now—and which is based on the ethics of selfishness and exploitation to begin with? Your assertions about "liberty" sound good; but they are based on a situation in which a minority have bought their freedom—to the extent that it *is* freedom—at the expense of a vast majority. We are that majority.

DAVID BALL *is a graduate student at the Sorbonne whose poetry has been printed in* Rhinerozeros, Locus Solus *and other continental journals.*

JEREMY LARNER *is a free lance writer whose work has appeared in such places as* Partisan Review *and* The New Leader *and who has recently completed a first novel, to be titled* Drive, He Said.

Part of this interview appeared in the April 16, 1962, issue of The New Republic.

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Wolfgang Leonhard

Marx and Engels Visit *Walter Ulbricht*

Walter Ulbricht and the SED [East German Communist Party-Trans.] call themselves Marxist. This claim not infrequently receives uncritical acceptance in the West. There are many in the Federal Republic who identify Marx and Engels with the present East German regime.

But is that really the case? Suppose Marx and Engels were to arrive today at the Party headquarters at Lothringer Strasse No. 1 in East Berlin and be received there by Walter Ulbricht. How would such a conversation proceed? Probably, as we describe it here. All the statements of Marx and Engels in the following conversation are quoted verbatim from their writings. Walter Ulbricht's response is naturally a construction, but it corresponds with the present position of the SED.

Ulbricht: In the name of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany I greet you with all my heart, Comrade Karl Marx and Comrade Friedrich Engels. It is a great honor for me solemnly to welcome you, the greatest sons of the German Nation. In the first workers' and peasants' state in German history, the German Democratic Republic, your great ideas are coming to fruition. We revere your names. We've renamed Chemnitz, Karl-Marx-Stadt; Leipzig

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University, Karl Marx University; and since May 1953 we have the Order of Karl Marx for outstanding accomplishment.

Marx: Neither of us gives a hoot for popularity. In aversion to all cults of personality I never permitted any of the numerous maneuvers for recognition for which I was bothered from different countries during the time of the International, to be publicized. Nor did I ever respond to them, except for an occasional reprimand.[1]

Ulbricht: Yes, yes, of course. We too condemn, at least officially, the cult of personality. But, let's be candid, aren't you proud of the recognition you're getting here from our glorious SED?

Engels: At last we again have . . . an opportunity to demonstrate that we have no need for popularity, no need for the support of any party in any country, and that our position is completely independent of such trifles.[2]

Ulbricht: "Trifles" is indeed a little sharp. But even if you reject the glorification of your person, one thing will fill you with pride: we, the SED, are avowed and unshakable Marxists.

Marx: All I know is that I am not a Marxist.[3]

Ulbricht: That certainly is a somewhat unmarxist formulation, Comrade Marx. But, all right, the most important thing really, worthy comrade, is that our Party, the SED, is firm as granite, united in word and deed.

Marx: Unity in word and deed means nothing other than blind belief and obedience to a carcass.[4]

Ulbricht: Just don't spread that among our rank and file. Do you seriously doubt that the working class needs a firmly united organization to realize its goals?

Engels: The looser the organization is now in appearance the stronger it will be in reality.[5]

Ulbricht: All right, I don't want to polemize. The form of organization depends on the circumstances of time and place. But your great political goals, worthy comrades, have certainly been realized here in the GDR. Not being mislead by reformist twaddle about compensation, we have expropriated the capitalists and big land owners in the GDR without compensation.

Engels: By no means do we view compensation as something inadmissible in every case. How often did Marx say to me that the cheapest way would be to buy out the bandits.[6]

Ulbricht: All right, let's skip the minor point whether with or without compensation. It's the result that counts. All commerce and production in our GDR has been nationalized.

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Engels: But neither the conversion into joint stock companies nor into state property deprives the productive forces of their character as capital. . . . State ownership of the productive forces is not the solution of the problem but it contains within itself the formal means, the key to the solution. This solution can only lie in . . . society, openly and without deviation, taking possession of the productive forces which have outgrown all control other than that of society itself.[7]

Ulbricht: A somewhat dangerous formulation, Comrade Engels. If society should take over the productive forces "without deviation," that would lead straight to the Yugoslav workers' councils, and we'd land in the morass of Titoist revisionism! But forget about that because I want to tell you about our greatest success: our entire agriculture is collectivized. Between you and me, we couldn't be exactly liberal with the peasants in order to overcome their private property mentality.

Engels: We stand decidedly on the side of the small peasants; we'll do anything to make their lot more bearable, to ease the transition to collectivization for them. In this sense, then, we can be very liberal with the peasants.[8]

Ulbricht: Certainly, Comrade Engels, I myself in public speeches have warned against extremes. But I hope you won't deny that somewhat forceful intervention is necessary to bring the peasants into the agricultural collectives.

Engels: . . . in the second place, obviously, if we're in possession of state power we can't think of violently expropriating the small peasants (whether with or without compensation). . . . Our task in regard to the small peasants consists, first of all, in transforming their enterprise and property from private to collective, not with violence, but by example and by purposeful collective assistance. . . . We can only promise them that we will not interfere in their property relationships against their will.[9]

Ulbricht: That I understand; but conditions are different here. And even if you don't approve of our economic measures, you will welcome our political changes. We've made a clean sweep of the bourgeois nonsense about "government of laws." Our entire legislation is subordinated to the political interests of the class struggle.

Marx: Partisan laws, laws without any standard of objectivity, are laws of terrorism. Laws which concern not deeds as such but opinions are nothing but explicit invitations to lawlessness.[10]

Ulbricht: With all due respect, Comrade Marx, you're going too far to accuse us explicitly of terrorism. Without political legisla-

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tion, or as you call it, laws against opinions, the thing just won't go. On that score, at least, you'll meet us half way.

Marx: The law against an opinion is not a law of the state for its citizens, but a law of one party against another. The partisan laws nullify the equality of citizens before the law. . . . Laws against principles are founded upon lack of principle, upon the immoral, opportunist, opinion of the state. They are the indiscreet scream of a bad conscience.[11]

Ulbricht: Ssshhh, Comrade Marx, if anyone should hear you call the legislation of the GDR the indiscreet scream of a bad conscience. . . . Well anyway let's get to the most important thing, the state. I can assure you that we, your successors, hold the destiny of the state firmly in hand. In the interest of our great cause, we permit no one to oppose our policies.

Marx: The best form of state is that in which the social contradictions are not wiped out, not violently . . . fettered. The best structure is one in which they come into free struggle and thereby to resolution.[12]

Ulbricht: If I didn't know for sure that it's you sitting here before me, Comrade Marx, I could almost imagine you were some journalist on a bourgeois liberal paper. Speaking of the press, I'm proud to assure you that every newspaper in the GDR serves the sole purpose of propagating the goals of the Party and mobilizing the masses for the realization of these goals. The entire press is firmly under our control.

Marx: For the press to reach its views, it is above all necessary to avoid prescribing views from outside, and to afford it that recognition one gives even to plants, a recognition of internal laws, that must not be arbitrarily withdrawn.[13]

Ulbricht: But, Comrade Marx, you don't stand behind the bourgeois shouting about freedom of the press. . . .

Marx: The essence of the free press is the principled, rational, moral essence of freedom; that of the censored press, unprincipled, anti-natural servitude.[14]

Ulbricht: But, Comrade Marx, Com. . . .

Marx: The government hears only its own voice; it knows that it hears only its own voice, but nonetheless the delusion that it hears the voice of the people becomes an obsession and a demand that the people accept this delusion.[15]

Ulbricht: Comrade Marx, if anybody else had said that, he'd . . . At least I like to think that Comrade Engels approves of our

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cultural policy. We've put art and literature at the service of our great cause. No more *l'art pour l'art.* Our literature is a distinct expression of our political struggle.

Engels: I think however that the solution of the problem must become manifest from the situation and the action themselves without being expressly pointed out and that the author is not obliged to serve the reader on a platter the future historical resolution of the social conflicts which he describes.[16]

Ulbricht: But Comrade Engels, we must demand, after all, that the author take sides, and use his political opinions to influence the reader's.

Engels: The more the opinions of the author remain hidden, the better for the work of art.[17]

Ulbricht: What you're saying implies a turning away from the principle of partisan literature and from socialist realism. Were we to permit that, any reactionary could come along and demand freedom of personality.

Marx: The vital danger to any creature lies in losing itself. Hence, loss of freedom is man's real mortal danger.[18]

Ulbricht: Generally speaking, granted—but later when we've reached the final goal of communism. But now? Now as far as the great transformation, the liberation of society, is concerned the interests of the individual must be subordinated.

Engels: It goes without saying that society cannot itself be free unless every individual is free.[19]

Ulbricht: Highly dubious, Comrade Engels. We cannot let this so-called personal freedom subvert our great ends, the reorganization of society.

Engels: We are not communists who would destroy personal freedom and turn the world into one big garrison or work house. Certainly there are communists who find it convenient to deny, and who would abolish personal freedom which, to their mind, stands in the way of harmony; we, however, have no desire to purchase equality with freedom.[20]

Ulbricht: But have a little understanding for us, Comrade Engels. You attack us SED leaders as if we've done everything wrong on our own. We are the faithful disciples of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; we are part of the world Communist movement with the Soviet Communists at its head.

Engels: It is not at all in the interests of this movement that the workers of any particular country should march at its head.[21]

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Ulbricht: Comrade Engels, you won't deny, as do the revisionist Titoists in Yugoslavia, the leading role of the Soviet Union? You won't deny the necessity of the lead of the glorious Russian working class in order to guarantee the unity of the international workers' movement?

Engels: A costly presumption, that to bring unity to the European proletariat it must be Russian led.[22]

Ulbricht: After all these highly questionable remarks, Comrade Engels, I really must admonish you to remember party discipline.

Engels: No party in no country can sentence me to silence if I am determined to speak.[23]

Ulbricht: I beg your pardon. I didn't mean it personally. That goes only for the others. Naturally for you, our great teachers, we make an exception. But you have to admit that, in general, socialist science must be subordinated to the control of the Party.

Engels: You—the Party—need socialist science, and it cannot live without freedom of movement.[24]

Ulbricht: What do you mean by using "you" in speaking of the Marxist-Leninist Party? Especially at this moment, for—despite all our great differences—we want to offer you, esteemed Comrades Marx and Engels, the highest state office in the GDR. Or would you rather have a position in the Party?

Engels: Not only no state office, as long as possible no party office, no seat in committees, etc., no responsibility for jackasses, merciless criticism for everybody, and, what's more, that serenity which shall not be taken from us by all the conspiracies of blockheads.[25]

Ulbricht: As harsh as your formulations are, Comrade Engels—and not even the capitalist press calls us jackasses and blockheads—and as hurt as we are by your rejection of public office in the GDR, one thing I can solemnly proclaim: We take you, our great teachers and champions Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, solemnly into the glorious Party of the German working class, the SED.

Engels: How do we, who flee public office as the plague, fit into a "party"? We, who spit upon popularity, who wouldn't know what to make of ourselves if we were to begin to become popu-



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lar, what need have we for a "party," i.e. a herd of jackasses which swears by us because it takes us for one of the herd?[26]

Ulbricht: Enough. The conversation is over. We are not yet finished with such enemies of the Party as yourselves, Herr Marx and Herr Engels. Your malicious attacks on the unity and solidarity of the Party, your rejection of Party discipline bear witness to your petty-bourgeois and individualistic deviations. Your proposal to compensate capitalists and landlords reeks of the foul spirit of social democracy. Your proposed agricultural policy is appeasement, retreat in the face of the class enemy. Your rejection of nationalized economy, your nonsense about socialist self-administration, and your slander that the international workers' movement is Russian-directed demonstrate how deep you have sunk into the morass of Yugoslav revisionism. With your liberalist drivel about an art and science independent of the party, and your demagogic demands, taken from the capitalist press, for personal freedom, freedom of the press, conditions of legality, you've exposed yourselves. Your intentions, Mr. Marx and Mr. Engels, are obvious: as mouthpieces for, and under orders of, Western imperialism, your design is to confuse the activists of the GDR, to undermine their confidence in the workers' and peasants' power, and their reliance on the SED, the Marxist party of the working class. There shall be no further ideological discussion of your attitude. The Party control commission and the organs of state security will attend to your case.

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

. . . After a perilous flight, Marx and Engels finally reached the Western refugee camp and were able to breath freely. They were lucky to have escaped the danger and now at last to be able freely to express their views. But their happiness didn't last long; only until they appeared before the first refugee commission. For them, the inconceivable then happened: their refugee card was denied them because they were "Marxists." With dismay Marx and Engels realized they are placed on the same level with Ulbricht and Company. To this day it hasn't gotten around to the gentlemen of

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the refugee commission—nor to many others—that the concepts of Marx and Engels have long since been falsified by Ulbricht and the SED, in many cases turned into the direct opposite.

Translated from the German by Richard Schoen

FOOTNOTES

1 Marx, *Letter to Wilhelm Blos*, 10 November 1877.
2 Engels to Marx, 13 February 1851.
3 Frequent remark of Marx's, cited by Friedrich Engels in a letter to Conrad Schmidt, 5 August 1890.
4 Marx, *The Alliance of Social Democracy*, 1873.
5 Engels, *Letter to Becker*, 1 April 1880.
6 Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany*, November 1894.
7 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 1878.
8 Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany*, November 1894.
9 Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany*, November 1894.
10 Marx, *Notes on the Latest Prussian Censorship*, Jan.-Feb. 1842.
11 Marx, *Notes on the Latest Prussian Censorship*, Jan.-Feb. 1842.
12 Marx in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 28 June 1848.
13 Marx in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 4 January 1843.
14 Marx in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 12 May 1842.
15 Marx in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 13 May 1842.
16 Engels, *Letter to Minna Kautsky*, 26 November 1885.
17 Engels, *Letter to Margaret Harkness*, beginning of April 1888.
18 Marx in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 15 May 1842.
19 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 1878.
20 Engels, *Fundamentals of Communism*, 1847.
21 Engels, Prefatory Note to *The Peasant War in Germany*, July 1874.
22 Engels to Marx, 29 April 1870.
23 Engels to Bebel, 1 May 1891.
24 Engels to Bebel, 1 May 1891.
25 Engels to Marx, 13 February 1851.
26 Engels to Marx, 13 February 1851.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD *was taken to Russia as a young boy by his German Communist mother. (She was later arrested and spent many years in Stalinist prisons.) Leonhard received a strict Communist education, was sent to East Germany where he held important posts in the Communist apparatus. Leonhard defected from the Party in 1949, fled to Yugoslavia and now lives in West Germany. He is the author of* Child of the Revolution *(1951) and* The Kremlin Since Stalin *(1962).*

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Renata Adler

"WE SHALL ALL CHAR TOGETHER..."

"We shall all go together when we go," sings Tom Lehrer on his most recent record, and the refrain has an ominously optimistic ring. One of the dangers of the increased publicity which the Bomb has been receiving lately is that universal annihilation begins to sound not altogether undesirable. The fear of prolonged physical suffering and the fear of separation from loved ones are two major parts of man's fear of death, and in the explosion of an infinitely powerful Bomb, no one dies slowly and no one dies alone.

Some examples of recent remarks which imply that the powers of the Bomb are infinite are the following:

> There is no technical upper limit on the size of a superbomb. [*Newsweek,* October 30, 1961.]
>
> Either our B 58 medium-range jet bomber or our B 52 long-range jet bomber can carry more explosive power than was used by all combatants in World War II . . . The explosive power of our weapons systems for all purposes is almost inconceivable. [President Kennedy, quoted in the *Congressional Digest,* March 1961.]
>
> Both East and West have today stockpiles of nuclear weapons which are more than sufficient to destroy their possible opponents and indeed most of the population of the world. [*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* September 1961.]



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Especially dangerous are such ambiguous phrases as "almost inconceivable" and "more than sufficient to destroy . . . most" (which seems to imply "sufficient to destroy . . . all"). It is impossible to sustain for very long an immediate and intense dread of an infinitely horrible possibility, and those who enumerate the powers of the Bomb in hopes of frightening the public into enlightened awareness of danger must reckon with a law of diminishing returns: describe horrors beyond a certain point and you appear to be extolling virtues. The listener's dread becomes resignation, and a kind of reckless, gay anticipation may set in.

It is an unanswered question how many lonely neurotics would end it all, but for the certainty of greater loneliness in death. One thinks of countless examples of social outcasts who go to almost ludi-

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crous lengths to make some kind of human contact. An elderly lady waits outside of church on Saturday mornings to find out the name of the bride in a fashionable wedding, so that she may recognize it in the social section of the Sunday *Times*. An adolescent commits a minor crime so that someone, anyone, will become aware of his existence. They are isolated cases, but the hopelessly lonely are a sizeable, if fragmented and heterogeneous, group, and one danger yet to be reckoned with is that the Bomb represents a formidable antidote to loneliness. Individual suicide entails separation, but mass suicide promises togetherness. The charm of togetherness in the face of death is amply illustrated in the nostalgia of veterans whose happiest memories are of the war, when men were buddies, "all in it together." But in previous wars, the all-in-it-together consisted in a shared risk, out of the consciousness of which grew a kind of romanticized friendship. The shared risk becomes, with the Bomb, a shared certainty, and the temptations of a universal suicide pact are not to be underrated.

One wonders also how many dissatisfied housewives and unsuccessful wage earners would die readily, but for the dread of abdicating a responsibility to their children. Mass suicide entails, certainly, the abdication of a higher responsibility, but that responsibility can be phrased only in terms of an abstraction, Progress, Humanity, Life itself. Who would maintain that mankind will survive out of a devotion to these?

It might be argued that there are, so far, no signs that mankind wants to give up. After all, people are building bomb shelters, an obvious manifestation of a commitment to life, of a will to survive. But shelters are being constructed on the premise that the Bomb poses a finite threat. On the presupposition that, in the event of nuclear attack, someone will survive, the shelter builder reasons that that someone might as well be he. His is still the logic of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which paradoxically allayed a horrible uncertainty; we have *seen* what a nuclear bomb can do, and we are willing to use it as a weapon to defend our way of life.

At the same time, however, the shelter builder knows, on no less authority than that of General Eisenhower, that the new magnitude and number of bombs are such that both sides possess sufficient retaliatory power to ruin any enemy. The Bomb is no longer a weapon of defense, it is an instrument of destruction pure and simple; and a sign of schizophrenic inconsistency, a sign that the shelter represents not a reasoned effort to survive but a senseless gesture to ward off awareness of the real issue, is the general imperviousness of the shelter builder to warnings about the *practical* problems of shelter building. A machine gun is proposed as the solution to the problem of im-



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provident neighbors, but, putting moral considerations aside, what if the neighbors are also armed with machine guns and waiting at the shelter door? People are building shelters in areas which are logistically doomed, when they know that the shelter can amount only to a cozy furnace for entire families. People are even buying equipment which they know to be totally worthless. The construction of shelters has become, in part, a fad, like the suburban swimming pool; for the rich, a new luxury, for the handy-man, a do-it-yourself toy. But the fad itself is a disguise and a symptom of man's unwillingness to cope with his subconscious welcome of the coming of the end.

THERE ARE MORE OVERT symptoms of that welcome than the ostrich behavior of the shelter builder. The "hate joke" is one: in this country, Lenny Bruce's humor of the basket case, and in France, Siné's cartoon of the legless man in a cart who attempts to hitch a ride to Lourdes from a blind man who already carries a crippled passenger upon his shoulders. There has been gallows humor before, in the Reformation, when whole populations were dying of the plague. Jokes about death and deformity are told when man is conscious that his days are numbered; the "hate joke" shows resignation and bravado in the face of an inevitable end. But the plague was a natural killer, and, in time, it passed. The Bomb is a killer in the hands of men, and there are few omens of its passing. There was nothing men could do about the plague, but men can, in principle, eliminate the Bomb. There is that insidious double logic: we are doing everything we can to avoid it, constructing shelters, marching in anti-Bomb parades. These are rationalizations; we are doing everything to bring it on, building more bombs, and arguing that we need them for defense—when we know full well that we are sufficiently armed to make defense no longer an issue. Two logics prevail side by side, with no effort to acknowledge and reconcile them.

Another disturbing symptom is the fact that some of us can view a film like *Hiroshima Mon Amour,* regardless of its artistic merits, with something like equanimity, as an artistic experience. It has become believable that love can exist in an environment of total catastrophe, and the viewer is made to see the scarred human remnants of the disaster. We immunize ourselves, with "hate jokes" and with tragic documentaries, to a holocaust which we are beginning to welcome.

It might be argued that religious feeling is a powerful force for survival, but we have only to consider the numerous splinter groups, the sects which yearly prophesize, with ill concealed glee, an imminent disaster. Those who sell all their goods to wait upon a mountain top may seem tragic or even ludicrous, but theirs is an eloquent



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testimony to a certain hopeful anticipation of finality. Parallels are often drawn between the day of bombing, and the Day of Judgment, and we have only to reread apocalytpic sections of the Bible to find an eager welcome of the Day. This is, of course, the devil quoting Scripture, but in whatever form, the desire to escape life completely, and in total company, has always been strong, and extremely articulate.

The end may now arrive by default, by refusal or inability to recognize in ourselves the partially willing accomplices of our destruction. Feiffer has created a cartoon fable in which people, in testing the world-destroying power of a bomb, unwittingly destroy the world. Propaganda and equivocation about the actual powers of the Bomb encourage us to let the very forces which we have set in motion make the decision for us; the conflict of desire for annihilation and survival may go unresolved and even unacknowledged.



THE NEED FOR DECISION is obscured by our ignorance of just what the Bomb can do. If nuclear war would entail mutual destruction of industrial cities, with a few residential areas thrown in to terrify the population, then we should be informed that the horror is enormous but limited. In that case, we must be told just where and what kind of shelters are necessary, and, absorbed in the competition to survive, we must build them. But either moral considerations or a dreadful uncertainty as to which will be those random "few residential areas thrown in to terrify the population" will persuade the citizen to proceed cautiously in the race for nuclear war. A limited but enormous threat encourages people, aware of the consequences of nuclear preparation, to work and to prepare for peace. Let no one, however, *exaggerate* the perils of the bomb on the mistaken premise that the larger the horror, the more intense the general desire to avoid it.

> *We shall all char together*
> *when we char . . .*
> *There will be no more misery,*
> *When the world is our rotisserie,*
> *And the party will be come-as-you-are.*

These are the macabre closing lines of Lehrer's song. The paradox is this: that universal destruction is not as frightening to the individual as is partial destruction, with uncertainty as to which individuals will be destroyed.

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Excerpts From

The Last Writings Of Andrzej Stawar

The Last Writings of Andrzej Stawar is a remarkable document. The article is exciting primarily for its ideas and their manner of presentation. Stawar's views and insights on such questions as who made the Russian Revolution, what Lenin meant by "Defeatism," his comments on "Barracks Socialism," the Party of the New Type, the several phases of Stalinist policy, the nature of the terror, his comparison of Lenin to Robespierre, his finding an element in bolshevism analogous to the "berserkers" of olden times, etc. are written in the style and manner of a historian and thinker who is always at home in his subject. Whether or not one agrees with his overall conclusions, or with his specific points and arguments, there is no doubt that he is a historian who deserves to be read and considered by an audience hitherto denied him.

What heightens our interest in Stawar's writings, of course, is the importance of the author in the intellectual and political Communist world, and the circumstances of his life as well as the particular circumstances of the publication of his Last Writings. Stawar's personal-political history is well capsulized in the introduction to his book by Pawel Hostowiec, which is also translated here (though not in full).

What we would like to underscore is that Andrzej Stawar felt that his final writings could not be published in Poland. And understandably so. For all the liberalization of the Gomulka regime there are limits to its relaxation. An attack on Stalinism, such as launched by Stawar, which does not limit itself to an attack on the crimes of Stalin but concludes on a more general note that there is something fundamentally rotten about the entire system is outside the permissive scope of the "liberalized" one-party rule in Poland. That is why Stawar had to ask Polish emigres living in Paris to publish his work and that is why there is no discussion of Stawar's last writings, certainly no publication of his book, in his native land where, until his death, he was a widely known and respected figure.

Needless to emphasize we are more than grateful to *Kultura* for permission to translate and publish the following excerpts from Stawar's Last Writings. The Editor

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Toward the end of March 1961, Stawar appeared at the Literary Institute, fully conscious that his days were numbered. The purpose of his visit was to persuade *Kultura* to publish his latest works plus some earlier essays. He felt that their publication would be impossible in Poland. Aware of his limited time, he endeavored to sort out and save his literary heritage from oblivion.

It was extraordinary that the oldest literary critic of the Marxist school by both age and rank who was neither a defector nor a revisionist had to look for a publisher among the emigrés. But it was not his first misunderstanding with either the Communist Party or censorship.

Andrzej Stawar was born May 1, 1900, son of landless peasants who hoped to give their children the education they lacked. For a few years he attended a Russian "gymnasium" [equivalent to a combination of high school and junior college]* and read a great deal. He joined the Polish Communist Party in the early twenties, publishing his early articles in the periodicals of the left wing peasant press. In 1924, he assumed the post of secretary to the Communist faction in the Polish parliament (Sejm), edited its bulletins and proclamations and wrote for the illegal press. In the internal discussions that took place after the May uprising [the Pilsudski coup d'état] he took a principled position in opposition to Communist opportunism. [The Polish Communist Party supported the Pilsudski uprising.] He expressed his views in *Dźwignia* [the "Crane," a literary political journal similar to the *Partisan Review* of the early thirties in the United States] and in *Miesięcznik Literacki* [Literary Monthly]. In literary and artistic matters, he stood with the avant garde and remained under the influence of the Russian "formalists." His independence and uncompromising Jacobinism lost him the confidence of the Party leadership. After the Moscow trials, Stawar either left or was expelled from the Party. At that time, he published two issues of a periodical called *Pod Prąd* [Against the Stream] which the Party hierarchy regarded as heretical. During the war, he sought asylum in Hungary.

Returning to Poland after the war, he was, for a time, a high official of the Ministry of Culture. Before long, old animosities and Party suspicions were revived. Stawar refused to submit to the so-called "self-criticism," fell into disfavor and was actually in danger of arrest. He escaped via complete silence for seven years. Only in 1955 did he resume writing, mostly on literary topics and studies of Polish, and some Russian, writers (Boy, Sienkiewicz, Galdzynski, Bielinski, Brzozowski). These essays immediately assured his position as Poland's most eminent literary critic. But they failed to restore completely the Party's confidence in his "loyalty." During the October events, Stawar did not join forces with the so-called revisionists.

In Stawar's writings Marxism preserved the spirit of "those" revolutionary days when it was free of the official dogma of a ruling Party; it served the critical mind in its quest to understand and shape social events with an eye to the future. One can hear in them the echo of old discussions which, alas, grew silent after Lenin's death.

In one of his sketches on the tasks of contemporary Polish literature, Stawar wrote: "We may not notice, or pretend not to notice, the historical tasks, but this does not detract from their urgency and their eventual fulfillment. I re-

* All bracketed notes and comments in this introduction and in the excerpts from the last writings of Andrzej Stawar are by the translator.

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peat, thus it was and thus it shall be." In formulating his determinism in this way, Stawar reminded one of the old stoics and determinists who, in the face of the modest choices available to them, maintained their dignity through personal independence and uncompromising freedom of thought. Stawar did not exchange his Marxist independence of judgment for the blandishment of power. In publishing his last works, we pay tribute to his moral stature and his devotion to freedom.

Pawel Hostowiec for *Kultura*

THE MAIN CHARGE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY directed against Bolshevism was the latter's alleged revolutionary adventurism, its disregard of objective conditions, its attempt to construct a new society on purely speculative grounds.



Obviously, the Bolsheviks did many things gropingly; old formulas were often applied to new situations. This reliance on traditional formulas encouraged subjective personal decisions of the leader. Nevertheless, in reality, the concrete historical situation, much more than personal will, determined the flow of events.

Let us remember—the February Revolution which abolished Czarism, and thereby determined the future course of events, was not led by any political party. The parties were disorganized and disoriented. The revolutionary leaders were either in prison, in exile or emigrés abroad.

Here, then, we are dealing with a spontaneous, elemental outburst, which came about as a result of accumulated factors, sealing the fate of the discredited Czarist regime and destroying it without any major opposition. These were basic revolutionary elements beyond the will of the leaders and programs of the various factions. The war supplied the cause.

Czarism armed millions upon millions of landless, ruined, politically deprived peasants. It has been proved historically that a class called to arms, sooner or later, utilizes the occasion to struggle for its own social betterment. There are innumerable examples of this, beginning with ancient times. Herein lies the secret of many rebellions in various countries.

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The military prestige of the Czars had been founded during the epoch when mercenary armies were limited in numbers and technical development in the art of war was rudimentary. A well disciplined, professional army consisting of veterans was equal, or superior, to the West European professional armies. This situation was changed by the 19th century. The advent of the French Revolution produced huge numbers of fighting men—unheard of up to that time. The million mark of men under arms was mentioned for the first time in 1793. Here was a true citizens' army fighting to preserve its freshly acquired rights. When, following France, other European countries introduced universal military service, it was everywhere accompanied by increased political rights of the masses, an expanded franchise and constitutionalism.

When the Czarist regime was obliged to establish universal military duty, it was an act that stood in flagrant contradiction to the whole structure of autocracy and a feudal state based on the social rule of the nobility. The peasants, armed in great numbers, would eventually feel themselves equal partners in internal conflicts.

. . . in Russia the mass of mobilized humanity in the army had to make up with numbers for her technical backwardness and lack of supplies. At first, the army did it. With the Russian soldier's typical endurance, he attacked enemy machine gun nests with a bayonet, covering his head with a sack, while massed cavalry attacked enemy trenches with resulting hecatombs of unnecessary sacrifices.

In the eyes of the mobilized masses this war experience undermined the ancient prestige of the regime and further undermined their faith in the ability of the rulers to lead. The middleclass politicians tried to concentrate their attacks against the purely political system of autocracy, accusing this or that group of ministers or courtiers of treason or stupidity. In reality, the entire economic system was discredited by the war. . . .

"PORAZHENSHTZEVO"—DEFEATISM

In Western Europe, where state borders more or less correspond to national boundaries, wars, as a rule, assumed a national character. An enemy invasion meant the occupation of national territory, the danger of losing a part of it and other untold destruction.

Russian wars were of a different nature. From the times of the Tartar invasion, war posed no threat to native Russian territory, the exception being Napoleon's invasion of 1812. As a rule, Russian wars were of an expansionist, colonial nature. They took place on ethnographically alien territory, even when they were tactically defensist, like the Crimean War. For millions of native Russians, these wars had a rather abstract aim as they were fought on Pol-

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ish, Lithuanian or, at worst or best, White Russian soil. The people could not be concerned with the occupation of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Of course, it looked different in the XVIth or XVIIth century. In the eyes of the then ruling feudal-clerical élite, it meant the defense of the Orthodox faith, the strengthening of their state power, and the entry into the outside world.

By the XXth century a window to the world was already hacked out in the Baltic, and access had been gained to the Pacific. On balance, the loss of millions of lives for the conquest of the Bosphorus was disproportionate to the possible gains.

Theretofore, to a Great Russian, winning a war meant adding to the empire several new provinces populated by several million foreign-tongued peoples. A lost war meant nothing more serious than the loss of several provinces with millions of the same foreign-tongued peoples.

But a victorious war also meant strengthening the corrupt government and consolidating the autocracy. Conversely, a lost war meant, as the experiences of 1885 and 1905 demonstrated, opening up a period of internal reform or even revolution. Here we have the key to the singular slogan, "porazhenshtzevo" (defeatism), that Lenin, with his usual boldness, advanced from the beginning. Important political groups in the West found "porazhenshtzevo" a difficult concept to accept in the then prevailing circumstances. But it was of great psychological significance. It meant that the Bolshevik Party was consciously preparing itself for military defeat and its aftermath—a tremendous revolutionary ferment among the masses and the collapse of the social order.

WAS A CHOICE POSSIBLE?

Social Democracy reproached the Bolsheviks for undertaking the revolution and the construction of a new order under the worst possible circumstances. But what would the result have been had the Bolsheviks joined with the majority democratic parties, the Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc? Would not the revolution have taken place?

This is a childish supposition. In this case, the number of parties supporting the provisional government would have grown by one—but the revolution would have continued under the leadership of other people and other groups. The above supposition is based on the erroneous theory that the Bolsheviks constituted the extremist Left and could not have been outbid in radicalism and hyperbole.

Here, the mistake made in relation to Lenin is reminiscent of early French middleclass historians' misunderstanding of Robespierre, whose example Lenin undoubtedly studied. Long before the revolution, Plekhanov called Lenin "Vladimir Maximilianovich,"

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making an allusion to the continuity of their ideas. It is an analogy that explains quite a bit.

It was not Robespierre's faction that was the extreme one among the Jacobins, but the so-called "enragés," whose leaders were accused by Robespierre of betraying the revolution and whom he eventually arrested and beheaded. Robespierre and his followers represented what can be called revolutionary order and they wanted to curb the extremists' revolutionary ardor and put strong legal-administrative underpinnings beneath the new regime.

Edgar Quinet in his work, *The Critique of the Revolution,* conclusively and convincingly showed that the spirit of the Jacobin administration was similar to that of the early pioneers of French absolutism. Fanatically centralist Jacobins broke the resistance of Girondin federalists in the same manner as the emissaries of Louis the XI or Richelieu broke the resistance of the feudal barons.

Such a Party of revolutionary order and revolutionary centrism was founded and nurtured by "Vladimir Maximilianovich."

WHO, REALLY WAS THE REALIST?

In 1917–1918, the most common grievance against Lenin was his alleged revolutionary utopianism and disregard of real conditions and possibilities, his doctrinaire fanaticism.

[To test the validity of this criticism] Let us take the problem of the continuation of the war, as was demanded by the coalition parties that supported the provisional government led by Kerensky. The military situation in Russia in the early part of 1917 [under the Kerensky government] had not improved, nor were there objective possibilities for raising the technical level of the army, its supply and its transport. To justify the attempt for a new offensive, a new weapon had been invented: revolutionary enthusiasm—which was supposed to compensate for the lack of armaments and military leadership.

Indeed, one cannot deny the importance of enthusiasm in war, but, historically, it has only been achieved by armies in which the officers and the privates were of one ideological mind. This was not the case in 1917. The army was still led by the old Czarist officers whom the soldiers did not trust. For the latter, renewal of the offensive meant restoring the old discipline which had broken down at the start of the revolution, when a system of dual power had been initiated: on the one side was the old leadership which kept losing authority; on the other, were the new soldiers' committees or councils which were not by nature very adept at leading military operations, particularly of an offensive character, but had a talent for the agitational tasks of deepening the revolution and widening the schism between officer and soldier.

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Under these conditions, it was Lenin's opposition to continuing the war that was realistic, while the coalition parties' insistence that the war continue and that the army mount new offensives was pure delusion.

This [new offensive] was not what the revolting masses expected; they hoped for a basic change of a general nature. The various parties did not have much to say in February, when the army revolted. They were first heard after the Czar's collapse, during negotiations carried on above, while below there were deep changes taking place in the consciousness of the lower levels of the revolutionized society.

A soldier's rebellion is no laughing matter; it is not the writing or distributing of proclamations. Men whose very lives were at stake demanded basic changes and gambled their lives for them. It is obvious, then, that if the most important thing was the continuation of the war, it made no sense whatsoever to overthrow the old regime, despite everything.

The position of the moderate parties, the Girondists of Russia in 1917, did not take into account the fact that the social revolution had already taken place in the minds of the people and all that was left was its legalization.

The moderate socialists were saying: Russia is not ripe for a socialist revolution, it has to go through a phase of capitalist maturity; we have to give the bourgeoisie a free hand in order for it to develop industry, build a West European type parliamentary system, establish free schooling, etc. During this period the socialists would quietly organize the workers, build and strengthen the trade unions; in general, struggle to improve the lot of the working masses.

But what guarantee was there that events would develop in this direction and that the disturbed bourgeois would not turn to reaction as they did in 1908? The Russian bourgeoisie never did show outstanding courage in political struggle. Was it only because Czarism clipped its wings? Actually, the war compromised not only the military leadership but also the economic system that could not solve the basic problem of supply.

The tortuous struggle that took place in the period between February and October left behind it a profound fatigue and disappointment. In this atmosphere, attested by observers, the October Revolution of 1917 took place.

The Bolshevik Party correctly interpreted the desire of the masses, especially the armed peasantry, which wanted to regulate its own affairs, chiefly to achieve the long nurtured dream of agrarian revolution and possession of land. Simultaneously, a spontaneous expropriation of urban property holders started.

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THE PARTY OF THE NEW TYPE

The Party of the new type (Communist) was built under conditions of civil war. However, the timber was of mixed origin and this had to arouse doubts among the leaders of the revolution that could not have been resolved conclusively.

In 1955–1957, during the period of critical reevaluation, it was thought, especially by political writers, that an inherent evil of the revolution manifested itself after the victorious civil war. Obviously, the concept of inherent evil is in itself somewhat dogmatic and smacks of fatalism. One cannot deny it a certain importance in the formation of human consciousness in the new societies which arose as a result of the cycle of wars and revolutions of 1914–1945. Aspects of it have practical significance. Ideologists and educators repeatedly searched for the roots of decadent moods, particularly among the youth (religious rebirth). A divergence existed which I would not hesitate to call tragic. Social Democratic critics like Sorel, and in Poland, Brzozowski, felt there was a weakness in that aspect of European socialism which was permeated with the spirit of consumptionism, the defense of workers' problems that dealt primarily with the division of goods, both material and spiritual. . . .

Typical were the arguments put forward by Kautsky against the attempts of socialization in 1918. To socialize when the national economy lay in ruins as a result of the war did not make sense to Kautsky. Not until the bourgeoisie rebuilt industry and developed it further was the economy to be socialized. The consequences of this position were seen ten to fifteen years later, when they produced a Party paralysis during the period of the Nazis' march to power.

The Nazis were not afraid to take power at the time of deepest depression. Many thought that they would be ruined by it. But they employed many measures that socialists should have employed, and they overcame the economic crisis.

Similarly, in the case of general state problems they (the socialists) limited themselves to social and economic gains of the workers—and left management of the state in the hands of capitalist politicians. Again, the gains were undeniable but so were the final results—creation almost of a state within a state. The sector of legal, economic gains of the working class was safe-

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guarded by deep trenches. It allowed the maintenance of a comparatively high standard of living for employed workers at a time when everything started to crumble during the general depression. Unfortunately, this citadel crumbled, too, when the number of unemployed became catastrophic.

It was these unemployed who, in large measure, formed the mass cadres of Hitlerism. The very privileges enjoyed by the employed—thanks primarily to the work of their trade unions—were turned against the trade unions, whose loss of privileges reflected, as well, the demise of civil liberties in the nation as a whole.

That is why I would call this the tragic dilemma. It appeared in the early years of the Russian Revolution at a time when positions were divided in an uncompromising manner and the partisans of civil liberties appeared to be in the camp of the opponents of the revolution. As the situation grew more tense, the opposing positions became irreconcilable. The Bolsheviks were remaking society, building a new economic system in bitter isolation and widening the sphere of state terror....

THE CHANGE OF CADRE

Bolshevism as a party of the new type was formed only as a result of the civil war. Only then was it possible to introduce an inner party discipline of a military type. Earlier, in Lenin's time, this was impossible given the basically social democratic composition of the membership.

The cadres of the intelligentsia belonging to the party preserved, in part, the style of political bohemianism described by Marx: an eagerness to discuss theoretical questions, doctrinairism, a penchant for intellectual novelties, etc. In the strict sense, the proletarian cadres were based on the special interests of the factory workers. They were, for the most part, agitators, trade union functionaries, delegates to the internal factory committees; an element that had organic ties to the trade union movement and to the defense of the limited trade union interests of the working class. This was the way Lenin formulated it in his time. Not until the civil war were new cadres created, with new ways of thinking. New types of people then gained the upper hand in the Party. These people had seven years of war behind them; this was their chief political baggage. Their contribution to the Party was of a military nature. Very often, after concluding successful actions, whole military units joined the Party en masse. These people seldom had a trade, or, if they had started learning one, forgot it; military apprenticeship became their trade. They learned the Party statutes by rote, with some difficulty, read a few pamphlets, had no feeling or liking for the discussions that were shaking the Party leadership and did not even understand them. They be-

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lieved in socialism in their peculiar way but understood it in a simplistic, military manner.

They demanded simple formulas—political as well as organizational—that would not make their heads spin. For them, the demand for military discipline in internal Party life was a self-evident truth. Generally, they could not manage any civilian affairs entrusted to them without commands. Uniformity, which the old guard looked on with disgust and distrust was, for them, the normal state of affairs.

These factors prejudged the fate of the Bolshevik old guard. People like Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and others could learnedly theorize and write theses on the Party of the new type, the genuine Bolshevik type, but, in practice, their mentality more closely corresponded to the old social democratic type.



WORKERS AND THE PARTY OF THE NEW TYPE

This phenomenon had a wider international significance. After 1924, Communist parties were reorganized and recreated in this new Bolshevik image. This led to several paradoxes.

In principle, Communist parties were based on the industrial proletariat. Such parties as the German, French, Czech had strong trade unions, co-ops, and a wide press. The reorganization was accomplished in a relatively smooth manner despite splits and purges which affected people primarily in the upper Party echelons. The authority of the Soviet was very strong.

But, in reality, the entire thing was a pure formality.

The industrial proletariat had undergone tremendous internal changes. Since Marx's time it had become a stable element. The development of social security type legislation, effective action by the trade unions, labor legislation of all kinds gave the working class of the leading industrial countries a more or less stable position. And with this stability, the temperature of their interest in politics fell....

Bolshevization consisted of an external drill. A militant Bolshevik type was created neither in Czechoslovakia, nor in Germany, nor in France, nor anywhere else—a fact which was revealed later on. The military bureaucratic drill and its inadequacy became a source of many anecdotes based on authentic material and widely

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circulated in Comintern circles where men held no illusions. What the Russians found particularly worrisome was the legalistic mind of the foreign Communist. To them, this was completely alien.

THE BREAKDOWN OF AN IDEAL

Traditionally, the hope of socialism differed from the Christian conception of paradise only in assuming that universal happiness was to be realized on earth. Rich countries were considered the ripest for accomplishing socialism—those countries with highly developed capacities for producing consumer goods and suffering from periodic crises of over-production. The socialist aim was to divide this surplus so that the few should not choke from oversatiety and the many should not suffer from poverty. But, for the first time in history a socialist party came to power in a country with a low productive capacity where, in addition, the ruination caused by the First World War and the ensuing civil war reduced the standard of living to an unprecedented degree.

The old socialist had in him something of an idealist-philanthropist who spreads goodness and happiness in the world through his own good will. However, the actual human agent of socialism turned out to be a soldier-veteran, overgrown with a crust of brutality acquired in a pitiless struggle, frequently starved and accepting this as a natural calamity. A society emerged which was able to function on an extremely low level of human existence. This helps to explain the common mistake made by foreign observers who looked at the falling indices of production and reserves of consumer goods and predicted the end of the Bolshevik regime. In reality, the opposite was true. The less the market had to offer, the more important the official allocations became. Bread cards as well as allowances in kind enabled the regime to keep order and permitted some qualified people to function on their jobs even though this was difficult to accomplish.

A sort of dreary puritanism arose. In 1918, Zinoviev was quoted as complaining, after an inspection visit to Kharkov: "I see quite a number of satisfied faces here." The unleashing of a struggle for the most elementary needs became a mode of operation and a means of activating followers. It also activated enemies but this was in accord with the spirit of combat. A seeming retreat to the military concepts of the middle ages took place—"war breeds war"—a situation pregnant with consequences for ensuing decades.

The Menshevik leader, Martov, presented a contemptuous definition: "barracks socialism." But here we must differentiate between the attitude of a pacifistically inclined intellectual to an army, and the attitude of the peasant mass. The chief plague of peasant life in Eastern Europe and Russia was semi-starvation. We are not talking here of periodic famines which were regarded as

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calamities of nature, but of the general lack of food at the end of the farming season, before the new harvest.

One of the peasant's basic ideals in life is the drive for satiety, in its most elementary form; he simply wants to get a belly full of food.

The army fulfilled this ideal. The soldiers' cauldron was always filled and the bread ration ready. One ate better or worse but, at any rate, to one's fill. Consideration must be given to this organizational role of the soldiers' cauldron and the psychological changes it produced among the peasants who lived in dispersed family units until the war began. The cauldron, indeed the common food supply, projected its influence on general ideas of life, not to speak of the general organization of the army. Lenin understood this. The leaders of the moderate parties did not.

TWO ASPECTS OF THE NATIONALITIES POLICY

The old Russia was a state based on quite archaic legal principles. Liberals used to say ironically that to the dynasty, the whole Russian empire was essentially a "votchyna"—a Romanov inherited estate, where they could do as they pleased. Czarist Russia was not ruled in a uniform manner, on the basis of clearly prescribed rules like Western Europe. The empire was divided into zones with military chiefs at their head in which different forms of a permanent state of emergency prevailed. . . .

But the Romanovs were not the exclusive owners of the empire. In the XIXth century there was an upsurge of great Russian nationalism. Numerous layers of officialdom, aides and various other categories of servants grouped themselves around the dynasty. The first ranks belonged to the 130,000 families of the nobility who regarded themselves as the main pillar of the state. Below them were the countless hordes of bureaucrats of lower rank, officers and professional soldiers. The main principle of this enormous apparatus was the uniform Russification of the huge territory inhabited by alien nationalities, and the spreading of the idea of "Russianism" in Poland, Lithuania, Turkestan or Georgia. Everywhere the native national culture was suppressed, Russian schools introduced, the Russian language made the official one and, of course, the ruling power was in the hands of Great Russians everywhere.

But this principle became absurd when the ideas of national emancipation sprang up and won the adherence of wider and wider masses in all parts of the empire where minorities lived. The official Russification policy was helpless against the growing influence of these ideas and, of necessity, was limited to official control and petty harassment. The application of such methods of rule in the

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XXth century weakened the state and constituted a danger to its very existence.

Earlier, I touched on the question of the social element that really started the civil war and carried it on. The Whites' slogan "Yedinaya, niedelimaya" [one and indivisible Russia], opposing any federal principle, continued the old formulas of Russification based on that social grouping which was either wiped out or sent into exile as a result of the civil war....

A central feature of Bolshevik policy was the removal of Great Russians from a position of monopoly in state rule. On all levels of Party leadership, in the army, in the administration, there suddenly appeared minority groups: Poles, Jews, Armenians, Georgians, etc. Undoubtedly, these people went through a complicated evolutionary process. While still under the influence of the old complexes whose origin was national oppression, they were fascinated by the powerful and complicated mechanism inherited from Czarist Russia. Just as the descendants of nationalities once conquered by Roman fire and sword, finding themselves in central positions of Roman rule, became the most zealous guardians of that very rule—so did the same transformation affect people like Dzerzhinski and Stalin. Though Lenin, himself, was a Great Russian, he wanted to establish new forms of collaboration. He was understandably disturbed when these forms did not emerge. Thus does life play tricks and spring surprises on ideologues and reformers. In actual practice, there arose in Russia a peculiar amalgam of the old and new state bureaucracy; the new rulers unfamiliar with the routine of rule and administration essentially tried to imitate their *de facto* teachers. This was particularly obvious in Stalin's case and it was not limited to his administrative practice.

PHASES OF STALINIST POLICY

Generally speaking, when evaluating Stalin's political activity, the period is divided in two; before and after the notorious purges (1936). The first phase is evaluated positively but in the second, some negative and destructive traits are discovered....

Rosa Luxembourg in her acute analysis of the organizational policy of Bolshevism proved that it must lead to the concentration of power in one man's hands. It was frequently alleged (particularly by Trotsky) that in Lenin's time, immediately after the revolution, things were different. But this can be explained by the specific situation at hand. The seizure of power in 1917, the ensuing civil war, necessitated political allies with whom power was shared gladly, even in Party leadership. Factional activities were lively and Party leaders were free from blind obedience and submission to the will of the leader. This explains, in part, why Lenin could see elements of oligarchy in that situation. ("From a certain point of view we have the purest oligarchy.")

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But as experience has shown, the oligarchical phase was not durable and collapsed rather quickly at the end of a few years. (After Lenin's death a triumvirate arose: Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev.)

The oligarchy that arose after Stalin's death suffered a fate similar to the earlier one. There was a period of "collective leadership" of the Party presidium with equality among the partners. Later, the rivals were thrust out and only Khrushchev remained at the helm. The Caesaristic element emerged in its pure form.

Industrialization was a generally accepted social necessity. Its methods—wholesale, frequently barbaric waste—were criticized, but here, too, we must take into consideration the lack of technical knowledge and the lack of industrial culture in a labor force whose majority was just plucked from behind the plow. The economic dilettantism of the government was not particularly surprising given this general background.

The most legitimate objection raised against the policy of total collectivization, with its appalling losses, was predominantly humanist. Here, too, the ground was partially prepared by history. Basically, the aim of the agrarian policy was to requisition grain to the maximum extent possible. This, in turn, had negative economic results. In 1924 or 1925, the economist Preobrazhensky, then close to Trotsky, published a book dealing with the perspectives of industrialization in which he openly stated the need to confiscate the village produce by military-feudal methods if necessary. Stalin did just this, but in his sly manner called it the "smytchka," the union of workers and peasants. It was difficult to expect that the NEP village would cooperate in making sacrifices for industrialization. Rather serious resistance arose from this area.

Instead of trying to seize the grain from millions of individual peasants, the government entrusted this task to 100,000 kolkhoz chairmen who, at the risk of personal responsibility, knew that they must fulfill this task—or else! (The peasants learned this after they tried to limit their sowing to personal and cattle needs as a protest against the government's agrarian policy, believing that this limited amount would not be requisitioned. This turned out to be a suicidal policy. The grain was taken away and the peasants were left to collect roots, origan and sour grass.) This policy insured the minimum supply of bread rations for the cities as well as the new "novostroys" [industrial enterprises] that were springing up over the countryside like mushrooms after the rain.

In the final analysis, industrialization proved beneficial even for the village, liquidating, to a large degree, the chronic overpopulation that trapped the pre-revolutionary Russian village. The peasants received a quantity of agricultural machinery to ease their production methods. The attempt made to raise the general cultural and sanitary level of village life was significant. Both sides

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could be blamed for the fact that requisitioned grain supplies were wasted in large quantities. At fault was the incompetent and frequently corrupt administration, as well as the peasants' resistance to the new forms of life. The chief defect of this agrarian policy remained its requisitioning character. The peasants received such low prices for their products that there was no desire left for careful work. This problem remains acute today and the search for methods that may inspire the peasants to greater effort and better productivity continues to absorb the energy of Soviet economists.

Whatever one can object to in these moves, from the state point of view they were purposeful, and at times, inevitable. The same is true for the effort to crown all these attempts with a new constitution whose aim was to legalize relations in the state on a new basis.

At first, this was not merely a formality. It was an attempt to reconcile the "oprichniki" with the "Zhemshchina." It was a period of sounding out whether the situation had ripened to a point where the commands of the state dictatorship could be obeyed through the voluntary and active effort of the non-Party mass. This attempt failed and the new constitution with its electoral provisions took on the character of a plebiscite with the concomitant authoritarian direction of the electorate's will.

THE SECOND PHASE OF STALINIST POLICY

. . . After Hitler's appointment as chancellor the Nazi movement stood at the crossroads. A great social-national upheaval proclaimed a revolutionary struggle to the end. But everything happened rather quietly. The parties of the left were shown to be incapable of any serious resistance; they could not even undertake a demonstrative general strike. The protests were limited to some mass meetings. The Communists—not to speak of the Social Democrats—were preparing for the role of a legal opposition, but to this legalism the Nazi movement could not and would not agree.

To what degree did German events trigger Stalin into action? It is hard to guess. At any rate, the German method of solving internal difficulties and simultaneously reinforcing the personal power of the leader found its practical confirmation.

By the end of the First Five Year Plan, Stalin found himself in a difficult situation. The promised general welfare had to be relegated to a distant future. In the southern regions, hunger erupted among the peasants and the cities were meagerly supplied. The general dissatisfaction had grown more pronounced. In the Spring of 1932, a "volynka" (something between a revolt and a demonstration) lasting several days occurred in Ivanov Voznesiensk. (Ivanov Voznesiensk was a textile center and, as is well known, light industry was treated badly.) As a result, the first concessions

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since the days of the NEP were given to the peasants. They were permitted to sell their surplus food on the open market, thus easing the procurement of food beyond the ration cards. Eating establishments were opened. This neo-NEP slowly widened its range, improving the people's lot.

Worse was the comparison of the first "pyatiletka" to the lavish promises made during its promulgation—that it would quickly raise the standard of living. On the contrary, a significant lowering took place. Stalin, evaluating the results, decided to construct a war industry in order to make Russia independent of foreign supplies. He was seconded by the generals with Tukhachevsky (then assistant defense commissar) at their head. But this was a great disappointment to the masses, and it is clear that this mood found its way into the Party, although it was subdued with an iron fist. Stalin's exalted position, his arbitrary moves, already vexed the Party dignitaries. Clearly, it was an exaggeration on the part of a Menshevik correspondent to write that Stalin's situation reminds one of Paul the First, and that he was isolated in the Party apparatus. But, undoubtedly, there was a basis for the rumors that there existed a tendency to limit Stalin's power and eventually to add a strong deputy to the secretariat. The name of Kirov was mentioned. He headed the Leningrad organization, second in importance after Moscow, and was popular in the Party. Kirov's murder took place against this background, perpetrated by a former agent of the GPU. In his noted speech at the XXth Party Congress, Khrushchev, unmasking Stalin, mentioned the Kirov case as one of the unraveled mysteries surrounding the dead dictator. But it is a fact that the removal of Kirov served the interests of Stalin, rather than of the opposition, since Kirov had not stood in the opposition's way and, perhaps, could have even improved its situation. (Kirov was of a liberal bent and defended certain people—authors, writers who were attacked in Moscow.)

I shall not enter into the details of the juridical-political circus known as the Moscow Trials. They became a point of departure for the decimation of not only the Party élite. Khrushchev in one of his confidential speeches after Stalin's death said that the best part of the Party was put to death. Figures mentioned in the famous speech at the XXth Party Congress ascertained that approximately two-thirds of the Party élite fell victim to Stalin's terror. Of even greater importance was Stalin's theory that the closer the victory of socialism, the sharper the class struggle and the greater the resistance of its opponents. This let loose a hurricane of repressions on a scale unknown until then, filling the concentration camps with millions of innocent victims. . . . An enormous number of schooled specialists, technicians, scientists, perished—and this in a country where there were not too many of them around. This was

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dramatically reflected in the Red Army. The annihilation, imprisonment and exiling to the concentration camps of the larger part of the experienced, schooled cadres of the general staff and of the officer ranks, undoubtedly contributed to the course of the war. If, at first, Hitler could seize over two million square kilometers of the USSR's territory, inhabited by 60,000,000 people (a figure close to the population of Germany itself) it was due, in large part, to the fact that the Red Army was led in a manner defying all the demands of modern war....

THE TYRANNY

Undoubtedly, Stalin exhibited some pathological personality traits in his later period. However, there is no ground to suppose that Stalin was a particularly pathological type. It should be remembered that he was viewed as through a magnifying lens. A certain analogy is in order. Had Tiberius finished his life's work in his fifties, he would have been thought a hard, perhaps a cruel ruler, although his decisions would have been characterized as politically purposeful. The traits for which history remembers him were developed with full clarity only in his old age.

German authors created the term *Caesarenwahnsinn,* the madness of the Caesars, characterized by a type of congenital pathology among autocrats who usurped power.

Place yourself in the position of a man who is treated with a mixture of sycophancy and fear, and is plied with praise. He feels surrounded by people who are simply waiting for his first false move in order to pounce on him. He is not and cannot be sure of his seemingly loyal courtiers. Is there a conspiracy against him? Does the glass of tea he is given contain poison? Is the doctor approaching him with an injection trying to kill him? It is an unusually tense situation in which tyrants find themselves; violent experiences, suspicious fantasy—all this is sufficient to shake the equilibrium of even men with strong nervous systems, with which Stalin by nature was undoubtedly endowed. These traits of psychic instability are not only the result of personal inclinations. This is proved by the repetition of this instability among people of quite differing and contrasting types. The Hungarian Rakosi, our (Poland's) Bierut, a man of quiet, careful and tactful mien who, toward the end of his life, manifested similar symptoms. As the

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years wore on, this revealed itself more sharply, assuming the dimensions of sadist imbecility, replete with refined torture of people and their ambitions, as, for instance, asking important dignitaries (among others, Voroshilov) to undress and dance the hopack in the nude; not to mention such traits as adding the adjective "great" to his name while correcting a book. These characteristics developed over the years projected themselves into politics, particularly in such actions as the so-called "Doctors' Plot."

The Kremlin court strongly resembled old Byzantium or Eastern Sultanates. There was always talk about Stalin using doctors to remove people whom he could not move against, for one reason or another, by staging a trial or using police methods. There was talk about it in connection with Frunze's death (1924) and Pilniak wrote on a similar theme in a famous novel which eventually cost him his life. The clinics for highly privileged personnel were under the constant supervision of the GPU and MVD, and were used, among other things, as a place to recruit doctors as agents. The first sensational doctor's trial was held in 1938, but this method of using doctors as murderers was ascribed to Yagoda, then chief of the GPU, although it is doubtful that he acted without the agreement or on the initiative of someone higher up.

In all likelihood, to the degree that Stalin, as he aged, was increasingly dependent on "men in white" for his personal health, the suspicion arose that he, too, could be removed by them, could become their victim. In such an environment, it was easy for some people in his "court" to excite his suspicious imagination. A pretext was thus found for a great purge which, according to some informants, was to assume dimensions similar to the purges of 1936–1938.

THE SOCIAL RESERVES OF THE TERROR

Journalists and historians assaying the regime of terror look at its most conspicuous and obvious aspect—the fear spread by the government, executions, cruelties, atrocities, exile, general depression. They forget about the other important aspect.

Edgar Quinet makes some astute remarks on the subject. (There was no lack of material in France of that period.) When the secret police hunts people en masse, when it exiles them by the thousands, when it sentences them wholesale, it arouses the sympathy of society for the hunted. But a dozen or so years pass—usually an amnesty is declared—and the survivors return. Society greets this return with mixed feelings, rather uneasily.

Why? Their places in the social scheme of things have been occupied, their authority garnered by others. The enterprise that was directed by the returning exile is directed by someone else. Someone else took over his office, or position in school; even his

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wife might have found another protector. All these people who benefitted from the removal of the victims of terror are apprehensive about their vindication and await possible conflicts with, even revenge from, the returnees with trepidation.

Human societies living under regulations prescribed by law have a slow rate of social mobility and rotation. A government clerk, an officer, scientist, even professionals have to wait their turn patiently for the spot they want. The competition is generally keen. *Nota bene* here is one cause for general social unrest, expressing itself in various forms.

The period of terror liquifies, so to speak, people, their relations and material things. The places of the liquidated are taken over by others who garner not only the privileges but the possessions of the exiles.

Under all systems, people similarly situated have behaved the same way. They try to arrange their homes comfortably, collect paintings or antiques, gather libraries, etc. Then, all this goes under the hammer. In the backlash of the terror a gloomy animation takes place, like a stock exchange, everything in motion—people, values, accomplishments, paintings, collector's items, rare books, etc.

If brilliant careers come to an end, new ones are quickly made. Many benefit from the quickened pace of advancement. The trusted assistant of the famed scientist, dejectedly counts the years, nay, the decades, when he will replace his superior. Now the opportunity presents itself; an adroitly prepared missive containing a few careless remarks made by the professor on some occasion is sent where it counts; the position is suddenly open. And who is more eligible to grace it with his presence than the one who helped the government in the removal of a dangerous wrecker?

In Caesar's Rome, a delator received part of the confiscated property of the condemned. Similarly, under other despotic regimes. This custom also existed in Russia of the pre-Peter period. Clearly, the proscribed ones were people from whom there was much to loot. The delatory fever reaches thousands and thousands of people. In the capital as in the provinces, in forsaken villages as well as in little towns. Only with an understanding of this background can we comprehend the real nature of the terror and its influence on society.

Indubitably, the USSR has achieved some sort of record of its own in this respect. We should not think that this system was one man's invention. Decades of practice of the apparat which appeared under different names during different phases of the revolution, contributed to it. During the period of civil war, it was the Cheka, later the GPU, the NKVD and MVD. It was always the same institution. Stalin, author of the famous and often repeated saying: "My vsie chekisty" [We are all Chekists], first gave

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it a theoretical base with his previous mentioned concept of the sharpening of the class struggle in proportion to the victory of socialism.

In any case, this hellish system functioned in a splendid and complete manner. Generally, under systems based on lawful procedures, the dissatisfied citizen becomes a source of trouble for the government. In this case, the dissatisfaction is dissolved rather qickly with the real threat of penal camps in constant need of fresh, unpaid labor power. Thus, in the long run, the state utilized openly expressed dissatisfaction.

. . . Stalin was compared, among others, to Nicholas the First. But the latter, though a Prussian despot, tried to cover up his autocracy with administrative laws to which he tried, in turn, to adhere. Stalin, on the other hand, particularly toward the end, did not care much about any laws and though, at times, he behaved like a typical autocrat, he had on hand a platoon of executioners with whose help he liquidated, at will, those of his entourage who got in his way—and thus he more closely resembled an Eastern Sultan.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM

The factors that led to the breakdown of this terrible system were twofold in character. The first, of a subjective nature, resulted from the growing resistance of the hierarchy itself. Some future historian will be able to figure out with the aid of statistical data, the average time the various dignitaries, ministers, etc., held power before it was violently terminated by the death penalty or life imprisonment. The average will prove to be very short.

In the first period of the terror, while the situation was still new, people did not reflect much on it. With time, the events began to repeat themselves with boring regularity: one got settled, began to feel the joys of power for so many months or years and then—into prison, or to the wall to make room for others. It is not worth citing examples since they are all well known. A peculiar caricature of the permanent revolution ensued. These people opposed Trotsky and removed him from power since he gave them no perspective of stability; on the contrary, his concepts seemed to forecast eternal confusion and constant fluidity of values which could only unsettle the individual. In practice, everything turned out to be much worse.

The principle of a permanent purge of the apparatus by terrorist methods met resistance among the dignitaries. For a time, an attempt was made to create some sort of haven for people of a certain rank, such as members of the Party Central Committee. All this went down the drain during the Thirties. But when the bloody frenzy subsided, these tendencies reappeared. Stalin knew this and saw in it a personal threat. For a time, he resumed the old policy

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of playing one group against the other. He favored certain people and groupings in an ostentatious manner, only to push them aside after a while and flatter others. But this policy was played out with time. It ceased to be effective and the last planned purge, it seems, met with unanimous resistance. Who knows whether it did not contribute to the shortening of the old dictator's life?

But there was another historical factor, a more important one: the loss in population. There existed in the camps a certain average norm of endurance that was roughly calculated by the prisoners themselves. For instance, they figured in Oświęcim that an average healthy male could endure it for three months, although some inmates survived for years and came out in fair shape. Oświęcim, however, was a liquidation camp and Soviet camps did not generally have this objective. In the more typical camp the average life expectancy was figured roughly at four years (though some lived through it for a dozen or more).

Frequently, some fantastic figures were given on the number of camp inmates—sometimes as high as tens of millions. This does not seem close to the truth. Let us take a lower figure of two to three million at a time, and, at the rate previously mentioned, the average life span in camp for a period of twenty-five years, we get a multiplier of 5 to 6. This gives us a figure of 10 to 12 million people prematurely withdrawn from life.

This is an arbitrary method, true enough, but it provides an approximation of the losses in population. Take into account that children or very old people were not sent to these camps but that people in their prime of life and at their most effective producing age were, and the results of this monstrous decline become even more glaring. With few exceptions, the camps were a thoughtless waste of the labor force. . . .

NATIONALISM—RACISM—INTERNATIONALISM

Conservative Western observers generally rate the international policies of Stalin's late period very highly. They look at it from the traditional historic point of new: territorial conquests, growth of prestige stemming from power politics, etc. Among others, George Kennan, the American historian-diplomat, treats the problem in this way.

What is more interesting, many among them add the emergence of the Chinese People's Republic to the achievements of Stalinist policy. After China's emergence many foolhardy suppositions were tossed about. There were those who wrote that a block of 500 million people was now under Moscow's direct power and its command (Burnham). The events of subsequent years have corrected these light-minded conclusions.

If the existence of Red China weakens the potential of the capitalist world, it nonetheless becomes a big headache to Moscow

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in the internal relations within "the socialist camp." The difficulties and conflicts stem, first of all, and paradoxically, from internal and psychological similarities of the groups that came to power in both countries.

As in Russia, the thinking of the Chinese Communist Party consists of a mixture of traditional factors and revolutionary missionary fervor. The traditional factor is, primarily, an inclination to a specific chauvinism, a nationalist megalomania and xenophobia. From experience, we know that these types of systems turn first against their immediate neighbors....

In 1934, Stalin, in an interview granted to a Western journalist, declared it was possible that in the future the class struggle would be replaced by the struggle between races as the chief conflict in society. It was said at the time that Hitlerian racist propaganda was at its apex. This propaganda was initially regarded as crackpot, a chimera devoid of any realistic basis. But a chimera that can tell divisions to march and cannons to boom needs a more fundamental appraisal....

European analysts are struck by the fact that while in Europe the eventuality of a third world war evokes feelings of horror, in the countries of the Eastern world, the native intelligentsia has the opposite response—a sort of positive interest. The radical position of the Chinese Communist Party on the question of a future war, its denunciation of the official Russian position of co-existence as a betrayal of revolutionary interests, points up this contrast in feelings more clearly....

The Third World War, even with the large scale use of nuclear weapons, will not destroy biological life on earth and will not even destroy civilization (the claims of the possessors of these weapons notwithstanding). On the other hand, it is quite likely that it will result in the permanent mutilation of the white man's lands and eliminate them as serious contenders for world hegemony.

These rich, once rapacious and always contentious countries with their population decimated, their terrain poisoned by atomic radiation, will be doomed to cathexy. The centers of civilization and economic development will then move to other points on the globe.

No wonder, then, that in China, the Arabic countries, etc., the possibility of the third world war evokes rather hopeful expectations. They even hope that the newly emerging African states will become heirs to European civilization.

... In the European view, nationalities were formed primarily on the basis of a common language prevailing in a given territory, a defined type of historical tradition which nurtured the development of art, science, etc. National expansion engendered definite political consequences.

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It is very hard to speak of this type of nationality when speaking of India with its multitudinous languages, its wealth of contrasts, and its tribal and caste hatreds. The same is true for China where powerful language complexes exist as different from each other as the Anglo-Saxon from the Germanic. Europe talks about Arab nationalism, again a collection of rather complex multinational groupings. It applies to a still larger degree to the Negroes in Africa. Among the thousands of tribes, thousands of languages and dialects, no national consciousness in our sense of the world could have developed. Since the borders of the various countries of Africa were arbitrarily drawn by the colonizers, conditions were lacking for the creation of a feeling of solidarity among its inhabitants on a European scale. Under these conditions, the most important "bind" belonging to the black race is hatred of the colonizers.

The newly created states whose role in the political life of the world is growing are basically formed on supra-national foundations. European nationalisms under these new conditions in the world are becoming something of a glaring anachronism.

From this point of view, the developments in the USSR, the attempt to create a supra-national Soviet people, homogeneous, albeit composed of hundreds of tribes and nationalities, corresponds to developments in the rest of the world. What is irritating is that Great Russian domination remains, giving rise to deep resentment, particularly among other groups which were formed and consolidated at an earlier stage in history.

Foreign policy in both the East and West after Stalin's death revealed the same symptoms: limitation of the freedom of maneuver and choice. This seems to contradict the generally accepted view of the USSR's superior mobility, maneuverability and initiative in foreign policy, compared to the inefficiency and pedestrianism of the capitalist countries. There is a different outlook if it is approached from the viewpoint of the tasks facing Soviet diplomacy. The prime problem for the USSR is the presence of American troops in Western Europe. As long as the Americans are in Europe, the entire structure of relations, the network of dependencies and alliances by the USSR in Central and Eastern Europe remains questionable. Because of this, diplomacy must concentrate on the task of eliminating American troops from Europe. Actually, persuasion, diplomatic pressure and similar means have not the slightest chance of success. There remains only the second variant—war, with all the consequences discussed earlier.

Thus, the post war foreign policy of the USSR was blocked and Stalin knew it well. He attempted by every means at his disposal to prevent knowledge of this state of affairs from spreading among the masses. Russian commentators and foreign policy spe-

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cialists wrote elaborate studies for various journals on the alleged growing conflicts among the imperialists. They discovered some second rate, competitive quarrels among oil companies, conflicts on some custom duties and, generally, all the traditional maneuvers in the international-economic-financial fields and "proved" that these must lead to an armed conflict among the imperialists. At the same time, they minimized and slurred over the appearance of new solutions in the capitalist world. (The following episode was revealed by Kardelj: During a conference, someone mentioned the Benelux countries. Stalin burst out angrily shouting that there was no Benelux, it did not exist, was all a fiction.) They attempted, in this manner, to create the illusion that the USSR was far from isolated and retained freedom of movement.

To be sure, Stalin's moves in 1939 do not warrant Trotsky's derisive remark that they represented the "policy of a horse trader." As policies that might have been practiced and understood by Catherine the Second or Nicholas the First, they were timely and profitable. That is why Stalin was so appreciated by conservative specialists and historians. For the middle of the XXth century, it was an anachronistic policy. In no case, could it be construed as the policy of a leader of a socialist country. Ignoring new social-political situations in the world and the needs arising from them, Stalin's policy, in fact, created new inflammatory material and prepared new difficulties for the Soviet Union and its immediate neighbors.

Opposite the Chinese Wall that Stalin built around the USSR and its satellites or allies, a similar wall began to rise on the Western side. Feeling hemmed in, Stalin's successors, after his death, began to cut out openings in the wall to permit some international contacts and to relax prevailing tensions, using as justification Lenin's theory of the possibility of peaceful co-existence of socialist Russia with the capitalist powers.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER

The Bolshevik leaders liked to say that a Bolshevik is a particular type of man, an unusual man. One can agree with them, particularly if there is concern with creating a particular type of combativity, an ability to struggle to the point of complete aban-

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donment. To a great degree, it is due to a singleness of purpose, the grasping of one major idea which simplifies conclusions and decisions from above and a blind, supine discipline in Party ranks.

The consistent political line in a power struggle results in the Bolsheviks' invincibility in their contests with other parties organized on different principles. It is a case of iron pots in the midst of soft clay. Thus, all coalitions, alliances, etc., as a rule, end with the crushing of their partners whether these partners are anarchists, Left Social Revolutionaries or weaker states in the political, diplomatic maneuvers.

Let us add to this an ability to organize social passions, to direct and dispose of mass emotions and to fascinate some people with splendor of unlimited powers.

The Normans, once famous for their wars of conquest, had a specially organized élite of warriors. They were called the berserkers. They excelled in their ability and bravery over all others, but the ease with which they were aroused to murderous fury made them dangerous to their own comrades in arms. Hence, they traveled in separate boats and were kept apart.

Indubitably, Bolshevism contains within it a similar berserk element. The fighting spirit, lacking a concrete external enemy, turns inward. Groups and factions become irreconcilable. Comparatively minor programmatic differences result in accusations of betrayal. Those who witnessed factional struggles or the purges say that they had a trance-like quality. It was a kind of perverse ecstasy followed by a slow sobering period.

This berserk element exists only to a small extent among the more than 8 million members of the Communist Party of the USSR of whom the overwhelming majority are probably normal bread eaters. What we have spoken of refers to the real combative élite. It is of importance to the degree that from among this élite, as a rule, the people who lead the Party and the government emerge.

On the other hand, the relations with the masses, to use an accepted term, are shaped dialectically. The élite travels in separate boats. Its philosophy, way of thinking, personal fate, with few exceptions, remain alien and indifferent to the general citizenry despite a powerful propaganda apparatus. The primary job of this propaganda is the popularization of the personality of the "vozhd" —the leader. It basically appeals to the centuries old traditions of monarchist instincts. The leader's personality takes on the state interest, tries to arouse the interests of the masses—above all, the Great Russian masses. Obviously, these are not the emotions aroused by the British constitutional monarchy. We are dealing here with a new Caesarist formation where the leader reveals himself through great deeds and successes, through loud, propagandistic drum beating. The emotions aroused are volatile and therefore unstable.

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The premise for the success of the "vozhd" resides in completely isolating the individual. In Stalin's time "capitalistic encirclement" was compared to a pack of wolves lying in wait to devour the people of the USSR. In general, warlike emotions are the easiest to create and become most violent. It must be admitted that they became masters in playing on emotional eruptions. . . .

Aside from the possibility of defeat, war under a liberal regime is a great burden for the individual. It means all kinds of restrictions, material as well as spiritual, a lessening of individual freedom, state compulsions, etc. In the USSR, however, war was viewed differently by wide circles, primarily by the intellectuals, as a harbinger of freedom, a singular type of emancipation, liberation from the deadening bureaucratic Party formalism and an opening of the window to reality. These moods were described in Pasternak's last, famous novel. This unique reaction to war may be paradoxical; it may be astonishing. Certainly, its dangerous aspect is worth noting. This lack of fear of war (and such fear is strong in the West) among wide circles, reveals the lack of an important brake on governmental decisions in the area of war or peace.

In principle, the Stalin-created and developed concepts remain untouched. Violent personal criticism and the destruction of the cult of the individual were products of the XXth Party Congress, but the criticism was formal and limited. It has not touched the basis of Caesarism. On the contrary, all attempts of this kind were answered in an unequivocally hostile manner.

The only force capable of reforming the state and the regime is the Party, but it has no program of reform. In any case, it could not be done without touching its monopoly of power. The lack of a legal method for transferring power was made clear by the changes that occurred after Stalin's death, although every attempt was made to effectuate this transfer smoothly. Given this state of affairs, every change in power results in smaller or larger coup d'états. This does not do much to educate the masses.

Outside of the Party and its police ruling apparatus, there are two forces which inherently possess a certain organizational autonomy. One is the army. On several occasions, it played a decisive role in the struggle for power that took place in recent years. A certain effort was required to tame the ambitions of the military (Zhukov).

The other force which has its own propaganda apparatus at its disposal is the Russian Orthodox Church whose position has been seemingly strengthened in recent years. To it should be added the numerous sects acting illegally or semi-legally and exhibiting a good deal of dynamism.

It is logical for the Party to reject a program of reform. After

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all, it predicts that the development of present social relations will lead the USSR to the highest phase of human social development —communism. The Soviet scholars, as can be seen by the interview with Professor Strumilin in the Warsaw *Nowa Kultura,* have worked out a calendar for the gradual introduction of communism. This is supposed to start in coming decades and reach fulfillment in this century. No doubt, among some of the political activists in the Communist Party of the USSR there are many who really believe that they will live to see it come. To them, dissolution of the monstrous apparatus of state compulsion during the next period seems possible. But to tell the truth, according to Khrushchev's latest precepts, the omnipotent Party will remain and retain its function as regulator of relations in the new society.

It is very difficult to imagine a general psychological change among those responsible for the system's functioning. After 40 years of Communist rule, the economic mentality remains the same—money is still the hallmark of success, and the average citizen's goal is, as in the West, to possess the largest amount possible, so much so that most of the time he goes about getting it by illegal means. If experienced politicians like Malenkov or Molotov viewed with skepticism the socialist character of the present regime only a few years ago one is entitled to doubt the good faith of those who promise to usher in the new order.

The entire thing looks more and more like some hanky-panky on the part of the departed "vozhd" which his heirs took over as part of Stalin's estate and which was calculated to appeal to the imagination of the youth. The Chinese experience proves that decreeing new phases of development with a calendar leads only to confusion.

Translated from the Polish by Jacob Lofman

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A REPORT ON SPAIN

Juan Bacofrá

ONCE AGAIN FRANCO HAS REVEALED his political resiliency. With one hand he has tried to counter the recent pressure of 200,000 striking Spanish workers with some wage concessions and with the other hand he has filled more prison cells and unleashed the police squads of the ominous Social and Political Brigade; he combats the pressure of more conservative democratic forces with exile, while he tries to overcome defections in the Army and Church with political power; and to quiet Western powers he reshuffles his Cabinet.

That Franco was not overthrown by the varied pressures exerted against his regime earlier this year does not mean that a progressive change must await the dictator's death. The pressures were simply not adequate to the task, but this is not surprising since they are still in their preliminary stages. However, one anti-Franco current that has moved out of its formative stage and is responsible for bringing other latent opposition forces to the fore is the working class as evidenced by the recent strikes. Never before during Franco's reign did labor protest so vigorously and for such a prolonged period.

The strike movement, which began in November 1961 (and not in April 1962 as is commonly thought), came at a critical time, when the regime was trying to assume a "liberal" posture, hoping to be admitted to the Common Market. Franco's brutalization of striking Spanish workers — hundreds of strike leaders and workers were imprisoned and savagely tortured—dramatically exposed the regime's fraudulent claim to "organic democracy."

Admission to the European Common Market is essential for Franco's survival. Forty-seven percent of Spain's farm exports now go to the countries of the Common Market. Should this outlet be closed, it would be catastrophic for the regime. Thus, some conservative forces, including capitalists, fearful of the disastrous economic consequences of exclusion from the Common Market and aware that the regime is an obstacle to entry, have moved from support to opposition to Franco.

It is unfortunate that in his efforts to overcome European resistance to Spain's entry in the Common Market, Franco enjoys the support of the United States; not that Washington feels any special sympathy for the regime but it hopes that by opening Spain to foreign capital and pushing it into the

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Common Market the dictatorship will gradually change, divesting itself of its ugliest features. Apparently the U. S. would like to see a "new" Franco or a possible monarchical solution, fearful that a sudden disappearance of Franco from the political scene would lead to the kind of ferment that Washington fears. But history should make it clear to American political strategists that a dictator cannot be changed. He can only be removed by force.

It would be fortunate if the American government could realize for once what is at stake and throw its weight against admission of the present Spanish regime to the Common Market. Should Franco gain access to the Market it would run counter to the interests and liberties of the Spanish people, the Common Market itself would be completely discredited and the cause of democracy suffer a setback. Unhappily, every sign in Washington points in the opposite direction. For example, an American military mission has been secretly negotiating with the Franco government to build a Polaris submarine base in Southern Spain. Should this mission achieve its objective, Franco's international position would be strengthened and American prestige, already low, would sink still further.



FRANCO EXCELLED IN PROPAGATING *fear* in its thousand monstrous forms: fear of civil war, fear of Communism—distorted to an unbelievable and self-defeating degree—fear of property damage, etc. And for those who could not be terrorized by propaganda, Franco and the Falange resorted to methods reminiscent of techniques employed by the Inquisition in earlier centuries and by Nazi Germany and Communist Russia in modern times: prisons, labor camps and torture.

This fear is now being dissipated. Instead, there is the realization that anything is better than servitude. This loss of fear is characteristic, above all, among the workers, students and intellectuals.

Until recently, Spanish universities were a complete political void. Compulsorily regimented in a totalitarian Students' Union, lacking leaders and great teachers, without any ideals other than passing examinations, dancing, soccer and women, students were wholly apathetic politically. They grew up and were educated in an atmosphere of fear with only the books approved by the Church and the Falange to satisfy their intellectual needs. However, since 1955, students have had the opportunity to travel to other European countries. In the first moments of their stay in a foreign country, be it France or Sweden, they were dazzled and intoxicated by their first taste of freedom; their life in Spain seemed like a prison sentence by contrast and this impinged on their consciousness and conscience. When they returned to

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Spain they carried back the seeds of protest which they planted among friends and colleagues. There is still a long distance that Spain's youth must travel before it sloughs off all its fear, inhibitions and apathy. But the young have arisen from their torpor and nothing can stop a full awakening.

The same applies, in varying degrees, to the new generation of intellectuals who are profoundly dissatisfied and in permanent protest, despite having obtained more liberal concessions from the regime with regard to the printing of books, showing of films and staging of plays as well as the contents of artistic, literary and philosophical publications.

FOLLOWING THE RECENT STRIKE WAVE not only did the strikers win wage increases but benefits accrued to some groups of non-strikers as well. For example, the employees of the State Railway Network were given increases up to 97 percent. These increases will bring about a further rise in the price of consumer goods, which has been going up since the end of the "stabilization" period in 1960. The burdensome consequences of this stabilization were borne entirely by workers and other low-income groups, while the profits of most companies showed variable gains. Therefore not only will the recent wage increases be absorbed by rising prices but there will be a widening gap between the cost of living and the earning of some six million workers who did not receive any wage increase. This Fall, then, could witness a new strike movement which might this time prove decisive. Even now, social unrest continues in the Basque where the workers are demanding the release of their imprisoned comrades.

WHERE THE CHURCH IS CONCERNED, Pope John XXIII's encyclical, "Mater et Magister" (almost unknown to the public because of censorship), some bishops' pastoral letters and various articles in the Catholic magazine, *Ecclesia,* the only publication not subject to Falange censorship, especially one article defending the right to strike—provided several Catholic movements with the moral justification for supporting the workers' protest. Apparently, under the guidance of the Vatican, the bishops realized the need to abandon a sinking ship. The Church is beginning to fear the possible consequences of its close identification with and approval of the dictatorship, and wants to salvage what it can of the impending wreckage. Thus, to the extent that elements in the Church supported the workers it was largely opportunistically motivated, and the attitude of many workers was summed up by the remark of the governor of Oviedo, the capital of the mining region, that "the priests are backing up the miners but the miners cannot stand the priests."

To placate discontented members of the hierarchy, Franco dropped three Falangists from the

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Cabinet (the Falange has always been opposed by both Church and Army) and replaced two of them with members of the Opus Dei, whereupon the Church immediately denied any connection with the strikes. The third replacement was from the military; General Muñoz Grandes was given the post of Vice Premier to reassure the generals of their future should the dictator Premier disappear from the political scene.

WHAT OF THE ARMY in the event that Franco is removed? It is doubtful that the army would attempt a coup to establish a new dictatorship, being aware of the enormous resistance this would meet from the workers, the youth, from capitalists, and the Church. Another factor operating against a hypothetical military coup is that from the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel down, the officers do not share the privileges bestowed upon the army by Franco and therefore are discontented with the dictator. The dissatisfaction is even greater among non-commissioned officers whose position can be compared to an extent with that of the workers.

However, all the high ranking officers support either Franco or an absolute monarchy. The reason is obvious. The generals have been the group most lavishly provided for by Franco. Should Franco fall, they will probably try to restore the monarchy. It is generally conceded that a monarchy, considered a solution by Western governments, will follow his fall, because of the power of the generals. However, the people are opposed to the monarchy and would vote against it in a free election. And it is hardly likely that they will be won to the monarchist cause by the only two pretenders to the throne who have any chance of success, Juan de Bourbon and his son Juan Carlos. Both are compromised in the eyes of the people by their continuing close relationship with Franco and their voiced preference for a "traditional" monarchy, i.e., a corrupt system that held Spain in semi-feudal conditions since the 17th century. It is doubtful, then, that a post-Franco monarchy, propped up by a military clique of old generals, would be more than a transitional regime, given its lack of support among an aroused Spanish populace.

THE ALLEGED DANGER of Communism has been widely used by Franco, and to a lesser extent by the American government, to win support for the dictatorship. However, if Franco's slogan, "Me or Communism," has any effect it is to convince individuals to think of themselves as Communists. What is striking is the obtuseness of Western powers which cannot recognize that the longer Franco stays in power, the greater the chances for a Communist takeover. Not only does Franco's pinning the Communist label on all opponents win converts to the Communist cause but the longer his regime is propped up, the greater the opportunity for Communism to increase its relative strength among the clandestine organizations as it continues to be richly provided by Russia with funds, equipment and means of propaganda. The so-called Spanish Independent Broadcasting Station, with powerful transmitters located in Czechoslovakia, beams its propaganda to Spain 8-10 hours daily, where it is widely heard. Six other Communist countries also broadcast daily to Spain. The Western democracies, on the contrary, have exceedingly limited radio time for

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Spain and some of their broadcasts have even been used by the dictator for his own purposes.

The upshot of all this is that a considerable number of younger people are turning toward Communism. They have no prior experience with Communist movements, they do not really know what Communism is; but the fact that they consider themselves Communist could serve Communism well should the occasion arise. Other factors favoring the Communists are: there are a number of Falangists who were Communists who find it possible to shift from one to the other given the totalitarian nature of both movements; the popularity of Castro is growing among the Spanish people; finally, the Kremlin could receive active assistance from the powerful Italian and French Communist parties in turning Spain into a Communist bridgehead from which to export Communist propaganda and direct action to Latin America and Africa, taking advantage of Spain's privileged position on both these continents.

There was no Communist danger in Spain in 1936 and none at the end of World War II. But because of the lack of foresight, understanding and honesty on the part of Western powers, Communism became a real threat in 1937 and is today a potential danger.

If the Communists have so far shown only limited gains compared to their resources—though the gains are increasing from day to day—it is only due to the anti-Communist positions of other underground organizations, mainly Socialist and Libertarian, who are well acquainted with Communist tactics. In fact all democratic forces, after brief association with Communists in the mid-forties, have repeatedly repudiated Communist overtures for collaboration or merger.

It is now about two years since a wide spectrum of the democratic forces have united to form the Union of Democratic Forces which includes, among others, Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberal Catholics and Republicans. They have agreed upon a program which, in brief, calls for: all possible efforts to dislodge the dictator, the establishment of a provisional government, recognition of basic human and political rights, strict enforcement of law and public order, free elections after a reasonable period of time and acceptance of their results.

Another outstanding development is the full cooperation—for all practical purposes, the first time in Spanish labor history—of all trade unions: the General Union of Workers (U.G.T.), the National Labor Confederation (C.N.T.) and the Basque Union (S.T.V.) in a common front called the Trade Union Alliance (Alianza Sindical). The Alliance began its operations in May 1961, and its promise for a future, free Spain is splendid.

Although the actions of all these political groups in the interior of the country is greatly impeded by

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the work of the police, there are now clandestine organizations of all the leftist movements which opposed Franco in the Civil War; this despite the fact that thousands of their members died in the heroic fight, were murdered by Franco, are in exile, in prison or deprived of their citizenship rights in Spain. The Socialists and Anarchists are the most influential. During the strikes, both organizations, through their respective unions, U.G.T. and C.N.T., distributed their leaflets throughout the country. To my knowledge, the Workers Party of Marxist Unity (P.O.U.M.) has only small active strength in Spain. All these forces, savagely persecuted by the Spanish police, are forced to operate in small groups which are periodically caught by the dreadful Political and Social Brigade, or Spanish Gestapo, tortured and imprisoned. New groups are immediately formed to continue the task of keeping alive the ideals and to fight the regime by all means available. This has been going on for almost twenty years. People known to belong to, have connections or even sympathies with these organizations are closely observed and jailed whenever any suspicion of activity arises, or when the dictator pays a visit to the town where they reside. Before the recent strikes, fifty leaders of the C.N.T. were imprisoned throughout the country. Some of them have, fortunately, been set free again.

SPANISH SOCIALISTS HAVE a promising future in a free Spain. If they approach the C.N.T.'s forces intelligently and honestly they will be able to count on that organization's support and form a powerful political force in the country. This does not mean that anarchist unions will embrace the socialist program, but they have learned a great deal from the past and will not divorce themselves from political life in the future, and they will certainly support Socialist candidates in any election.

The Socialist Party is especially well suited for playing a leading role in areas where the need for action will be most pressing: education on all levels, agrarian reforms, formation of cooperatives, socialization of important industrial sectors, an extensive program of public works, social security and welfare legislation, to name but a few. But it must also somewhat change its traditional views to conform to present Spanish conditions. For example, it must be prepared to support regional autonomy and the decentralization of power through expanding the rights and duties of municipalities and provinces.

Above all, Spanish socialists must help to inspire the young with a growing sense of political self-awareness and idealism that is not yet sufficiently intense for it to play its full, necessary role in the creation of a free, democratic Spain.

JUAN BACOFRÁ *is an economist and collaborates on* España Libre, *the publication of the Spanish Confederated Societies.*

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Hal Draper

Marx and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

THIS STUDY DEALS WITH the origin and history of the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Marx and Engels. It asks: What did this term mean *to them?*

The larger subject behind it is "The State and Democracy" in Marx's writings. But study of this subject is shadowed by the belief that Marx advocated a "dictatorship." This is reinforced by the two types of exegetes who today carry on the cold war over the corpus of Marxism: the bourgeois ideologues who think they must prove Marx an authoritarian in order to defeat Moscow; and the Soviet schoolmen whose assignment it is to wrap Stalinism in quotations from Marx. Both these camps are anxious to prove the same thing. In fact, Marxian exegeses, once the property of a few socialist scholars, bids fair to become a minor world industry.

The larger issue, then, is the image of Marx for the modern world. For me, Marxism is the gateway to *a revolutionary socialism which is thoroughly democratic and a democratic socialism which is thoroughly revolutionary*. Hence the need for the investigation which follows.

1

THERE IS NO SURVEY of the use of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Marx and Engels which is even near complete. The first question is what the word "dictatorship" meant in the middle of the 19th century.

This happens to be a word that assumed its present meaning in relatively recent times. *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* dates this transformation to the "decade following the [First] World War." Till well into the 19th century the word remained primarily a reference to the institution of "dictatorship" in the Roman Republican constitution. The Roman *dictatura*

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was a constitutional provision for a temporary one-man ruler named for a particular crisis, with limited powers. The modern institution which corresponds to it is "martial law" (on the Continent, "state of seige") as a form of crisis-government.

By the time of the French Revolution, even the "one-man" connotation had weakened somewhat. The Girondins, for example, attacked "the dictatorship of the Paris Commune;" there were references to the "dictatorship of the Convention." We have here the "dictatorship" of a popular, relatively democratic body.

The primitive communist movement led by Babeuf in the last episode of the revolution picked up and used the word; between a one-man dictatorship and a dictatorship of the revolutionary leadership, they decided in favor of the latter. From this time to Marx, the idea of a revolutionary dictatorship was virtually standard in the early socialist and communist movement, being accepted in one form or another by Weitling, Saint-Simon, Bakunin, Proudhon and Louis Blanc, as well as the Three B's of the period, Babeuf, Buonarroti, Blanqui.

While Blanqui and the Blanquists, like others, advocated a revolutionary dictatorship, it is not true that Blanqui or his followers anticipated Marx in using the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," as has been asserted in some hundreds of books, each copying from the other. It has been established by Maurice Dommanget and Alan Spitzer that there is no record whatsoever that Blanqui ever used the term. The claim stems largely from R. W. Postgate's *Out of the Past,* not a line of whose purported evidence stands up under investigation. Everybody repeated the conclusion and no one bothered to check it.

These earlier advocates of revolutionary dictatorship clearly meant a dictatorship of one sort or another *over* the proletariat. As we shall see, Marx formulated the term "dictatorship *of* the proletariat" precisely as a counterposition to this idea, which was the orthodoxy of the day.

2

How does Marx use the word "dictatorship," apart from the term "dictatorship of the proletariat"?

Writing to Engels March 31, 1851, Marx details his money troubles and adds: "And besides all that, they have me exploiting the workers and striving for a dictatorship! *Quelle horreur."* Plainly he was not aware that he was for a dictatorship. In 1857 Marx writes of England that Palmerston's administration was a "dictatorship" since the beginning of the war with Russia. This, for his New York *Tribune* readers, refers to the war-crisis powers and activities of a government otherwise not very "dictatorial."

But let us look especially at the same work in which he is first going to use the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," namely, *The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850.* We have room only to point to three out of many passages.

(1) Here Marx first makes the distinction between the dictatorship *of a class* and dictatorship *over a class*: "But Cavaignac was not the dictatorship

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of the sabre over bourgeois society; he was the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by the sabre." Alongside Cavaignac existed also a sovereign Assembly; in fact, Marx refers elsewhere in the same work to "the dictatorship of Cavaignac and the Constituent Assembly," giving us the "dictatorship" of a representative body again, like the "dictatorship of the Convention."

(2) When in the next stage of the events the "Party of Order" used its parliamentary majority to scrap universal suffrage, Marx comments:

> By repudiating universal suffrage, with which it had hitherto draped itself and from which it sucked its omnipotence, the bourgeoisie openly confesses, *"Our dictatorship has hitherto existed by the will of the people; it must now be consolidated against the will of the people."* [All emphasis in quotations as in original.]

This reference to a "dictatorship" based on universal suffrage reflecting "the will of the people" is another indication of the aura of the word.

(3) Explicitly distinguished from a "dictatorship of the proletariat" is Marx's description of a possible government of "the social-democratic party," i.e. the party of the pink-socialistic Louis Blanc, whom he despised, and the timid democrats of the "Mountain," who were an even sorrier lot. (This was then called the "Red" party, but let us not be confused by terminology.) In a remarkable sentence Marx refers simultaneously to two "dictatorships" in connection with a discussion of the "exploiters" versus the "allies" of the *peasant*:

> The constitutional republic is the dictatorship of his united exploiters; the social-democratic, the Red Republic, is the dictatorship of his allies.

Obviously this does not mean what we mean by "dictatorship," but rather a *domination,* a *social rule.*

When in his writings Marx advocates the *domination* or *rule* of the working class, the term he usually employs is *Herrschaft.* This represents the view he adopted, probably around 1845 and first expressed in *The German Ideology,* that to achieve communism the proletariat must *take political power.* This is the view which is occasionally going to take the term "dictatorship of the proletariat."

In 1847 Engels wrote in an article, "In all civilized countries the necessary consequence of democracy is the political rule of the proletariat, and the political rule of the proletariat is the first presupposition of all communist measures." In his preliminary draft of the *Communist Manifesto,* he answered the question, "What will be the course of this revolution?" as follows:

> First of all, it will establish a *democratic constitution* and thereby, directly or indirectly, the political rule of the proletariat.

And in the *Manifesto* Marx and Engels say "that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy." When this has been accomplished and the proletariat abolishes "the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class."

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Although the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not appear in the *Manifesto,* the passages quoted here appear in our story later.

But the first "dictatorship" which Marx advocated was, in point of fact, not that of the proletariat. This was in the midst of the 1848 revolutionary upsurge in Germany when Marx, editing the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in Cologne, was lambasting the ludicrous pusillanimity and empty phrasemongering of the bourgeois National Assembly in Frankfurt, which was afraid to take any strong action against the Crown and the absolutist regime.

Its ministers, wrote Marx, were bleating about standing on Constitutional Principle while the absolutist counterrevolution organized itself. But what was going on was a revolution, which had first to *establish* constitutional principle. One had to fight with energy now so that there would be a constitutional principle to stand on.

> Every provisional state setup after a revolution requires a dictatorship, and an energetic dictatorship at that. From the beginning we reproached Camphausen [the prime minister] for not acting dictatorially, for not immediately shattering and eliminating the remnants of the old institutions. So while Herr Camphausen lulled himself with constitutional dreams, the defeated party strengthened its positions in the bureaucracy and in the army—indeed here and there even ventured on open struggle.

The "dictatorship," or "dictatorial measures," for which Marx is calling, then, is by the elected representative body of the German Democracy over the old regime. What exactly were the "dictatorial measures" he advocated, and what would the "dictatorship" of the Democracy have looked like? This is already partly indicated: "immediately shattering and eliminating the remnants of the old institutions" by (Marx goes on to say) *mesures de salut public* energetically and boldly carried through. His use of the French Revolution's term is intended to suggest the "dictatorship of the Commune."

But still, what are these "dictatorial measures" exactly? They are spelled out several times in *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany in 1848.* This passage can stand for all:

> . . . if the Assembly had been possessed of the least energy, it would have immediately dissolved and sent home the Diet—than which no corporate body was more unpopular in Germany—and replaced it by a Federal Government, chosen from among its own members. It would have declared itself the only legal expression of the sovereign will of the German people, and thus have attached legal validity to every one of its decrees. It would, above all, have secured to itself an organized and armed force in the country sufficient to put down any opposition on the part of the Governments.

But instead the Assembly of old women failed to take up the cause of, and recognize, the revolutionary uprisings that had broken out, or "to call the people to take up arms everywhere in defence of the national representation." Always, "they shrank back from decisive action." The old governments of the German states "had counted upon a very dictatorial and revolutionary action on its part" but in fact the Assembly gave them little cause to worry.

In short, Marx's first call for a revolutionary "dictatorship" was for an energetic regime by the nearest thing to a representative democracy that Germany had, literally a "dictatorship" of the Democracy.

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3

WE NOW COME TO THE LOCI in which Marx and Engels used the term "dictatorship of the proletariat." There are eleven in all (counting a work with more than one such passage as only one). They cluster in three periods: (1) 1850-52, i.e. after the revolution of 1848; (2) 1872-75, i.e. after the Paris Commune; and (3) 1890-91, this last period being, we shall see, a sort of echo from 1875.

In both the first and second periods, and most clearly in the very first locus, Marx used the term particularly in *connection with* the Blanquists.[1] What exactly was the nature of this connection? Marx's attitude toward Blanqui and his movement remained essentially the same from 1844, when Marx first became a socialist, to the end. This attitude combined complete rejection of the Blanquist putsch, to be made by a conspiratorial group with great admiration for Blanqui as a devoted and honest revolutionist; it combined great respect for Blanqui as a socialist militant with no respect for his ideas on how to make a revolution. In revolutionary periods Marx sought joint *action* with the Blanquists and other revolutionary currents—a "united front"—in spite of political disagreement. Such united-front contact took place especially in 1850 and again after the Paris Commune. In both cases these were "united fronts" or joint action in London, between Marx and Engels and Blanquist *refugees* from the fighting in France.

In these contacts, Marx and Engels, rejecting the Blanquist concept of dictatorship, *counterposed to it* their own formulation of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

This is what Engels explained in retrospect when, in 1874, he set down explicitly the difference between the Blanquist and the Marxist idea:

> From Blanqui's assumption, that any revolution may be made by the outbreak of a small revolutionary minority, follows of itself the necessity of a dictatorship after the success of the venture. This is, of course, a dictatorship, not of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of the small minority that has made the revolution, and who are themselves previously organized under the dictatorship of one or several individuals. [This passage is referred to below as Locus 7.]

One can hardly demand a clearer line of demarcation between the Blanquist dictatorship of the active revolutionary minority and a *class dictatorship* or domination, the rule "of the entire revolutionary class." This emphasis on *class* dictatorship is what we find in the first locus.

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1. Of the 11 Marx-Engels loci on "dictatorship of the proletariat," Lenin's *State and Revolution* gave the ones here numbered 5a, 6, 8, 11, adding no. 4 in its second edition. Kautsky's reply pretended there was only one in Marx. Ernst Drahn, *Karl Marx und Fr. Engels ueber die Diktatur des Proletariats* (1920) knows only of loci 4, 8, 10. Max Beer's "An Inquiry into Dictatorship" (*Labour Monthly*, August 1922) mentions only 1a, 1c, 4, 6, 8. Sherman H. M. Chang's *Marxian Theory of the State* (1931) quotes 1a, 1c, 4, 5a, 6, 8 — exactly one half the available passages, the most to date. The opposite record is held by Stanley W. Moore, *The Critique of Capitalist Democracy; Introduction to the Theory of the State in Marx, Engels, and Lenin* (1957), which never reveals that the term is to be found in Marx or Engels at all.

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The first use of "dictatorship of the proletariat" is in Marx's articles, later assembled under the title *The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850,* in his new London magazine *Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-Ökonomische Revue.* The first article (in the first issue) was written in January and published in early March.

After the defeat of the June 1848 workers' uprising, says Marx, "there appeared the bold slogan of revolutionary struggle: *Overthrow of the bourgeoisie! Dictatorship of the working class!"* [Let us call this Locus 1a.]

There is a problem here. Marx writes that "the bold slogan" appeared: "Overthrow of the bourgeoisie!" But then there immediately follows the slogan of the "dictatorship of the working class." Is Marx intending to say that this slogan "appeared" among the revolutionary workers too? But it is quite certain that it did not. I suggest he is not literally claiming that this hitherto-unknown slogan "appeared," but rather he is explaining, in apposition, what the "bold slogan" of overthrow of the bourgeoisie means—in the first place, what it means to him, Marx. In reality he is launching the slogan himself, putting words to the inchoate working-class aspiration expressed in the revolution.

In the second article (written at the beginning and published toward the end of March) Marx comments that the proletariat was "not yet enabled through the development of the remaining classes to seize the revolutionary dictatorship" and therefore "had to throw itself into the arms" of the social-democrats. [This qualifies as Locus 1b.] He is here not only excluding the idea of establishing the "revolutionary dictatorship" by a band of conspirators, but also even by the proletariat as long as it does not yet have the support of other classes. As elsewhere in the same work, as previously in the *Manifesto,* the "rule" or "dictatorship of the proletariat" is firmly linked to the idea of majority support.

The third article (written March 5-15 and published in mid-April) said:

> the proletariat rallies more and more round *revolutionary socialism,* round *communism,* for which the bourgeoisie has itself invented the name of *Blanqui.* This socialism is the *declaration of the permanence of the revolution,* the *class dictatorship* of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the *abolition of class distinctions generally,* to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social relations. [Locus 1c.]

It is ironic that this, by Marx himself, is the only contemporary passage on record which links Blanqui's name with "dictatorship of the proletariat"! It is *Marx* who does the linking. Of course, he is not saying it is Blanqui's slogan; he is saying that the bourgeoisie has attached Blanqui's name to this revolutionary socialism, emphasizing the *class* character of the revolutionary regime.

4

WE CAN NOW SUGGEST WHY THE TERM "dictatorship of the proletariat" makes its appearance *in connection with* the Blanquists but not *by* the Blanquists. Ordinarily Marx's expression for this idea was "rule of the proletariat," "political power of the working class," etc., as in the *Manifesto.* When, however, it is a question of counterposing this class concept to the Blanquist-type dictatorship, it is dressed in the formula "class dictatorship." Class dictatorship is then counterposed to Blanquist dictatorship.

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In united fronts with the Blanquists, it was only such a class formula- that could be acceptable to Marx. Such a united front was formed in early 1850 when Marx still considered a new revolutionary upsurge to be imminent. He set about developing a framework for joint action by revolutionary groups from various countries, an embryonic International, through representatives in London, including the left-wing Chartists around Harney, the Communist League of the German émigrés, and the French revolutionary refugees "who wanted to differentiate themselves from the bourgeois democrats [and therefore] usually called themselves Blanquist" (as Arthur Rosenberg puts it in *Democracy and Socialism*).

In April there was formed a Société Universelle des Communistes Révolutionnaires on the basis of a brief Programmatic Agreement signed by Marx, Engels and August Willich for the Communist League, Harney, and two Blanquist émigrés. The constituent organizations retained their independence while joined in practical collaboration. Article 1 of the Agreement read:

> The aim of the association is the downfall of all the privileged classes, to subject these classes to the dictatorship of the proletarians by maintaining the revolution in permanence until the achievement of communism, which is to be the last organizational form of the human family. [Locus 2.]

This is in Willich's handwriting, and perhaps the exact formulation is his too.

At the very same time that this agreement was made, Marx and Engels published in *NRZ-Revue* an open criticism of the Blanquist conspiratorial illusions which their French allies held, characterizing them as "forestalling the process of revolutionary development, pushing it artificially into crises, making a revolution on the spur of the moment without the conditions for a revolution . . . They are the alchemists of the revolution," etc. This educational critique of Blanqu*ism,* at the very moment after they had entered into a united-front agreement with Blanqu*ists,* was a deliberate effort by Marx and Engels to utilize the new relationship to "straighten out" their allies, to influence their views.

While it is doubtful if the SUCR ever really got off paper in the first place, in any case it died for good after September, when Marx concluded that the revolutionary wave was spent and that reorientation toward a new period was necessary.

Marx's *Class Struggles in France* next evoked an echo within Germany. In Frankfurt, the *Neue Deutsche Zeitung* was co-edited by Joseph Weydemeyer and Otto Lüning (who were also brothers-in-law). Weydemeyer had been a supporter and personal friend of Marx since 1845 and was anxious to publicize Marx's writings; Lüning was a sympathizer of the so-called "True Socialists." The *NDZ* in June carried a long review in four installments summarizing Marx's work, written by Lüning. In addition, in one critical passage Lüning put the spotlight on Marx's idea of "the revolutionary rule, the dictatorship of the working class" (Lüning's words). A transitional dictatorship was necessary, he agreed, yet "class rule is always an immoral and irrational state of affairs," and the aim should be "not the transference of rule from one class to the other but the abolition of class differences."

It should be noted that he did not direct any objection to the *Diktatur;*

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he was speaking of any *Klassenherrschaft,* any class rule. In the July 4 issue Marx had a brief letter to the editor (*Erklärung*). [Locus 3.]

> . . . you reproached me with advocating the *rule and the dictatorship of the* working classes, while as against me you urge the *abolition of class differences generally*. I do not understand this correction.
>
> You knew very well that the *Communist Manifesto* . . . says: [Here Marx quotes the same passage we referred to in section 3.]
>
> You know that I advocated the same view in the *Poverty of Philosophy* against Proudhon . . . [This refers to the last page or two of the book.]
>
> Finally, the very same article which you criticize . . . says: [Here Marx quotes our Locus 1*a*.]

One of the interesting features of this communication is that Marx (like Lüning himself) is not aware of any special point, to be explained or defended, in the use of *Diktatur*. It does not seem to be a problem. The passage in the *Class Struggles* with its "dictatorship of the proletariat" is assimilated in his own mind with his formulations in the *Communist Manifesto* and elsewhere, confirming the oft-expressed view that the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" is to be equated with the *Manifesto's* formulation "rule of the proletariat."

That this exchange with Lüning centers not around "dictatorship" but the basic idea of working-class rule emerges clearly from Lüning's subjoined note on Marx's reply. He agrees that Marx's correction is "well-based." But he still complains that

> Herr Marx himself, but even more his supporters, constantly put the accent on the *rule* of the class, the *abolition* of which they let peep out only reluctantly as a later concession. In contrast I wished to place the abolition in the foreground, as the goal and aim of the movement.

As far as Marx's passages are concerned, most particularly the one Lüning picked up, it is easy to dispose of his complaint, but more interesting is his side-blow against the "supporters" of Marx who put too great stress on the "rule." It is true that Lüning's petty-bourgeois socialism was naturally uneasy at any idea of working-class rule, whether in the foreground or background, but it is still interesting to see in his words a reference to that one of Marx's "supporters" who was his own co-editor and brother-in-law and with whom he had no doubt often discussed—namely, Weydemeyer.

Weydemeyer now becomes the link with the next locus, which is one of the two most often cited: Marx's letter to Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852. This is the one and only time that the term crops up in Marx's private correspondence. Why does it make its appearance at this time? There is an episode to be filled in.

After escaping from Germany and finally deciding to emigrate to America, Weydemeyer arrived in New York on November 7, 1851. The first article of his published in the U. S. (written in December) appeared in the January 1, 1852 issue of the New York *Turn-Zeitung*.

Its title was "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

This is probably the only article with such a title till at least 1918. It is all the more interesting since the article is not really about the dictatorship of the proletariat for the most part. Most of it is a condensation of a good part of the *Communist Manifesto*. There is a reference to *die Diktatur*

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des in den grossen Städten konzentrirten Proletariats only in the last paragraph.

For present purposes the most important thing about Weydemeyer's article is simply its existence. Indications are that when Marx penned his famous letter of March 5 to Weydemeyer, he had just recently received the latter's own article on "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

This letter, moreover, is devoted to giving his friend suggestions for material for subsequent articles, in the course of which he advises on the treatment of certain American opponents. The reference to "dictatorship of the proletariat" comes in here. The next paragraph says: "From the foregoing notes take whatever you consider suitable." In other words, Marx has been jotting down notes to be used by Weydemeyer for his, Weydemeyer's, own articles.

What Marx wrote was that he did not claim credit for discovery of classes or the class struggle:

> What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up with *particular historical phases in the development of production,* 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat,* 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a *classless society.* [Locus 4.]

In using "dictatorship of the proletariat" here, instead of his usual "rule of the proletariat," etc., Marx was echoing Weydemeyer, who himself was echoing Marx in 1850. Marx was throwing in a phrase that had special connotations and associations for his correspondent. His use of it in a private letter in passing depended on a certain amount of "understood" background. In this sense Weydemeyer was not just the recipient of the famous letter but its begetter.

5

FOR THE NEXT 20 YEARS, no sign of the term appears in any writing, public or private, by Marx or Engels. (Or by anyone else, including Blanquists.)

During these decades there was little contact between Marx and the Blanquists; it is no accident that during these same two decades the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not show up. The Blanquists talked as usual about the revolutionary dictatorship of their band or of "Paris," and the Marxists talked as usual about the "rule of the proletariat" or "political power of the working class." What we have seen is that the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" as used by Marx is the reformulation of the latter when counterposed to the former.

When Marx wrote his great defense and analysis of the Paris Commune, *The Civil War in France,* he still had no contact with the Blanquists. The term "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not appear in this work. There are three features of it important for the rest of our story:

(1) Marx presents the Commune as "a working-class government . . . the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of Labour." This and other formulations are so sweeping that a government so described must be, for Marx, that which he elsewhere called "dictatorship of the proletariat."

(2) What determined the character of the Commune, for Marx, was the *hegemony of the proletariat* in the revolution, that is, the fact that all

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the other class elements in the revolution looked to it as the vanguard and leader.

(3) At the same time, lengthy sections of *The Civil War in France* are devoted to painting in glowing colors the thoroughgoing *democratic* character of the Commune: universal suffrage, all officials and judges elective and revocable, abolition of the standing army, end of all "hierarchic investiture," depoliticalization of the police, communal democracy from below replacing the shattered centralized state, etc. All this Marx summed up by saying that the Commune "supplied the Republic with the basis of really democratic institutions . . . its special measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the people." (In contrast, the Blanquists regarded the Commune's democratic measures as a weakness and a mistake. The contrast between these two diametrically opposed analyses of Commune democracy was contained *in ovo* in the two different formulations on the "dictatorship.")

With the defeat of the Commune, the influx of Communards to London included many Blanquists and their leaders. Here for the first time many of them came into prolonged contact with Marx, his circle, and the General Council of the International. There was considerable impact on them for several reasons: the role of Marx's *Civil War in France* as a champion of the Commune in the eyes of the scandalized official world; Marx's massive relief work for the refugees; the addition of a number of Blanquists, especially Vaillant, to the General Council, working with Marx; the Blanquists' joint fight with Marx against the Bakunin faction; friendship with Marx's two French sons-in-law, Longuet and Lafargue.

For these reasons, and perhaps also because the experience of the Commune reinforced the same direction, the ideas of the London Blanquists underwent a degree of "Marxification." Their political formulations were largely affected, if not their essential putschism. This was displayed especially in two programmatic statements they issued, in 1872 and in 1874, both of these containing references to "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Publicly as well as privately Engels stated more than once during this period, rather exultingly, that the new Blanquist program had dressed itself in Marxist ideas. Once was in his *The Housing Question* (1872):

> . . . when the so-called Blanquists made an attempt to transform themselves from mere political revolutionists into a socialist workers' faction with a definite programme—as was done by the Blanquist fugitives in London in their manifesto, *Internationale et Révolution* [1872]—they . . . adopted, and almost literally at that, the views of German scientific socialism on the necessity of political action by the proletariat and of its dictatorship as the transition to the abolition of classes and with them of the state—views such as had already been expressed in the *Communist Manifesto* and since then on innumerable occasions. [Locus 5a.]

Here we have Engels stating categorically and publicly that when the Blanquists (in London anyway) *did* use "dictatorship of the proletariat" for the first time in 1872, they took it from Marx, not the other way round as Postgate believed. Twice more in this period Engels described the "Marxification" of the London Blanquist program. Furthermore, the passage on "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the 1872 program *Internationale et Révolution* of the Blanquists virtually says itself that this is a new view for them "axiomatic since the 18th March," i.e. since the Paris Commune.

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As for Marx and Engels: first use of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" in this period is by Engels in his book *The Housing Question* (1872), originally three newspaper articles. The term occurs twice; we have already given Locus 5a. In the second passage Engels polemizes against a Proudhonist as follows:

> Friend Mülberger thus makes the following points here:
> 1. "We" do not pursue any "class policy" and do not strive for "class domination." But the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, just *because* it is a *workers' party,* necessarily pursues a "class policy," the policy of the working class. Since each political party sets out to establish its rule in the state, so the German Social-Democratic Workers Party is necessarily striving to establish *its* rule, the rule of the working class, hence "class domination." Moreover, *every* real proletarian party, from the English Chartists onward, has put forward a class policy, the organization of the proletariat as an independent political party, as the primary condition of its struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat as the immediate aim of the struggle. By declaring this to be "absurd," Mülberger puts himself outside the proletarian movement and inside the camp of petty-bourgeois socialism. [Locus 5b.]

What stands out is Engels' obvious assumption that "dictatorship of the proletariat" has no *special* meaning other than the taking of power in the state by the socialist workers' movement. It appears here as one of three or four terms used indiscriminately: "class domination," "rule of the working class," etc. We are also told that *every* real proletarian party stands for it, including the Chartists—a statement which can make no sense to anyone who believes there is some special "theory of proletarian dictatorship" apart from the basic idea of the need and goal of working-class political power.

THAT THE TERM WAS ALSO on Marx's mind now was evidenced the following year, in an out-of-the-way place: an article written January 1873, for an Italian journal, directed against Proudhonism and anarchism (title: "L'Indifferenza in Materia Politica"). Since the passage in this article was cited in Lenin's *State and Revolution* it has been often referred to, but without explanation of its peculiar context. For the passage is not exactly set down by Marx in his own name.

The article begins abruptly with a long section all in quotation marks, purporting to represent what an anti-political Proudhonist would say if he set down his views bluntly. The tone is satiric:

> "If the political struggle of the working class assumes violent forms, if the workers substitute their revolutionary dictatorship for the dictatorship of the bourgeois class, they commit the terrible crime of violating principle [lesoprincipio]; because, in order to satisfy their wretched, profane everyday needs, in order to crush the resistance of the bourgeois class, instead of laying down arms and abolishing the state they give it a revolutionary and transitional form . . ." [Locus 6.]

Marx, of course, implies he himself proposes that "the workers substitute their revolutionary dictatorship for the dictatorship of the bourgeois class," but the whole thing is said in passing. We do get the direct counterposition of two *class* dictatorships, one the alternative to the other, thereby putting the accent on the social basis of the power rather than on the political forms of the regime.

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The next use of the term is by Engels in 1874, and we have already quoted it in section 3 above [Locus 7]. It appeared in Engels' article on "The Program of the Blanquist Fugitives from the Paris Commune" in the *Volksstaat*.

This period of tension with Blanquism no doubt accounts for the fact that the term, being around, gets used in an important document written by Marx the following year—his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, attacking the Lassallean formulations in the unity program being proposed for the merger of the two existing German socialist parties. This document was a sort of circular addressed to the "Eisenacher" leaders.

This passage on "dictatorship of the proletariat" is one of the two most often-quoted loci, yet it is one of the barest. Its context is an attack on Lassalle's now-well-known fetishism of the state; Marx is arguing that "Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ standing above society into one completely subordinated to it." He raises the question of the dying-away of the state in the future society, and adds:

> Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.* [Locus 8.]

That's all, but a passage on the next page is very relevant. Marx has said that the *state* will be a dictatorship of the proletariat. We now get a very sharp reminder that when he says "state" he does not mean the "government machinery." To say that the *state* is a rule or dictatorship of the proletariat is a *social description,* a statement of the class character of the political power. It is not a statement about the forms of the government machinery.

The last thing to note is that Marx does not propose that the party program call for "dictatorship of the proletariat." The missing demand which he does press is that for the *democratic republic,* though he reluctantly agrees that government repression rules out its open inclusion. (Nor did Marx bring in "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a term when the program of the French Marxist party was drafted in his London study in 1880.)

6

THERE NOW ENSUES ANOTHER HIATUS OF 15 YEARS—no mention of "dictatorship of the proletariat" in any writing by Marx or Engels, public or private.

The next time we meet it is in a letter by Engels to Conrad Schmidt, October 27, 1890, explaining that historical materialism does *not* say that only economic factors are operative in history:

> If therefore Barth supposes that we deny any and every reaction of the political, etc., reflexes of the economic movement upon the movement itself, he is simply tilting at windmills. He has only to look at Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* . . . Or *Capital* . . . Or why do we fight for the political dictatorship of the proletariat if political power is economically impotent? Force (that is, state power) is also an economic power! [Locus 9.]

Here "dictatorship of the proletariat" is tossed in with the utmost casualness as a mere synonym for the conquest of political power.

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Why did the term recur to Engels now, after a 15-year gap? Perhaps because he was already looking back at Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program* in anticipation of the coming Erfurt party program discussion. For not long after, Engels proceeded to get Marx's 1875 critique published for the first time, with results leading to our next two (and last) loci.

Engels knew that its publication would be "a bomb" because of its attack on Lassalle, whose legend had grown. The target was also the rapidly developing opportunist trends in the party. On both scores there was indeed a violent reaction. One of the things that was seized on was the fact that the newly published document used the term "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." In the Reichstag itself, the social-democratic deputy Karl Grillenberger arose to repudiate Marx and say for the party that

> the Social-Democratic party rejected the suggestion which Marx had made for its program. Marx was annoyed by the fact that the German Social-Democratic party has worked out its program as it thought fit in view of conditions in Germany, and that therefore for us any revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is out of the question.

The veneer of "Marxism" which lay over the top strata of the party had broken through. It is doubtful whether the good Reichstag deputy shuddered more over the word "dictatorship" or the word before it.

Eighteen days after, Engels finished his introduction to a new edition of Marx's *The Civil War in France,* the last words being "the dictatorship of the proletariat." This line of thought takes off from another attack (similar to Locus 7) on the Blanquist concept of "the strictest dictatorship, and centralization of all power in the hands of the new revolutionary government." In contrast Engels offers the Paris Commune, reviewing (as did Marx) its great expansion of democracy and control from below. Then follows a criticism of "the superstitious belief in the state" typical of Germany, and the need "to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrapheap." Then the last paragraph:

> Of late, the Social-Democratic philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: Dictatorship of the proletariat. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat. [Locus 10.]

Three months later he had another "bomb" ready for the "Social-Democratic philistines": a critique of the new draft program (Erfurt program). In this, as he wrote Kautsky, he "found an opportunity to let fly at the conciliatory opportunism of the Vorwärts [party organ] and at the *frisch-fromm-fröhlich-freie* 'growth' of the filthy old mess 'into socialist society.'"

Here Engels raises very sharply the question of the demand for the democratic republic, which had been omitted from the program. In the course of this he remarks:

> One thing that is absolutely certain is that our party and the working class cannot achieve rule except under the form of the democratic republic. This latter is even the specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the Great French Revolution already showed. [Locus 11.]

True, he agrees, the program cannot openly come out for the democratic republic in so many words, but ways must be found to say as much:

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> . . . what in my opinion can and should go into the program is the demand for the *concentration of all political power in the hands of the representation of the people.* And that would be enough in the meantime, if one cannot go any further.

So "concentration of all power in the hands of the representation of the people" stands for the forbidden "democratic republic," and this in turn is "the specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The advocate of that revolutionary dictatorship which perturbed the "Social-Democratic philistines" is arguing with them that they should hint at their goal of a democratic republic instead of adapting themselves to the kaiser regime's legality.

With this episode of 1891, prefiguring the future, comes to a close the story of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," as far as Marx and Engels are concerned. But of course, as we know, this is only the first chapter in the history of that phrase.[2]

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[2] This is a much condensed version of a study which will be published shortly (about September) in No. 6 of *Etudes de Marxologie* (Paris), edited by M. Rubel, and which will present full reference notes, considerably more detail, and some additional sections. The spring issue of *Labor History* (III,2) contains a translation of the article by Weydemeyer on Dictatorship of the Proletariat, referred to here, and my introduction to it.—H.D.

HAL DRAPER, *former Editor of* The New International *and* Labor Action, *is on the Editorial Board of* New Politics.

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Albert Fried

The Scientific Culture of C. P. Snow

SCIENCE IS THE SOURCE of wealth and power today. It revolutionized the West and is now even more rapidly revolutionizing the rest of the world. How can this revolution be carried out to the best advantage of both the West and the people now experiencing it? Sir Charles Percy Snow, the well-known novelist, scientist and administrator offers an answer which, to judge from his popularity and influence, reflects a widely held point of view: Scientists should not only be the instruments of the revolution, they should sponsor it, guide it and preside over it as well.

He has written two short essays to show why and how this should be done. *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* is addressed to the two communities to which Snow himself belongs, the "literary intellectual" and the scientific. He calls attention to a profound division between them marked by mutual antipathy, ignorance and contempt, which augurs the possible fall of the West. The underdeveloped countries, the poor everywhere, are embracing science as their hope of life. They realize that only through industrialization will their poverty, ignorance and disease be eradicated. The world insists now on obtaining what the West has achieved. Snow sees in this situation a direct threat to the West unless it shares its science and technology with the rest of the world. But the condition for undertaking such a task—and here is Snow's point—is that the two cultures be brought together in such a way that science takes its proper—undoubtedly it would be a dominant—place in

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society. The effects of the change, especially in education, would be revolutionary. Nothing less would suffice for Snow.

He is convinced that scientists deserve to be the governing élite. They possess unique qualities emanating from the nature of science itself. According to Snow, scientists "have the future in their bones," while the other culture "responds by wishing the future did not exist." Also, the scientific culture carries on arguments "almost always at a higher conceptual level than the literary persons' arguments." The "scientific edifice of the physical world . . . in its intellectual depth, complexity and articulation [is] the most beautiful and wonderful collective work of the mind of man." Morally, too, Snow insists, scientists "are by and large the soundest group of intellectuals we have; there is a moral component right in the grain of science itself, and almost all scientists form their own judgments of the moral life."

Snow presses forward his argument, this time to prove the peculiar political merit of scientists, in his essay, *Science and Government*. He is persuaded that the temperament and morality of scientists specially equip them to make political decisions. "We are becoming existential societies," he warns (neglecting to explain what he means by existential societies), "and we are living in the same world with future-directed societies." Scientists should accordingly be active on all levels of government, for "they have something to give which our kind of existential society is desperately short of." This peremptory conclusion follows a long explanation of a conflict between politicians and scientists over an important decision, which turned out to be a blunder, made by the British government during World War Two. But the explanation, instead of proving the conclusion, contradicts it or bears no relation to it.

When Churchill took power in 1940 he appointed his friend F. A. Lindemann as his scientific adviser. Lindemann was a nasty and reactionary man who despised anyone who disagreed with him. With Churchill's approval he devised the plan for saturation bombing of German factories and working-class homes. Several other scientists objected to it on the ground that the bombs could more effectively be dropped elsewhere. When the war ended it was revealed that most German factories remained in use and that German workers had actually increased their output. Snow sees this blunder resulting from a situation in which politics counts for more than science in making decisions. But the blunder only proves that when the scientist is called upon to participate in a political decision he acts as a politician and not as a scientist. Snow fails to show that Lindemann's policy was less scientific than his opponents' objections or that his opponents' objections were less political than his policy. To judge from this case, society would gain nothing by replacing existentialist politicians with scientific politicians.

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SNOW'S ARGUMENTS ARE DIFFICULT to take hold of, much less bite into. He does not develop abstract ideas, he intimates them or presents them as asides. It is as though he were talking informally to colleagues at a Cambridge High Table or to friends at a cocktail party. Judgments are made about things we all assume are very important but we are not told why. Snow's style and content thus accords with what appears to be his intention: to have a talk with the governing élite from who he can expect immediate action. Snow's essays are actually policy statements.

But they are no less disturbing for all their intellectual shortcomings. One of his cardinal tenets is that the Soviet Union is the scientific society par excellence, the very model of what might and ought to be done. It has bridged the gap between the two cultures. In Snow's words:

> With some qualifications, I believe the Russians have judged the situation sensibly. They have a deeper insight into the scientific revolution than we have, or than the Americans have. The gap between the cultures doesn't seem to be anything like so wide as with us. If one reads contemporary Soviet novels, for example, one find that their novelists can assume in their audience—as we cannot —at least a rudimentary acquaintance with what industry is all about. Pure science doesn't often come in, and they don't appear much happier with it than literary intellectuals are here. But engineering does come in. An engineer in a Soviet novel is as acceptable, so it seems, as a psychiatrist in an American one. They are as ready to cope in art with the process of production as Balzac was with the processes of craft manufacture.

This is an incredible statement. Snow would have it believed that these novelists express the feelings of Russian society. But they only express what the Soviet state wants Russian society to appear to feel. Naturally, the gap between the two cultures is closed: society is the instrument of the state and the state's policy is to promote the accomplishments of industry. Snow mentions nothing of the *quality* of the Soviet novels that are being published. It is hard to believe that he would grade a hack novelist who praises scientific



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culture higher than a Pasternak who disdained it and a D. H. Lawrence who loathed it. If Russian writers were free it is just possible that the gap between the cultures might even be wider than in the West.

The important thing for Snow is not whether a society is free but whether it is industrialized. This amounts to saying that industrialization *is* freedom. Accordingly, *how* societies industrialize is secondary to the industrialization itself. It is enough that the deed is done. Of course the same argument has been presented many times before. Briefly, it goes: history is the march of progress and the triumph of science. Those who oppose the method of making society over into a scientific one oppose science or history itself. Therefore it is understandable, though unfortunate, that a high cost must be paid for keeping in step with progress. The results are more than worth it. Snow writes in *The Two Cultures,* referring to the great leap that Russia has made, and that China will have made, in one generation:

> These transformations were made with inordinate effort and with great suffering. Much of the suffering was unnecessary: the horror is hard to look at straight, standing in the same decades. Yet they've proved that common men can show astonishing fortitude in chasing jam tomorrow. Jam today, and men aren't at their most exciting: jam tomorrow, and one often sees them at their noblest. The transformations have also proved something which only the scientific culture can take in its stride. Yet, when we don't take it in our stride, it makes us look silly.

It should not be thought that Snow prefers one ideology over another. Industrialization transcends all ideologies. Snow is as prepared to excuse the crimes of nineteenth century capitalism as of twentieth century Communism. This leads him to make particularly crude and unfair criticisms of nineteenth century intellectuals who opposed the industrial revolution. In a chapter of *The Two Cultures,* "Intellectuals as Natural Luddites" (the Luddites, it will be recalled, were English workers in the early nineteenth century who destroyed the machinery which had taken away their jobs), he in effect accuses them of moral cowardice for preferring aestheticism to industrialization. The Ruskins, Morrises, Emersons and Thoreaus of the world "shuddered away as though the right course for a man of feeling was to contract out." It is true that Ruskin and Morris were incorrigible aesthetes who blamed machinery along with capitalism for the condition of the English people and English countryside. But they did blame capitalism and genuinely felt for its victims. They sang no such paean to the future as Snow sings because they were much more horrified than Snow at what they saw in the present. How could they justify sci-

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entific progress if it destroyed man's bodies and souls? They, along with the workers who had been mercilessly driven off the land by enclosure and by the repeal of the Corn Laws, would have laughed bitterly at Snow's romantic assertion that "with singular unanimity, in any country where they have had the chance, the poor have walked off the land into factories as fast as the factories would take them." Presumably, the Soviet Union is fortunate in not having such intellectuals as Ruskin and Morris to "contract out" on her.

Snow himself personifies the scientific culture which literary intellectuals have, for good reason, come to distrust. The distrust did not always exist. The meaning of science has changed. Scientists were once revolutionaries. In the seventeenth century the philosophies of Galileo, Descartes and Spinoza, attempting to establish new methods of thinking in defiance of temporal and religious authority, required personal no less than intellectual heroism. But since the end of the eighteenth century, when science revolutionized technology, the burgeoning power of state and industry has simultaneously subordinated science to technology and technology to its immediate and exclusive needs. What do scientists today have in common with the great moralists of the seventeenth century? Science has become the chief means by which massive organizations, creative and destructive, totalitarian and democratic alike, obtain and exercise power.

The heart of Snow's error consists in the assumption that science has a value of its own, that it is intrinsically moral or good, that it is the equivalent of art. On the contrary, science is amoral and at no point touches the purpose or form of art. It is as erroneous to invest science with qualitative meaning as to deny that it pervasively affects men's lives, the nature of their moral conflicts and the subject of their art forms. Science, or rather technology, confronts men in the habit of social and political institutions. It is impossible to approve of industrialization *per se* without implicitly approving of all the social and political institutions which batten on it. The hope of science for the poor everywhere will be realized or will turn to ashes depending on how it is applied



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politically and socially, on whether it is used to tyrannize over men or to free them.

The West will guide scientific revolution best by adhering to a democratic ideology in its dealings with underdeveloped peoples, not by chasing the *ignis fatuus* of scientism and technocracy. Let us train more scientists and engineers by all means. But what kind of *men* will they be?

ALBERT FRIED *is an Editor of* NEW POLITICS *and has illustrated his own article.*

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Robert V. Daniels

Toward a Definition of Soviet Socialism



DESPITE A CENTURY AND A HALF of the most diverse developments in the history of socialist thought it is still the habit of most followers of any school of socialism to regard their own beliefs as the sole, exclusively valid form of socialism, all others being perversions. Any discussion of the subject would be considerably clearer if we detach the definition of socialism from particular preferences for particular socialist forms, and treat socialism as a broad category permitting a large variety of particular possibilities of social organization which must be judged on their individual merits. Accordingly, I take as my general working definition of socialism, "any theory or practice of social control over economic activity."

This definition is purposely vague. It embraces any degree of social control in the economy, from the U.S. Post Office to the completely nationalized economy of the USSR. It covers both state socialism and non-state (cooperatives, syndicalism, etc.). It permits democratic as well as dictatorial forms of political control. As such a catch-all, socialism necessarily becomes an emotionally neutral term, an analytic concept, which hopefully can be unburdened of the positive or negative emotional connotations with which it is usually invested. The proper object of emotional reaction is not socialism in general, which, when emotionally apprehended, tends to be defined in a narrow way to fit the individual's preferences or antipathies. The Communist, for example, excludes all non-Communist socialism from his definition of true socialism; the American conservative describes all socialism as Communistic; the democratic socialist or Trotskyist argues that the Soviet system isn't

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really socialist. All these people are entitled to their points of view, but their preferences are really reactions not to socialism in general but to particular forms and degrees of socialism with particular political arrangements. Logic demands that these particulars be spelled out rather than be confused with the general concept of socialism.

Two special senses of "socialism" deserve to be noted and distinguished. One is the special theoretical use that is made of the term by the Communists to denote that transitional system after the proletarian revolution when people are still rewarded according to their work rather than according to need in the truly "communistic" fashion. This is not the real Soviet "socialism" which I propose to discuss; I might only note that it is the basis—and the only basis—for the popular conservative notion that socialism (in the general sense) leads necessarily to Communism (in the sense of the power of the Communist parties).

The other popular usage of socialism applies to socialist movements which oppose revolution, dictatorship, and the Communist parties—in other words, it denotes the democratic socialist parties. This is accepted political terminology, but it should not obscure the fact that socialist economic organization can be found in totalitarian regimes, and that any totalitarian regime must be socialistic to some degree.

WHAT DISTINGUISHES MARXIAN SOCIALISM from all other forms is a theory of how socialism is to come about, as the natural consequence of the historical laws of class struggle and revolution which Marx thought he had discerned. As to the specific characteristics of the future socialism, Marx was always advisedly vague; he added little to the hopes and plans of the Utopian socialists of the generation preceding him. Marx's socialism was Utopianism with a difference: the earlier ideal of an anarchic collectivism with complete distributive justice was now reinforced with a sophisticated theory of social and economic development. Marx was the first philosopher in history to incorporate in his thought the full importance of economic development through technical progress and industrialization, which by multiplying society's capacity to produce would finally give some realistic substance to the old dream of abolishing human misery. The stark facts—largely overlooked by Marx's Utopian predecessors—were that given the limits on productivity in pre-industrial society, no redistribution of the wealth of the small privileged class would make much of a dent on the average in the poverty of the vast majority. Redistribution would only undermine the culture-bearing class, or be evaded by any group with the drive and the power to spare itself from reduction to the average level of misery.

The crucial function of economic development is, according to

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Marxism, to supply the prerequisite for the effective socialist redistribution of wealth in the name of justice. This developmental function is not the responsibility of socialism, but is the distinctive work of capitalism. The Marxian law here is rigorous: socialism must follow capitalism, but by the same token capitalism must precede socialism. Where capitalism has not entered the picture to play its "progressive" role, the productive capacity and the propertyless proletarian class will not exist to provide the indispensable foundation for socialism.*

The great paradox of Marxism is that the proletarian socialist revolution envisioned by Marx never came to pass in the more advanced industrial countries where he expected it, but instead proclaimed itself in Russia where the economic transformation under capitalism was still in an early stage. Russia in 1917—by the admission of all schools of Russian Marxists—still dismally lacked the industrial maturity and proletarian majority required for socialism. It was for this reason that the Mensheviks and even right-wing Bolsheviks opposed the attempt at a "socialist" revolution going beyond the "bourgeois democracy" of the Provisional Government. The rationale for the Bolshevik seizure of power was drawn from Trotsky's "theory of permanent revolution"—the contention that a working-class uprising in Russia would inspire general socialist revolution in the riper countries of the West. When the great world-revolutionary hopes of 1917–1919 faded away in the early 1920's, the supposedly proletarian socialist regime of the Russian Communists was left hanging in mid-air, as it were, without much of the industrial and proletarian base which was presumably the prerequisite for it.

Lenin conceded as much in reply to Menshevik criticisms, and his solution was to claim that the Soviet government could deliberately create its own cultural and economic prerequisites for the goal of socialism. Meanwhile the "workers state" would protect the interests of the proletariat while the country operated under the nationalized economy of "state capitalism." No heed was given to the divergence of this doctrine from the Marxian conception of the conditioning of political forms by economic relationships. In reality the Soviet system had already departed from the Marxian framework.

Lenin's position was the starting point for two sharply contrasting approaches toward socialism—exemplified by Trotsky and Bukharin—which set the theoretical part of the stage, at least, for the great factional controversies in the Communist Party in the mid-1920's. Trotsky wanted to take the offensive, with a state-

* Marx did concede that Russia might be able to skip capitalism and develop directly into socialism on the basis of the country's traditional communal agriculture, if the simultaneous international success of socialism provided a favorable setting. His Russian followers—both Menshevik and Bolshevik—were more orthodox than the prophet, and insisted on the preparatory function of capitalism.

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planned industrialization drive which, by expanding industry, would build up the proletarian class "base" for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and keep it from collapsing for lack of a foundation. Bukharin took the cautious approach of long-term "peaceful co-existence" with the peasantry—not only the Soviet peasants, he pointed out with considerable insight, but also the great peasant majorities of Asia and the colonial territories. Stalin's theoretical contribution of "socialism in one country" was less a policy directive than a political maneuver to try to use Lenin against Trotsky. All factions were concerned to build up the Soviet economy and avoid international risk, and the issue was only whether the existing Soviet system was theoretically secure socialism. Trotsky, in opposition, said no; Stalin and Bukharin, seeking doctrinal security, insisted on a positive answer. Stalin began doing deliberate violence to the scriptures by quoting Lenin out of context to make it appear that Russian socialism did not depend on the success of international revolution. He insisted on an act of faith in a socialist Russia, and was soon enforcing this faith with all the force of the totalitarian state.

THE HISTORY OF THE THEORETICAL GYRATIONS performed by the Soviet leaders to square their power and their practices with the Marxian perspective leads naturally to a fundamental question: can Soviet Communism in any real sense be regarded as the proletarian socialism predicted by Marx? Or should we not approach it as quite a different phenomenon, entirely outside the Marxian framework, which only makes claim to the Marxian label—which in effect is using Marxism as "ideology" or "false consciousness" in the service of a distinctly new movement?

The Russian revolution and most instances of significant Communist strength are products not of a great proletariat and industrial maturity, but of the stresses of early industrialization and the alienation of the intelligentsia. This is particularly the case in countries outside West Europe and North America; the Communist movement is typically a response to meet the challenge of Westernization. Its ambitions are those of anti-Western Westernizing nationalists, for whom the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist phraseology of Marxian socialism provides an irresistable theoretical vehicle. It makes no difference that the country

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concerned is not ripe for the Marxist revolution and may have yet to enter its bourgeois phase; the Marxist revolutionary appeal is psychological rather than logical. As Adam Ulam has demonstrated in *The Unfinished Revolution,* Marxism has typically reached its greatest strength—in late nineteenth-century Germany, in early twentieth-century Russia, in Asia in the second quarter of this century—when a country is just beginning its most rapid transformation.

The Marxist revolution—or rather, the revolution of the Westernizing intelligentsia with a Marxist "ideology"—really rests on the possibility of the *diversion* of a society's development away from capitalism and into revolutionary socialism. This socialism is not the successor to capitalism but an alternative, which is likely to be ruled out if capitalism is allowed to develop too far. Such diversion is made more likely by various circumstances—the lack of a liberal democratic development prior to the onset of industrialization; overly rapid industrialization (such as foreign capital permits); and above all by difficult anti-colonial struggles or the military defeat of the traditional government, as in the case of Russia and China.

Once such a revolutionary regime is in power, it has to contend with the problems of economic development that would have been handled by capitalism had it remained in effect. Since the new regime is socialist in principle, it begins to apply its socialist forms of economic organization and control to the task of economic development. An utterly new kind of socialist ideal then emerges —not the socialism of redistributive justice, but a "production socialism" which is trying to do capitalism's job of accumulating capital and developing the productive forces of society. From this fundamentally different economic content of socialism stems the whole sad history of the betrayal of democratic and equalitarian ideals and the creation of the permanent bureaucratic apparatus of what can well be termed "state capitalism."

THE FOREGOING REPRESENTS SCHEMATICALLY what happened in Soviet Russia in the 1920's and then became the model for the whole international Communist movement. Lenin was fighting with the left-wing Communists as early as 1918 over the restoration of hierarchical authority in industry and the army. In 1920 Trotsky proposed the militarization of labor and the trade-unions, in order to create a machine that could mobilize the effort which Russia's dire economic straits required. In the early '20's Trotsky and his economic spokesman, Preobrazhensky, borrowed the industrial planning model of the German "Kriegssozialismus" of World War I, and for the first time anywhere laid down the basic principle of planned industrial development by the socialist state. The novelty of the idea is attested by the resistance it encountered on the part

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of Trotsky's political opponents, who for years, under the inspiration of Bukharin, insisted that development could only proceed in the capitalistic fashion of stimulus (even of state-owned industry) by market demand. Preobrazhensky frankly added the principle of "primary socialist accumulation"—deliberate exploitation of the people (especially the peasants) by the socialist state, in order to squeeze out the surplus required for industrial capital formation.

The theory of the new "production socialism" worked out by the Trotskyists awaited only its adoption by the dominant political force in the country, and this was precisely what happened in 1928 when Stalin, having crushed the Trotsky opposition, plagiarized their ideas and turned against the cautious Bukharinists. The resulting Five-Year Plans of intensive industrialization have provided the foundation, both dynamically and structurally, for the Communist economy as it exists to this day. Soviet economic development is based on the use of the dictatorial state to accumulate capital—by taxes, obligatory farm deliveries, wage control, and monopoly state trading profits—and to channel this capital through the central planning system into the construction and equipment of heavy industry. Ownership, and basic production decisions as represented in the plan, are of course in the hands of the state, individual enterprise being tabooed altogether regardless of considerations of efficiency and incentive. Below the level of ownership and the plan, however, the requirements of industrial effectiveness led the Soviet regime at an early date to revert to almost all the familiar capitalist forms—or rather, the bureaucratic forms which corporate capitalism and state-owned industry can have in common: the managerial hierarchy and individual responsibility, in preference to the workers' control and committee administration which was the Communists' initial ideal; salary differentials, bonuses, and piece wages; strict industrial discipline; and a fully monetary, profit-and-loss accounting system. (Yugoslav Communism, in this connection, has turned back toward the old committee ideal, as well as restoring much of the capitalistic market in lieu of central planning.) The Soviet enterprise differs but little from the capitalistic corporation except that the profit motive is replaced by plan-fulfillment, and there is of course no significant labor-management bargaining.

The Soviet system is undeniably a form of socialism—emphatically so, in the broad sense of the term as social control over economic activity. The particular kind of socialist control which distinguishes the Soviet system is the all-embracing bureaucratic hierarchy embodied in the totalitarian state. As its purpose this socialism sets for itself not distributive justice but the development of industrial production and power. We can well visualize it as

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the capitalist corporation on the scale of the national state, where the whole country is a company town (with insurance and pension plans, to be sure) and the citizen-stockholders are manipulated by the managers in rigged meetings. Add to this, of course, the oriental political habits of Russian despotism and the religious requirements of theoretical indoctrination which the movement has inherited from its Marxist background, and we have all the essentials of Soviet society.

THIS DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET SOCIALISM would not be complete without reference to a particular school of early socialist thought which, by coincidence, the Soviet development has remarkably paralleled. This is the doctrine of the French Utopian, Henri de Saint-Simon, whose writings in the first quarter of the nineteenth century sketched out a model of the new industrial society as organic, hierarchical, enlightened by science and technology, and infused with moral concern for the welfare of the workers. Saint-Simon's socialism was frankly elitist, with careers open to the technically talented —a form of "meritocracy," if you will—and its emphasis on natural obedience and the propagandizing of virtue had strongly totalitarian implications. The irony of history is such that the socialism of Marx's followers conforms much more closely to that of the precursor whom the Marxists meant to reject. Saint-Simon's insights about the coming forms of industrial society were so profound that his ideas would make a much less unrealistic "ideology" for the industrializing totalitarianism which the Russians established in the name of Marx.

Some neo-Trotskyist analysts have tried to combine the Marxian conception of the class struggle with a sort of Saint-Simonian view about the bureaucratic industrial society. People like James Burnham and Milovan Djilas have represented Soviet socialism as a new type of class society—the "managerial revolution" or the "new class"—succeeding the bourgeoisie. This is a dubious effort as far as salvaging the Marxian class analysis is concerned, but it does appropriately emphasize the non-proletarian nature of the Soviet system. It is a form of society which parallels the function of early capitalism and to this end borrows and exaggerates the bureaucratic institutions of mature capitalism.

As such, Soviet socialism has been an outstanding success in the task it set itself, of rapid industrialization and the achievement of a self-sufficient military potential. This is not to say that the same results could not have been accomplished in a capitalist-mercantilist manner, as in Japan and Imperial Germany. The Soviet system is not the only developmental alternative, even though it works. What Soviet socialism *cannot* offer is any substantial progress toward the free equalitarian justice of the nineteenth-century socialist ideal.

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It might seem that now that the industrial transformation of the USSR has been largely accomplished, a liberalization could follow with more scope for democratic procedures and egalitarian ideals. This is the fond hope of neo-Marxists who feel that industrialism means democracy and that the economic success of Soviet totalitarianism is so to speak sowing the seeds of its own destruction. In point of fact, stable democracy is a product of the pre-industrial commercial societies of Western Europe of the 17th and 18th centuries, and wherever industrialization has commenced without a *prior* liberal political base—i.e., outside of the North Alantic community—democracy has not been able to achieve a stable existence. Far from laying the groundwork for democracy, the Soviet development has accomplished a profound bureaucratization of political and economic life.

Even though the original justification for "primary socialist accumulation" by dictatorial means has now passed, the bureaucratic structure of the Communist party and the Soviet state has a permanent life of its own, and there is no force on the horizon which can effectively challenge it. Systems of organized power can —Marx to the contrary notwithstanding—perpetuate themselves for long periods of time after the conditions which brought them into being have disappeared. European feudalism endured almost a thousand years after it performed its function of restoring order out of Dark Age anarchy. The bureaucratic hierarchy of Soviet socialism may prove equally hard to undo.

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

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Nicolas Calas

Action In and Out of Painting



GONE ARE THE DAYS when artists were urged to become either fellow travelers of the working class, navigators on the stream of consciousness or opticians in the laboratory of Gestalt psychologists. The *masses,* the *unconscious,* and *form,* worshipped in the pre-war era, are now fallen idols. Painters are committed to an unknown god, but they paint. There arose a new apostle: Harold Rosenberg proclaimed that the unknown god is the painter. A picture is to be recognized in the action of painting: Harold Rosenberg abolishes the distance between the artist and the world: "a painting . . . is the painter himself changed into a ghost inhabiting the art world."[1] Why not add: They are two in one flesh? Painting has become "a space in which to act." Is it because Rosenberg speaks on behalf of the artist that they are not two in one voice? "What goes on the canvas is an event." The canvas has become an arena in which the greens fight against the blues. Art for art's sake is immolated to art for the artist's sake: "The question of the driftwood is, who found it?" Harold Rosenberg claims that the question of identity is more important than the knowledge of whether a painting is good or bad."[2] The artist visited the wasteland and discovered the driftwood as the kings visited a manger and discovered the virgin's infant to be god; what angel visited the loft that was turned into a studio populated with Rosenberg's "ghosts"?

"Painting that is an action is inseparable from the biography of the artist." This explains why, according to Rosenberg, "art comes back into painting by the way of psychology." He fortunately gives the assurance that this psychology "is the psychology of creation. Not that of the so-called psychological criticism that wants to 'read' a painting for clues to the artist's sexual preferences or debilities." I no more understand the "psychology of creation" than the biology of an incubus. A living creature, and by extension a man-made object, whether a bed or a painting, to be appreciated must be compared to other specimens of its kind. Conformation is a prerequisite of creation. To ascertain the degree to which a living creature or a man-made object conforms or not to a given type it ought to be studied morphologically; its relation to its maker, whether God or man, put in brackets. This is what Harold Rosenberg excludes. When

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he says that "painting that is an act is inseparable from the biography of the artist" he means to detach painting from aesthetics. The danger is that the action painter who believes that he has been baptized in a Jordan of paint might be drowned in Rosenberg's Heracletian river.

If the painting is inseparable from the action of the artist it would have to be treated as an event only, and share the fate of all events, which is to fade into the past and give way to new events. The trouble with Rosenberg's theory is not that it is false but that it is becoming true. Today the governments in the Western world view modern paintings as an occasion for a series of international celebrations, held in Venice, Pittsburgh or Sao Paolo, and intended to add prestige and value to this or that event-maker. This Rosenberg has vividly pointed out in a recent article.[3] Because of the rapid succession of events the artists find themselves at the mercy of café society and the happenings of a giddy season which is what fashion opposes to world-shaking events. Instead of saying, as does Mary McCarthy in her criticism of action painting, that one cannot hang an event upon a wall,[4] I would say, *why* hang an event upon a wall?

The doctrine of action painting, which enjoys such an astonishing success, has the merit of offering the artist an alternative to the depressing psychoanalytical diagnosis. Overnight, thanks to Harold Rosenberg, the artist found himself metamorphosed from a sinner into a hero. In Western society where heroes are unknown soldiers, unknown prisoners of concentration camps, what a relief it is to know that there are still heroes that bear a name! For painters, who according to Rosenberg had been Marxist sympathizers, the doctrine of action has a romantic connotation with action, as understood in the Thirties by left wing intellectuals. It is as if, when viewed in terms of action, there appeared a vacancy in the City of Man which, at the suggestion of Rosenberg, was filled with the gestures of painters. Artists enjoy today the feeling that the only interesting events concern the relation of a blue to black. They have become heroes drunk with the blood of color. The division of labor between them is colorful: "What do you know about black?" says the Master of Ochre to the Master of Porphyry.

WHAT HAROLD ROSENBERG DID for painting Charles Olson did for poetry;[5] like Rosenberg he speaks of action and process. Action in the new poetry is found in the relation of the breath to the line divided in syllables. It is as if the most breathtaking events depend on the rhetoric of empty gestures and breathless Marathon runners of phonetic particles. But process ought not to be viewed as pure movement. It is for the investigator, through process, to discover the pattern of an unsuspected order. Harold Rosenberg necessarily dismisses patterns when he excludes painting from the realm of aesthetics.

With action painting and poetry the artist ceases to be a maker and becomes an actor; the beholder is asked to admire a performance. When the emphasis is on the artist's role the tacit implication is that acting is more important than making beautiful things or expressing one's deepest feelings. Once

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again our neighbor will be exposed to the danger of being condemned not for what he is but for the role he plays, for our judges will be Pharisees whom Jesus accused of caring for the outward appearances of the cup rather than for its inner cleanliness. Am I perhaps reading into Harold Rosenberg's texts ideas that are not his? Evidence to the contrary is provided by his article on another subject than art, his challenge of the Eichmann trial.

In the beginning of this undoubtedly brilliant essay the writer explains the compulsion to present Eichmann before the Israeli court to "the irresistible demand for a tragic retelling by multitudes inconceivably brought into psychic unity of an antique folk by an inconceivable blow, their not to be denied poetic passion to hear related and before the whole of humanity, the terrible fate of their stricken relatives and ancestors." The tragic character of a need to retell is, as Rosenberg most astutely points out, well perceived by Shakespeare when he makes his dying Hamlet say to Horatio "draw thy breath in pain to tell my story." Since Aristotle, poets and philosophers know that it is the function of tragedy, and of tragedy only, to retell a shocking story so that the soul of the spectator could be cleansed through catharsis. Unlike tragedy, justice does not cleanse but frees the spectator from any suspicion of guilt by imposing penalty upon another. In the Western world, whose most enlightened tradition is based on a respect for the individual, the accused is not condemned for murder unless his soul is stained with criminal intentions. The only authority competent to determine this intention is the tribunal. Because our sense of justice does not require that the accused cooperate with his judges, it is not necessary that he should confess his guilt. The judge is not a pastor preoccupied with the salvation of the soul of his lost sheep. Harold Rosenberg thinks otherwise and claims that once Eichmann's inner viciousness could not be satisfactorily demonstrated because the defendant clung with tenacity to his allegation that he had been but a cog in the Nazi machine, the Prosecutor should have requested the death penalty on the grounds that the defendant had assumed the role of the head of IV B4 of RSHA —the administrative section responsible for the extermination of the Jews.

Were this principle adopted by the Courts it would be sufficient for a totalitarian state to nominate certain men as heads of genocide departments to save the actual leaders from the danger of ever having to account for their crimes. It would also imply that any national or class enemy might eventually be condemned in the name of a partisan justice. Vae Victis! War would be confused with justice and man would sink again to the level of the Pharisees who condemned Mary Magdalen for the role she assumed in life without consideration of her as a human being.

I have introduced Rosenberg's article on the Eichmann trial to present his thinking. Whether he writes on justice or on art he implies a "cast." His lowliest cast consists of those who play vicious political roles, his princely cast is composed of artists who are beyond good and evil.

Rosenberg says that "the new painting has broken down every distinction between art and life," and that "an action is not a matter of

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taste." If this is so, action painting cannot be, as he claims, a process of the personality of the artist. Process is elaborated when thinking is pursued for an investigation —otherwise the term becomes meaningless. Freed from the worries of making, both the pure artist and the pure scientist investigate unexplored aspects of a given field in the belief that they will discover order there where before there was only chaos. While the maker *forms*, the investigator, through process, *discovers* the pattern of an unsuspected order. What counts in an investigation is the discovery of a significant pattern, and what counts in art is the creation of variations on a pattern. As for the critic his principle role is, on the one hand, to proclaim to the world the new discovery and to assess its aesthetic significance, and, on the other, to denounce frauds.

Footnotes

1. Harold Rosenberg's now famous article *The American Action Painters* first appeared in 1952 in *Art News*. It has been included in his book *The Tradition of the New;* see Evergreen Edition, Grove Press, New York, 1960, pp. 23–39. When not stated otherwise, all my quotations are from this article.
2. "Critic within the Act" in *Art News*, Oct.1960.
3. *Art News*, Oct. 1961.
4. As quoted by Harold Rosenberg, op cit.
5. See *The New American Poetry, 1945–1960*, edited by Donald Allen; Grove Press, Inc., 1960, pp. 386–400.
6. See *Commentary*, 1961, pp. 360–381.

NICOLAS CALAS *has written a book of surrealist essays,* Confound The Wise. *He has also published, in collaboration with Margaret Mead,* Primitive Heritage. *More recently, he has been writing a series of articles on vanguard painters that have appeared in various art magazines, especially* Art News.

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mondo nuovo

Critica Sociale

LA GIUSTIZIA'

Avanti!

CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA



problemi del socialismo

CURRENTS IN ITALIAN SOCIALIST THOUGHT

VALERIO AGOSTINONE
LELIO BASSO
VITTORIO FOA
GIORGIO GALLI
LUCIO LIBERTINI
GIOVANNI PIERACCINI
ITALO VIGLIANESI

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EDITOR'S NOTE

No one who reads the following articles by leading Italian socialists can fail to be struck by both their common observations and conflicting conclusions. The rapid growth of Italian industry in the last decade—the "Italian Miracle"—and the erosion of the last vestiges of semi-feudal relations in the countryside are the prime facts of Italian economic life and the starting point for most of the contributors to our symposium. It is also generally agreed that there *is a movement to the left in Italian politics which is reflected not* only in the formation of the Center-Left coalition government but in the ascendancy of the more liberal elements in Italy's largest party, the Christian Democrats, and a liberalization of the social dogma of the Vatican.

However, while these changes are acknowledged, their significance is disputed. Where economic growth is concerned, the problem becomes how to function in a newly industrialized and "affluent" society without sacrificing socialist principle and effectiveness.

Where the Center-Left government is concerned, Italian socialism is divided by a problem which socialists have debated from the beginning of the movement: is it permissible for socialists to support, even enter, governments dominated by bourgeois parties? The answer given by the Social Democratic Party is unequivocal: it is already part of the government coalition. The Socialist Party is more hesitant, less uniform and not a government party, but its 89 deputies today provide the Christian Democratic controlled coalition with its parliamentary majority.

What of the attitude toward Communism and the Communist Party? The question is a more divisive one in the socialist movement than at any time in its history; certainly since 1947 when the issue was largely responsible for the split from the Socialist Party which led to the formation of the Social Democratic Party.

Thus, while many of the problems discussed by contributors to this symposium specifically relate to Italian politics—in itself of great interest—the role of the working class in an industrialized society, the nature of Communism and the Communist parties, the question of socialists working within bourgeois parties for their reform, the relationship between democracy and economic growth are questions which concern all socialists in all countries.

GLOSSARY

PSI	**Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)**
PSDI	**Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Social Democratic Party)**
PCI	**Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)**
DC	**Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party)**
CISL	**Confederazione Italiana Sindicati Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Labor Unions)**
UIL	**Unione Italiana del Lavoro (Italian Labor Union)**
CGIL	**Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labor)**

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Giovanni Pieraccini

Editor of Avanti, official organ of the Italian Socialist Party, member of the Party Directorate.

THIS YEAR, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), founded in Genoa on August 14–16, 1892, celebrates its seventieth anniversary. The Party's influence in this period of Italian history is remarkable; with its formation, political life in Italy was radically changed as the great mass of workers and peasants entered the scene and played an increasingly important role.

The Socialist Party fulfilled a decisive democratic function. Italy had recently won its independence, but the nation was ruled by a narrow, restrictive bourgeois class. The formation of the Socialist Party, its vigor and positive reception by masses of workers and peasants, was largely responsible for an historic process which eventually led to universal suffrage, to the first social legislation and to the growth of freedom.

Of course, the history of the Socialist Party was not devoid of internal struggles. The problem of the relationship between socialism and democracy, and between reforms and revolution, tormented the souls of many militants. A series of clashes, the most serious of which took place in 1921 and gave birth to the Communist Party, hurt the Party in its long history. But, beyond all internal and external vicissitudes, despite crisis and errors, the PSI always maintained distinctive characteristics which distinguished it from the socialist parties of Western Europe.

First of all, it always was a party deeply rooted in the working class with a large following even among peasants. Given these roots, the Party heightened its drive toward a radical reconstruction of the country, sustained its power of criticism of the old capitalist order, honed its fighting edge—in sum, its revolutionary spirit (not, of course, in the ordinary sense of insurrection and revolt) was always alive. Thus, the PSI did not experience that steady devolution into a liberal-reformism so typical of European Social Democracy. Consequently, the PSI often proved a decisive influence in the country, but always as a force in opposition to

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the ruling class and its governments; never as a force within the government.

In international affairs the main feature of Italian Socialist policy was always its consistent, determined, courageous and often dramatic struggle in defense of peace. Socialist pacifism is derived from its deep faith in the equality of all people, of the necessity for cooperation among all nations, and of the uselessness, the absurdity, of war. This is the Party's glorious tradition which was never abandoned, as evidenced by its struggle for peace on the eve of and during the First World War. From this conviction also flows the Party's opposition to the policy of forming big power blocs and to an equilibrium which relies on rearmament and therefore contains the dangerous potential of new military conflicts. This is the root of the so-called neutralism of the Socialists. This conviction also underlies the Party's militant stand against racism and colonialism. Italian Socialists courageously fought against Italian colonialism in past decades.

TODAY, THE SOCIALIST PARTY holds a position which, in the light of its history, seems in certain respects to be a new one. The Party supports the new Italian government of the Honorable Fanfani, the Center-Left government formed by the Christian Democratic Party, the Republicans and the Social Democratic Party (PSDI). Does this mean as some critics maintain—even within the PSI—that a process of yielding to middle class pressure, a drawing closer to the characteristic stance of Social Democrats in so many European countries, is now starting? I believe that to pose the present policy of the PSI in this fashion is a serious mistake. On the contrary, one must start from a consideration of the present Italian situation.

Italy, after the war, above all in the past ten years, has been a country undergoing rapid and extensive economic and social changes. Italian capitalism, which had long lived under the protection of customs barriers and fascist autarchy, has matured; it has grown accustomed to dealing with international complexities and has reached, after a long and arduous process, a productive and technical ability which can stand comparison with that of other advanced countries—a process which has been called, internationally, the "Italian Miracle."

Italy is a country full of contradictions and deep inequalities. Recent capitalist development has not eliminated them; instead, the contradictions are aggravated and made more apparent. The gap between the economic levels of the South and the North has actually widened. Deep inequities still exist between town and country and between social classes. While there is a lack of technicians and skilled workers, a high rate of unemployment remains, espe-

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cially in the South. In some areas of the country, illiteracy has not yet been conquered. Education must be developed and revamped, for it is no longer adequate for a highly industrialized society.

To these economic and social contradictions, the problems deriving from the organization of the state itself should be added. Ours is a state which, despite its truly democratic republican constitution, is still organized in a centralized fashion on the old Napoleonic pattern. Everything must be decided in Rome, which brings about the suffocation of local autonomy, promotes the abnormal growth of bureaucracy, encourages the excessive power of the central government and, therefore, permits injustice and corruption. The fiscal set-up is such that it would horrify any American because it is so shaped that direct taxation represents only a part of the government's income and the rich pay proportionately much less than the poor. If this were not enough, tax evasion is commonplace.

In this contradictory framework of the old and the new, all of Italian society is in motion. Millions of people are leaving the countryside and coming to the towns, or moving from the South to the North. New customs and needs are developing. The peculiar tendencies of a consumers' economy emerge; there is the urge to own private cars; the employment of women in the factories and other fields evidences the breaking down of the old family order and a new way of life. Italy, in brief, is in a fluid and transitional period.

POLITICALLY, THE STAGE IS DOMINATED by the three big parties: the Christian Democratic (Catholic) Party, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Besides these three parties, minor organizations also exist—Social Democrats and Republicans on the center-left, Liberals on the right, fascists and monarchists on the extreme right.

Since the war, the Christian Democratic Party has been the ruling party, governing alone or in alliance with some minor parties on the basis of a conservative policy. However, within the CD Party there are large numbers of workers and peasants as well as representative groups of capitalists, landowners and elements of the reactionary clerical right.

In CD controlled "center" governments, the conservative Catholic forces prevailed. The policy of the workers' parties, the Communists and Socialists, was therefore based on a clear and rigid opposition to the Christian Democrats. This opposition was also inspired by foreign policy considerations, because, naturally, the Communists cannot tolerate NATOism and the Socialists, in keeping with their tradition, pointed out the need to overcome military blocs in order to preserve peace among peoples. Italian pol-

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itics after the war was therefore characterized by the head-on collision between two powerful alignments: on the one side the Christian Democratic Party with its minor allies (called the Center, because two small parties of the extreme right, the monarchists and fascists, remained in opposition) and Socialists and Communists on the other (called the Front because of Italy's Popular Front alliance of 1948).

This very bitter struggle had no solution on the parliamentary level. Of course, it would be naive to think that the very powerful left wing opposition did not exert its influence, often successfully. But the CD Party continued to wield all substantive government power, and its allies had only secondary functions.

But changes in Italian life and on the international scene in recent years opened new possibilities. The darkest days of the Cold War, from 1948–53, gave way to a period in which international tensions continued, but with greater flexibility and tolerance. Stalin's end came in 1953, followed by denunciation of Stalinism. A "third force" of newly constituted nations asserted itself. In the United States, John Foster Dulles disappeared along with what he represented; McCarthyism was defeated and, subsequently, the men of Kennedy's New Frontier came to the fore. The Communist world no longer appeared monolithic as in Stalin's time. Khrushchevism emerged. There was the Soviet-Chinese conflict and internal ferment in the Communist world—particularly apparent in the Italian Communist Party.

In this new international context, Italian society entered a period of rapid internal change, already outlined.

GIVEN THESE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, what is the task of the Socialist Party today? The majority of the PSI has already answered: in times of change, a change in policy is called for.

Previously, we viewed the Christian Democratic Party as an organic bloc, uniformly conservative, and destined to strive only for consistently reactionary goals. Those who start from this conviction, today, are naturally hostile to the Party's new policy because they believe that contact with the CD can only bring about the degeneration of socialism. But how can one believe that a party such as the CD, which brings together so large a number of ordinary people, could be immune to internal change? How can one

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fail to see that within the CD there are antagonisms which reflect the conflicting nature of the social groups composing the party? The Christian Democratic Party has, in fact, a physiognomy which, in some respects, makes it similar to the Democratic Party in the United States where reactionary Southern politicians and progressive elements of American society co-exist. Consequently, since the PSI's Turin convention in 1955, the Socialists have "initiated a dialogue" with the Catholic political movement. The Socialists offered to the democratic Catholic forces the opportunity to move along a different path than the old (CD) conservative center policy.

Italy, today, needs to solve serious problems of democratic development before solving the problems of building socialism. There is the need to overcome the imbalance between North and South and the problem of an overcentralized State; there are the needs of full employment, development of education and scientific research, agrarian reform to eliminate medieval structures such as sharecropping, reform of the tax system. All are necessary for the establishment of democracy. But in Italy each of these reforms faces a powerful coalition of vested interests and cannot be introduced without the support of the peasants and workers. As always in Italian history, it is the presence of the labor movement which can give the democratic forces their power for victory.

It is not enough that an awareness of the need for social, economic and legal reforms exists in the consciousness of the people if there is no alignment of political forces capable of achieving them. Democratic Catholic groups were paralyzed by the impossibility of allying themselves with the Communists because of political, ideological and religious reasons, and as long as Italian politics presented only a choice between rigid, hostile political blocs the Democratic wing of the Catholic movement could only bow to the conservative Catholic wing.

The new Socialist policy, however, on the basis of the new situation, has broken this stalemate, for it considers that the changing situation requires the Italian labor movement to pursue a flexible policy rather than a bloc, or "front" policy. It must honestly be said that the events which led to the crisis of Stalinism, the Hungarian Revolution and the events in Poland in October 1956, also influenced Italian Socialists' choice of a new course, rekindling their belief that socialism must be built on freedom. A socialist society without the freedoms of opposition, criticism, thought, art and religion is doomed to crisis and degeneration. This awareness of the indivisibility of socialism and freedom, never absent in the entire history of the PSI, was given new vigor by the dramatic events within the Communist world, reviving Socialist polemics with Communists and bringing to the fore again the differences between the two workers' parties.

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THE "FRONT" POLICY OF ITALIAN SOCIALISTS was overcome and replaced by a policy of independence which has as its main spokesman the Secretary of the Party, the Honorable Pietro Nenni. This did not happen without internal struggles. At the Party conventions in Venice, Naples and Milan, between 1956 and 1961, substantial groups of the Party, led by Tullio Vecchietti and Lelio Basso, saw in the new policy a dangerous weakening of the unity of action of the Italian labor movement, a start on the road to reformism, a threat of the PSI becoming a party with a conservative role in Italian life. No one denies that collaboration with non-socialist forces such as the Catholics contains risks; but no policy exists devoid of risk. Moreover, the minority in the PSI was never able, in our view, to develop an alternative policy realistically capable of breaking the conservative hold in Italy and offering a winning edge to democratic forces.

THE NEW SOCIALIST POLICY, initiated somewhat confusedly and slowly, has begun to bear fruit. The left forces in the Catholic party, for the first time in many years, could combat the conservative CD center policy with a program of democratic reforms that could now be implemented with the votes of the Socialists—in fact, by a new parliamentary majority formed by the CD and the PSI. Thus a struggle ensued between the right and the left wings of the Christian Democrats. In the CD convention, held in Florence in 1959, the right wing won by a narrow margin. But in Naples, early in 1962, the CD convention endorsed an agreement with the Socialists.

The left wing critics of Nenni within the PSI tend to point out that these events only mean that the Italian bourgeoisie adapts itself to the needs of neo-capitalism. Actually, a more complex phenomenon is afoot. There is adaptation, but there is also the weight of Catholic peasants and workers, of trade unionists and intellectuals who express these ideas.

On the basis of the new political situation within the PSI and the CD, the conditions for a shift in Italian politics were created. Thus the Center-Left government led by the Honorable Fanfani was born with an economic program which was accepted by the Socialists and, in fact, partially coincided with the programs de-

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veloped by the Economic Committee of the PSI under the chairmanship of the Honorable Lombardi.

At the core of the new program is the concept of economic planning. The long list of serious problems confronting Italy, which I have already mentioned, cannot find a solution if investments, credits and the sources of energy are not used for this purpose. The whole national effort must be concentrated on essential fields such as education, industrialization of the South and agrarian reform. Concurrently, the old administrative machinery of the state must be reformed, decentralization must give birth to an effective regional organization with meaningful local autonomy, and a democratic way of life must prevail everywhere, starting with industrial enterprises. These, I repeat, are not yet socialist objectives, but their implementation will increase the influence of workers in society. New Italy will not be a copy of Old Italy, nor will the relationship between social classes remain the same.

We are now in the initial stages of this development. Just one year before the general election of 1963 it is only possible to lay the basis for the new policy, to prepare a policy of planning rather than implementing it. Among the initial measures, there is the nationalization of the electric power industry, which would affect one of the most powerful monopolies in Italy. This is necessary because no planning is possible without resources of energy being under the direct control of public authorities.

The new policy is, of course, opposed by the entire right wing array, including the powerful right wing of the Catholic movement. And no one can predict with certainty whether or not the right wing forces will once again prevail in the CD.

But this policy of democratic reforms and democratic planning is not only significant and important for Italy. It created new problems in the Communist Party itself, because this policy could not be defeated by uncompromising opposition nor by the simplistic argument that the new policy entailed a new and dangerous adaptation to neo-capitalism. Conflicts grew in the Communist ranks because it is impossible to argue in front of the Italian workers that measures such as the nationalization of the electric power industry, which hits big capitalist monopolies, or the implementation of the new regional organization, which affects the power of the centralized old conservative state, are reforms without significance which in no way change the relationships between classes. Thus the official attitude of the Communists has taken the form of constructive opposition.

THE NEW SOCIALIST POLICY is linked to a series of questions of an ideological nature. There is, for example, the following problem (which can only be mentioned in this article): If the state is

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always, by definition, the subservient agency of the bourgeoisie, then any collaboration with non-socialist parties will only serve to strengthen the power of the bourgeoisie. In this case, the new Italian Socialist policy can only be a betrayal of the workers. If this is the reality, the role of the labor movement is only that of staging an opposition, perhaps powerful, but unable to gain a majority, because "revolutionary" conditions do not exist in Western Europe.

But *is* a modern state, and the Italian state in particular, the state of the nineteenth century? We believe that the decades' long struggle of socialism has contributed to changing things. Today, the state is an entrepreneur and can intervene in the economy at all levels.

Even now, all the means of the state are under the control of the bourgeoisie, but not exclusively so. The weight of trade unions, the power of the socialist movement, the influence of workers in general, the very logic of the development of state enterprises, have created a new situation. The modern state, itself, has become an arena in which different influences meet and clash. Therefore, to promote a policy of reforms, as in Italy, does not mean to leave things as they are. It is part of a policy which sees changes in the power relationship among classes, which sees a development toward socialism through democracy—a dynamic and independent development which is certainly not derived from preconceived or abstract conceptions.

Translated from the Italian by Valerio Agostinone



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Lelio Basso

Member of the Directorate of the Italian Socialist Party, Editor of the socialist journal, Problemi del Socialismo *and Deputy in Italian Parliament.*



READERS OF NEW POLITICS ARE undoubtedly aware that for many decades the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) has differed widely from the Social Democratic parties of Europe. During the First World War the PSI, unlike all the other great parties in the warring countries, was against the war, did not accept "sacred unity" with bourgeois parties and remained firmly in opposition throughout the war. In the years following, it was in favor of the revolutionary conquest of power and the Third International, refusing affiliation to the revived Second International.

It was only during the Fascist period that the small group of exiled members who reestablished the Party in France, away from the realities of national life, rejoined the Second International. However, after the Second World War, when the Party resumed legal activities, its policies soon appeared to be divergent from, even incompatible with, the policies of the Second International. Thus, the PSI regained its international autonomy which allowed it to support all workers who fought capitalist and imperialist oppression under different circumstances and, therefore, by different methods. The PSI was, in fact, always in favor of the idea of differing national roads to socialism and refused to accept the idea of only one road valid for all countries under all historic circumstances, whether violent insurrection, as was the case in Russia in 1917, or democratic accession to the government, as was the case in Britain in 1945.

In an early issue of *Universities and Left Review* which appeared in England some years ago, I tried to explain to the Anglo-Saxon public the historical reasons for the specific characteristics of the PSI. In substance, it can be said that they stem from the backwardness of Italian capitalism which restricted both economic growth and democracy. The ruling class sought to resolve its failure through its own violently achieved dictatorship. This only encouraged the strong class instincts of Italian socialists and furthered their aspiration for the unity of all Italian workers.

This sense of class solidarity, in turn, promoted Italian socialism's unity of action with the Communists. This necessary unity was made possible by the peculiar nature of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) which made a serious and effective contribution to the democratic struggle in Italy. It was active in the anti-fascist resistance

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movement, and favored the establishment of a Republic at a time when others sought a reactionary, clerical regime in Italy. To this, it should be added, the Italian Communist Party is the strongest workers' party in Italy, claiming a little under 2,000,000 members and polling 7,000,000 votes. For the PSI to break with the Communists would be to isolate itself from the most militant section of the Italian working class and make it susceptible to becoming the tool of the conservative forces in the Christian Democratic Party.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, the PSI committed some serious mistakes in this policy of unity of action before 1956. The leading group in the Party behaved as though it believed that socialism in Italy should not be the result of an autonomous struggle of the Italian workers, but rather the result of an expansion of Soviet power in Europe. Thus, unity of action, in practice, led to subordinating the PSI to the PCI and to Soviet policy which it faithfully approved and supported until the Twentieth Congress. This went to the extent of Stalinism being proclaimed by the PSI leadership as the official doctrine of the Party. This writer, as a member of the PSI, fought that policy and found himself more or less isolated in the Party and on its sidelines, during that period.

THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY of the Soviet Union opened new possibilities. When the Soviet leaders proclaimed that there was a possibility not only of finding different roads, but even democratic and peaceful roads, to socialism in the various countries and, at the same time, denounced Stalin's crimes, it became difficult for Italian Socialists not to abandon their old position. Nevertheless, the long period of conformism had left the PSI unused to taking its own responsibilities. In practice the Party never considered the problem of democratic struggle for power and socialism, and now that the old strategy had to be abandoned the leadership found itself unprepared to give new answers to the problems of the struggle for socialism and for a democratic seizure of power by the workers. The reaction against Stalinism led it to conclude that Saragat had been right and the idea of unity with Saragat's party was launched by Nenni in the summer of 1956. The Party membership rejected this suggestion and at the Venice conference of 1957 the view prevailed that the PSI should aim to create the conditions for "a democratic alternative" to the Christian Democratic regime which not only defends the capitalist order but defends it by undemocratic methods.

This idea of a democratic alternative met with success. Not only the PSI showed its approval but also some minor parties of bourgeois democracy; for instance, the Radicals, and the Communists, too, adopted it. It soon became apparent, however, that under the same name different policies were intended. Within the PSI the division has grown since then between the right wing led by Nenni and the left wing to which this writer belongs. In the two conferences of Naples, 1959, and Milan, 1961, the right wing prevailed by a small majority and succeeded in imposing its policy. According to the right wing of the PSI, the governing Christian Democratic Party is a party of the people embracing representatives of big business along with some workers, and it is likely to pursue different policies as one

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or the other tendency prevails. When the left wing prevails, the conditions exist for an alliance of the Christian Democrats and the PSI for the purpose of initiating a shift to the left. Against this thesis, the left wing of the PSI contends that while the Christian Democratic Party is a composite party, it is also, in practice, subordinated to the Church hierarchy and therefore remains, even in its left wing, a clerical party with all this implies in Italy regarding education, freedom of expression and censorship, domestic relations, church influence in political life, elections campaigns, etc. The presence of the Vatican makes a Catholic party in Italy particularly obedient to the dictates of the Church. Moreover, since the hierarchy of the Church has imposed the duty of maintaining the unity of all Catholics on the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, it only takes the clerical right wing's threat of a split in the Party to stop any shift to the left. The leading group in the CD being a center group, it never showed any intention of opposing the will of big business which always inspired its economic policies. At any rate, it is only on the basis of a serious program of structural reforms and democratic change that the willingness of the CD to bring about this advertised shift to the left can be tested.



AT THE LATEST CD CONFERENCE held in Naples in January 1962, the leading center group which gained a large majority, declared itself in favor of a thoroughgoing change of the methods and policies of the government and asked for the support of the PSI in parliament. Several factors account for this attitude. First, the exceptionally favorable trend which accounts for a rapid development of the Italian economy over a period of years, and obliges the more dynamic forces of capitalism to renovate the economic life of the country. There is the new emphasis on education, needed to prepare manpower suitable for the new demands of modern technology; and efforts are being made to raise the living standards in depressed areas in order to expand the domestic market and the consumption of those items (automobiles, refrigerators, TV sets, etc.) which Italian industry produces in rapidly growing quantities. In other words, over the past few years, the process which tends to transform Italy from an economically semi-developed to a modern capitalist country has gained momentum and Italian neo-capitalism wants to secure social peace by turning the PSI into a party wholly integrated into the capitalist reality and subject to the interests of the ruling class in the manner of the German Social Democratic Party and European social democracy in general.

It is these neo-capitalist forces, primarily the Fiat monopoly, Montecatini (the chemicals monopoly), and state capitalists (in par-

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ticular, the state oil trust, ENI) which pressured the CD into this new policy and into exploring the possibilities of a rapprochment with the PSI. Much, however, was due to other factors such as the attitude of the new Pope, John XXIII, and his social doctrine voiced in the encyclical, Mater et Magistra, which represents a move toward the position of the new capitalism in contrast to the preceding Catholic social doctrine based rather on pre-capitalist tenets. Another factor is the example and encouragement of the Catholic President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, who was often pointed to as a model by the CD leadership. Finally, there is the realization that without some basic change which would increase its popular support the CD risks losing its governing authority in the country. Without such support the CD might try to rule in alliance with the Fascists—a course followed more than once in the past, such as in 1960, when however, this policy was defeated by a wave of violent protest in the country and within the CD itself.

Confronted by this situation, the division within the PSI risks becoming more serious. In the opinion of many in the right wing, the new policy of the CD represents a true shift to the left and the PSI would therefore not only be duty bound to support it, but would also have to seek new formulas for an organic and permanent alliance with the Christian Democrats in the very near future. Once again, the left wing of the PSI does not agree. It contends that to acknowledge what is new in Italian capitalism and in the Christian Democratic Party does not justify abandoning the fight for socialist alternatives to what remains a capitalist system in Italy despite recent changes and reforms. The PSI, according to its left wing, cannot cease to oppose Italy's participation in military alliances and power blocs as it always did unanimously in the past; it cannot cease to fight the neo-colonial policies of the Western powers in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, etc; it must not cease to fight the capitalist policy in Italy which modernizes certain obsolete structures but charges the cost of this to the workers by maintaining some of the old imbalances and creating new ones as it puts a brake on Italy's democratic development.

The left wing of the PSI is not deceived by appearances. In reality, in modern capitalist countries extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional power structures exist in the special interrelationship of large private interests, the top level bureaucrats and the bourgeois politicians. In Italy, the Church hierarchy needs to be added. Thus, participating in a parliamentary majority, perhaps even in a government, as a minority may be less than nothing when the true levers of power remain beyond control.

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NEITHER THE EXPECTATION OF A final revolutionary crisis nor the simple parliamentary routine can represent the true democratic road to socialism today. Instead, it is necessary to develop a program of structural reforms which focuses on the centers of power, transforming them into centers for democracy, thereby changing existing class relationships. Through the largest possible consensus and with the energetic participation of the masses there must be exerted an unrelenting pressure against the class barriers of contemporary Italian society and, simultaneously, the autonomous power institutions of the working class must be strengthened to make possible a progressive transformation of society.

It is apparent, however, that this strategy is incompatible with the organic adhesion of the PSI to a parliamentary majority led by the Christian Democrats, the party which actually represents the interests of big capitalism and clericalism. Within this alliance the PSI would be condemned to a subordinate role. The Party would witness a limitation of its offensive power, would isolate itself from the majority of the working classes; all this in exchange for those reforms which neo-capitalism is prepared to make today as a precondition for its own expansion, and which do not modify the class nature of Italian society but, in fact, strengthen the power of big monopolies. Although socialists cannot oppose—indeed must favor —this process of modernization of capitalism, even if it strengthens the power of monopolists, we must not forget that it is our task to counterbalance the strength of big business by the strength of the organized working classes. By breaking the unity of the workers and placing themselves in a subordinate position to the party of big capital, socialists in Italy may find themselves aiding a process of rapid decay of democratic life into modern forms of capitalistic dictatorship as are already being witnessed in France and Germany.

The differences within the PSI have been resolved, at least temporarily, in a Party document which calls for: the nationalization of all sources of energy including electric and nuclear power, thorough change in land relationships, a fiscal reform including the abolition of secrecy in banking, an advance toward economic planning in order to overcome the profound imbalances of Italian society (in particular the backwardness of the Southern region), etc. This document does not entirely satisfy this writer who, nevertheless, approved it because it is necessary to replace abstract formulas with concrete and integrated objectives; and, despite its shortcomings, this economic document is a first step in this direction.

On the basis of this program and despite various changes, a compromise was reached with the Christian Democratic Party and the Center-Left government, supported by the PSI, was established. During the past few months the government submitted to parliament the first of the bills which had been agreed upon; the bill to nationalize the electric power industry is now under discussion. There is no doubt that if the whole program of the government were to be implemented, the Italian labor movement would see some of its main demands ful-

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filled (even if the experience in some other countries, above all in England, tells us that the most important thing is not that nationalization take place but the way in which it is brought about). Moreover, as a result of the new situation the political climate in the country has favored the immediate launching of new demands and has called forth a fresh fighting spirit among the workers. All these, however, are short-term results and leave unanswered the question "what next?"

The Christian-Democratic Party clearly states that it intends to accomplish these reforms because it believes they are timely. But it has no intention of following them up by further nationalizations or by other important structual reforms. The Party adds that its present policy is really a continuation of its traditional policy and that in other fields, such as foreign policy, nothing must be changed. Finally, it openly reveals its intention of utilizing the reforms to increase its power in the country and to intensify clerical pressure, especially on education, censorship, etc. Undoubtedly, the Christian Democratic Party aims to achieve a new political-social-economic equilibrium which can better respond to the very rapid development of Italian industry in recent years. It aims also to consolidate its political power and to strengthen the alliance between big capital and the Catholic church: all this made possible by the incorporation of the Socialist Party into the Parliamentary majority.

If the PSI wants to remain a socialist party, it must refuse these conditions. It must also refuse to accept the series of reforms which is already coming to a close. The Socialist Party today must concern itself with strengthening the power of the working classes in all centers of decision-making – and these lie not only in parliament and in the government – if the future is to be different from the one wished and imposed by the ruling class. The Socialist Party cannot view its present role as a junior partner in the Center-Left coalition as its ideal and permanent role. On the contrary, it must prepare itself for a possible break with the Christian Democrats, should the latter wish to stop the movement to the left. And the Socialist Party can only prepare itself if it arouses the fighting spirit of the masses around a program which aims at quickening the progress already made so as, ultimately, to effect real changes in the relationships of production and of power. It is a matter of utilizing the present fighting spirit to push further and more effectively rather than to preach compromise with the Christian Democrats.

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THE ADVANCE OF MONOPOLISTIC capitalism has fundamentally changed the social and economic conditions in Italy and has thereby created new problems and new difficulties for the labor movement (which runs risks at any moment of falling prisoner to neo-capitalism). At the same time it has created new possibilities. The problems of socialist struggle in Italy, as in all advanced capitalist countries, are quite different from those which existed just after the end of the Second World War. The victory of the Labor Party in England and the coming to power of socialist parties in many countries had then produced hope of a quick evolution in the direction of socialism. In reality, the attitude with which social democratic parties assumed power, the objectives they set for themselves and the reforms they carried out, represented the final gasp of the old socialism, of a socialism which was not yet prepared to take power. Its timidity led to supporting a capitalistic rehabilitation of Europe which was, in fact, the final triumph of monopoly capitalism. Nothing remains to be achieved along that road and by those methods. The labor movement must resume the offensive, convinced that the old prewar democratic and parliamentarian world exhausted itself under the pressure of monopolies. In the struggle for socialism lies the only alternative to the totalitarian tendencies inherent in modern capitalism.

Translated from the Italian by Valerio Agostinone

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Valerio Agostinone

Now living in the United States, working as the trade union representative of the OECD, frequent contributor to Critica Sociale *and member in Italy of the Social Democratic Party.*

A DECISIVE SHIFT in Italian socialist policy was brought about by the establishment earlier this year of a new government, in which the Social Democrats (the PSDI) participate and to which the Socialists (PSI) give their support in Parliament. This event can well be said to mark a turning point in the post-war history of the Italian labor movement because it closes a period of strife, and sometimes bitter conflicts, among socialists. It also opens prospects of collaboration and possible eventual unity.

The two parties have moved gradually together since a few years ago, when the Social Democrats, who consistently refused any form of subservience to the Communists, sought new ways of breaking the stalemate of government coalitions of the center. And the Socialists, who had maintained a solid connection with the working classes, grew increasingly disenchanted with the Communists and aware of the independent function of their Party. This rapprochement has taken the outward form of a partnership, in and outside the Government, in working out and implementing a policy designed to win for the workers the largest possible share of the benefits of an unprecedented economic expansion. It is also designed to force the leading government Party, the Christian Democrats (CD), to choose a new orientation to the left rather than a discredited coalition with the right.

All this has not been easy and the decisive change has met with determined opposition, both from the right and from the left. Apart from the anticipated vocal dissent of neo-fascists and monarchists on the extreme right (as well as of the Liberals who were dropped from the government coalition), this new government has to wage a constant battle against the powerful vested interests represented by the right wing of the Christian Democrats and the disruptive forces in and around the Communist Party. If there was any doubt that this new orientation of Socialist policy was the right one, the fact that both the totalitarian left and the capitalist right oppose it so strongly would dispel it. However, because uncertainty and sharp criticism are voiced in the PSI itself, it may be useful to discuss some of these criticisms.

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The left wing of the PSI and the Communists claim that the position taken by the majority in the Socialist Party represents both an ideological surrender to reformist principles and a political disruption of working class solidarity. This is in essence what they charge Nenni and his followers with, even if at times they mask this basic denunciation behind vague considerations of tactics. Let us consider these charges.

First of all no ideological yard-stick exists to assess whether collaboration with non-socialist forces constitutes a betrayal of socialist principles. Apart from the example of powerful and respected Socialist parties in Europe which lead political coalitions, Marxism, as a science and not a dogma, is naturally subject to change, interpretation and, yes, revision, in the light of changing circumstances. And Heaven knows whether the circumstances of the workers' struggle have changed over the past one hundred years! In the second place, the last to raise a problem of this kind should be the PCI and its fellow travellers. The Italian workers remember only too well the Communists' abject policy of support for the discredited fascist Monarchy of Italy and their decisive role in allowing the Catholics to make the Concordat between Mussolini and the Vatican an integral part of the Italian Constitution. These are significant events, the consequences of which are still deeply felt in Italian society, even if in the eyes of the Communists and their friends they merely reflect the kind of mentality and political wisdom which suggested Stalin's flirtations with Chiang Kai-shek in the twenties and with Hitler in the thirties. Above all, it is certain that if there were any chance at all of the Catholics accepting or inviting Communist support, these preachers of ideological purity would readily throw themselves into their arms. To confirm this, one has only to go back to the events in Sicily in 1960, when the PCI joined the fascists in supporting a CD right-wing coalition, against both Socialist parties, in the regional government.

In effect, behind all this loose talk about ideological treason and working class unity, is the fear of the Communist Party and its leadership of being isolated and cast out of the Italian political game, with the prospect of eventually losing all influence among organized labor. This is perhaps understandable in the case of the Communists. But it seems peculiar that some groups like the left-wing of the PSI should be worried at the prospect of their party's re-establishing itself as the leading party of the Italian workers. It is true that for a long time all they could think about and all they were trained for was how best to serve the interests of the PCI and the Soviet bloc, but one would expect them to have learnt something in the past few years. Gone are the days when the PSI fully endorsed the Cominform declaration of war against all Social Democratic Parties, when "neutralism" started from a proclamation of allegiance to the "Socialist Camp," when Pietro Nenni accepted the Stalin Prize for Peace and the Party threatened with expulsion its members who had dared visit Tito. These days are gone, but still the idea seems to prevail among the left-wingers of the PSI that the Communist Party is by definition the leading party of the Italian working classes and that the Socialist Party is only a junior partner, inadequately attempting to emulate the senior partner for the benefit of second class Marxists.

In fact, after the Hungarian revolution and the Twentieth Congress

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of the Soviet Party, the left-wingers protested vehemently against the PSI's decision to accept into its ranks some leading Communists who left their Party in disgust. To the fellow-travellers, moving from the PCI to the PSI (to which they, after all, militate) perhaps means a surrender of one's revolutionary birth right, a sign of weakness and ideological instability. On the contrary, when someone leaves the Socialist Party to join the Communists, even when it is only a case of a planted agent being recalled to headquarters, they admire him for his "big leap forward to join the daring vanguard of the proletariat," as if he had overfulfilled his ideological quota ahead of time.

Thus it is not surprising that the PSI's final renunciation of unity of action with the PCI and open condemnation of Soviet anti-proletarian deviations was fiercely opposed by the Communists and that the new policy of support for the left-center government is contested by their fellow-travellers in the PSI. Both groups insist on the principle of absolute working class unity, which is a quite respectable concept. But by making this unity dependent on the recognized supremacy of the Communist Party, they merely deprive the PSI of any claim to an independent policy of its own. The fact is that should the PSI, as is its right and duty, claim the role of leader of a united working class movement and work toward that goal, these same people would still contend that this means a step backwards on the road to the revolution and a tendency toward "petit bourgeois sectarianism, diversionism and revisionism." The unity of the working classes is a very peculiar and certainly unilateral concept with the PCI and the PSI left-wingers. One could only mention the fact that after the Red Army's suppression of the Hungarian uprising, the Executive Board of the CGIL (the "front" Confederation of Labor) unanimously passed a resolution condemning the armed intervention of the Soviet forces. This was immediately explained by the Communist General Secretary of the CGIL as a necessary manoeuvre to preserve the unity of the CGIL, and not at all as an expression of the Communists' opinion. In other words, it was only a sop for their weakling junior partners in the PSI who could not stand the sight of proletarian blood. Even today these are largely the circumstances in which the PSI trade unionists stay on in the CGIL. They are an impotent minority kept on to preserve the myth of unity.

It seems to me, therefore, that all the high-sounding phrases about keeping faith with Marxism and maintaining proletarian unity have very little relevance, except to show that they are merely used to protect the interests of the Communist Party and to promote its aims. Likewise, the indignation about the alleged ideological surrender of the PSI is a farce

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if one considers not only the facts in the situation but also that the CPI would itself be more than glad to "capitulate."

THE OTHER CRITICISM REMAINS, regarding the political wisdom of supporting a government which some consider a typical expression of neo-capitalism. Let us say that this course of action may not be ideal, but let us also frankly recognize that the entire situation in Italy is not ideal for a wholly socialist experiment. Since the war Italy has witnessed the development of a Catholic political movement which has produced the strongest party in the country. For many years to come, the Christian Democratic Party, which at one time was able to govern the country alone, will be the necessary partner of any coalition government. The question is, which kind of coalition. For the past fifteen years the CD has chosen a so-called center coalition with the small parties of the democratic left and the Liberals, a coalition which allowed the Catholics to pursue a fundamentally right-wing policy on behalf of growing capitalism while playing the game of arbitrator between the conservatism of the Liberals and the progressivism of the Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats did not choose a coalition with the extreme right of the Monarchists and neo-Fascists because they did not need to do it for the purpose of their policy. On the other hand they did not attempt to form a coalition with the left, simply because, while the PSI remained indistinguishable from the PCI there existed no actual political feasibility for it. The best one could hope for, in those circumstances, was continuation of a center policy which, however ineffective and static, seemed better than an outright revitalization of Fascist clericalism.

It was when the center coalition collapsed, because of its own enervation and the conflict between Liberals and Social Democrats, that the question was dramatically posed of where the CD would turn. Its first half-hearted attempts to turn to the PSI, after the latter's disaffection with the Communists developed over Stalinism and the Hungarian events, were quickly foiled by the conservative right-wing of the party and the Church hierarchy. There followed an experiment by the CD to govern with the support of the Fascists, but this floundered among waves of popular rebellion and fighting in the streets. At this point it was clearly the responsibility of the PSI to force a fundamental choice. It could, by expressing its will to be "available" for a center-left experiment, help a decision within the CD to turn to the left rather than to the right, or it could simply continue its policy of strict identification with the PCI and push the axis of Italian politics towards the right-wing extremes.

That the majority of the PSI chose the first alternative (although the left-wing minority later endorsed the decision without enthusiasm) is undoubtedly to its credit. By doing so it brought at least part of the Marxist-oriented groups of the working classes back into the mainstream of Italian politics from which they had been excluded for fifteen years. At a time when domestic economic expansion, international economic integration and the long-delayed development of the South gave renewed impetus to the workers' struggle and provided unprecedented opportunities for their manifestation, the Socialists rightly considered that their role

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as a workers' party was to aid and directly influence the new orientation which social and economic progress was imposing on the Catholic movement. More than this, the PSI leadership saw that their refusal to create an alternative of the left would have enormously strengthened the forces which, after reaping the advantages of the "economic miracle," were ready to trap the workers into a paternalistic system of empty "rewards." The support of the PSI, by making possible the formation of the center-left Fanfani government, carried forward the logical consequences of economic expansion, (through measures like central economic planning, the nationalization of the electric power industry, the establishment of regional government), far beyond the limits envisaged by the advocates of neo-capitalism. Perhaps it opened the way to a much deeper reform of the economic structures of the country. In fact, one cannot forget that much of the economic outline put forward by a special research committee of the PSI was adopted by the new Government as part of its program.



WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE ALTERNATIVE open to the advocates of proletarian unity and ideological firmness? Clearly it would have been to follow the Communists into isolation, into a kind of proletarian ivory tower which would have soon become a prison. It would have continued the experience of the past fifteen years, during which time the workers have been unable to exert the least influence on events. This alternative would have meant continuing to comfort the bereaved widows of Stalinism, with no other prospect than that of an impossible revolutionary miracle. Meanwhile, the workers, made restless by their increased awareness of possibly sharing in the widespread well-being, would have been left to their own devices, fighting a hopeless battle against the apparatus of a reactionary State. Such a State eventually might have attempted either to frustrate the forward movement of the proletariat by the bribery of piecemeal concessions or to crush it altogether. At best, the Socialists would have sought to share with the Communists the very dubious satisfaction of claiming that prosperity and progress were due to the pressure of the masses under their leadership, whereas, if it were up to them, the Italian workers would still be chanting revolutionary slogans in front of idle factories.

Thus, in essence, the alternative that the left-wingers in the PSI and the Communists have to offer to the present socialist policy is that of a "popular front" which, short of a world Communist revolution or a victorious Soviet conquest, would be denied any chance of constructive participation in Italian politics and would simply have the Italian workers busily rehearsing revolutionary tattoos, claiming as proletarian victories

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occasional capitalistic hand-outs. This policy undoubtedly serves the aims of the PCI, which has no other function than that of obstructing economic and social progress in Italy and dreads to be left alone to do the job. Moreover, this policy would eliminate, in the name of proletarian unity, any possibility for the PSI of presenting itself as a strong Marxist challenge and alternative to the domination of the Italian workers by the PCI. When the Communists reel under the impact of Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist revelations, they are revived by the continued allegiance of Socialist advocates of the front who help the Jack-of-all-trades leadership of the Communist Party to maintain their position at the top and to effectively keep their subjects under control.

The policy chosen by the leaders of the PSI therefore not only cannot be lightly dismissed as ideological surrender to capitalism or as political sell-out to government inducements, but presents the only workable alternative to political self-annihilation and the only way of shaping the economic and social future of Italy. Some will argue that it is not with the present forces of the PSI and the PSDI that this job can be done in the face of the massive opposition of the class enemies. But the new policy of the PSI can help open the prospects for an early organic re-unification of the two parties. The new stand taken by the PSDI encourages this possibility. From this would emerge once more an Italian Socialist movement fully dedicated to the ideals of liberty and justice. Its tradition and conviction, deeply rooted in the working classes, alone hold the promise of a true renovation and advance for the country as a whole and of rallying all progressive forces.

The dark years of division and conflict brought on by the Communists since the time they first split the movement in the face of the imminent Fascist onslaught, may well be near their end. It may also end the apparent dichotomy between a Socialist Marxist society and a modern free society. It will not be the peddlers of totalitarianism, parading around the empty coffin of their squalid hopes, that will prevent the rebirth of a strong and free socialist movement. In the words of a leading figure of democratic socialism in Italy, the workers, rallying to us, will be able to proclaim once more: "We left behind us the ashes, we took away with us the flame!"

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Lucio Libertini

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TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS and prospects of Italian socialism we must begin with the most important political event in Italy in the last few years: the forming of a Center-Left government. This government, created in March 1962 and presided over by the Honorable Mr. Fanfani, is based on an organic majority which includes the Christian Democrats (by far the largest political party in Italy), the Social Democrats and the Republicans (the smallest party, with only five deputies). But the three party coalition alone does not have a functioning majority in Parliament. Up to two months ago, the Liberal Party (21 deputies) furnished the governing majority's margin of safety. Since March the Socialist Party has been the one to guarantee the life of the Fanfani government, albeit indirectly, by an abstention vote. The Socialist Party, to judge by the number of deputies (89), members and voters (4 million), is the third party in Italy.

The precondition of the Center-Left coalition is the intense capitalistic development which has taken place in the last decade, particularly in the last three years. We are witnessing a capitalist unification of Italy through the elimination of all feudal vestiges. In 1949, 43% of the population was still actively engaged in agriculture. According to the 1961 Census the agricultural population had decreased to 29%; probably at present it is not over 26%. Large numbers of peasants have emigrated from the South to the North, from rural areas to big cities, from Italy to other countries, mostly to Western Europe; some 300 thousand people emigrate a year. In the past ten years, two million Southerners have moved up North, reinforcing the ranks of industrial workers and, to a lesser degree, joining service industries. In the past three years the growth of industrial production has outdistanced that of any other capitalist country in Europe and America: in 1960 production rose by 14%.

It is an accepted fact that the rise in wages and salaries, real or nominal, has not corresponded to the rise in productivity. This can

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be explained by the persistence of a vast sector of unemployed, by the influx of Southern workers to the factories, and by the growing power of the monopolies in organizing and running production.

Even agriculture is experiencing a profound transformation. The large absentee-owned estates have been liquidated as a result of great mass struggles in which many peasants were killed, wounded or imprisoned (nonetheless, there are still important pre-capitalistic elements in the rural areas). Land owned by small farmers comprising 50% of the acreage has merged into much larger units; above all, modern capitalist enterprise, especially in the Po Valley, is characterized by a high organic composition of capital and by very advanced methods of production.

Finally, a recent phenomenon is the penetration of the South by private capitalism, imported by the state; in the interior of this economically and socially backward area important industrial centers are being established. Centers of agrarian development, however, are rising less rapidly.

There is another side to the industrial scene: backward and outright pre-capitalistic elements still remain. Out of a total population of 50 million, one and a half million are still unemployed. This is due to the inadequacies of economic development as well as to the limited occupational qualifications of Italian workers. Despite monopolist penetration of the South and the creation of both industrial and agricultural centers, the disparity in the level of economic development between North and South has actually widened.

In large sections of the country contracts and relations are conducted which are positively feudal. Differences in income from zone to zone and region to region are often considerable. In many industries, above all, in service industries, wages are inferior to the contractual minimums. Working hours are not respected, and hygienic conditions are totally neglected.

AT PRESENT A LIVELY DISCUSSION is under way in the Italian labor movement seeking to analyze these economic problems. Naturally everyone recognizes the dynamism of Italian capitalism, and no one repeats the foolish theories, now in vogue in France, on the absolute impoverishment of the working class.

I shall say little about how the Social Democratic Party proper, and the social democratic tendencies within the Italian Socialist Party, interpret these facts. Social Democrats hail the extraordinary development of capitalism as a means for inviting the working class to enter the system and thereby share its well-being.

Of greater interest is the discussion going on within the Communist Party and the left wing of the Socialist Party. One group of Communists, led by George Amendola, maintains that the most

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important aspect of the Italian situation consists of so-called secondary contradictions, i.e., contradictions between the advanced productive development and the backward, often pre-capitalistic, social relations. The task of the labor movement, therefore, would be to exploit these secondary contradictions, taking in its own hands the banner of bourgeois democracy and economic progress against the monopolies.

Another large sector of the Communist Party and the Socialist left emphasizes the growing importance of capitalist unification related to the primary contradiction between capital and labor. Given this approach the struggle for them must not be limited to the bourgeois-democratic reform of society; it must be to take advantage of the essential link between bourgeois-democratic transformation and socialist revolution.

As I have said, the Center-Left arises in the first place from the dynamic of capitalism: large monopolies today need to reorganize Italian society more rationally, eliminating vestiges of pre-capitalism, balancing the different parts of the economic apparatus and greatly enlarging the mass market. In agriculture, the capitalist transformation can be advanced only when feudal contracts, such as those made with sharecroppers, are abolished. Industry and agriculture would function together more rationally if the redundant means of distribution were changed. A comparison between Italy and a capitalist country like the United States would show how striking are the effects of high costs of distribution on the price of Italian goods.

ITALIAN POLITICS REFLECTS exactly this monopolistic movement, affecting the whole economy, toward modernization and rationalization. In Italy, the power of the industrial bourgeoisie had once rested on a direct alliance with feudal and reactionary elements found mostly in the South, whose spokesmen were the Monarchist Party, the Fascist Party, the Liberal Party and the right wing of the Christian Democratic Party. Rapid capitalist development is now breaking this alliance and producing an acute conflict between the huge monopolies and their old allies. Significantly, Fiat, which is a major, very modern Italian trust, arranged the great campaign in favor of the Center-Left coalition; its daily paper, *La Stampa di Torino,* has

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defended this new political and parliamentary solution with all the ideological arguments of neo-capitalism.

Clearly, such a coalition corresponds to the new perspectives of Italian monopolistic capitalism.

A SECOND CAUSE of the rise of the Center-Left is the erosion of the old Centrist majority which governed Italy after 1947. By 1953 it was clear that the four Centrist parties (Christian Democrat, Liberal, Social Democratic and Republican) no longer held a solid majority. Because of this, the government attempted to have a plurality act passed which the opposition nicknamed the "swindle law." But the electorate rejected the measure. From that moment on, in the midst of a long and exhausting crisis, the Christian Democrats faced the problem of choosing new allies either on the right or on the left. That considerable sector of the Catholic party which staked an open alliance with the traditional right was encouraged by both the most backward capitalist groups and, as long as the autocratic Pius XII remained on the pontifical throne, by the Vatican hierarchy. Thus, in 1960 the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, the Honorable Tambroni, formed a government whose parliamentary majority comprised Christian Democrats, Liberals, Monarchists, and Fascists. Within four months Tambroni's government was overthrown by a violent popular insurrection which bloodied the pavements of many Italian piazzas, brought out the police and regional and central authorities of the great industrial center of Genoa, and threatened to split the Catholic party itself. From then on it was obvious that a government based on an alliance with the right was practically impossible, with the only course left to the Christian Democratic Party being a Center-Left arrangement with the Socialist Party. The latest convention of the Christian Democratic Party, which met in Naples last winter, adopted this new orientation. At this point we should emphasize the fact that agreement with the Socialists was formally presented by Christian Democratic leaders as a device for splitting the Italian labor movement, for isolating the Communist Party with its 2 million members and 7 million voters and for integrating the Socialist Party into a capitalist system open to certain modern reforms.

THE THIRD CAUSE of the Center-Left coalition is to be found in the general popular shift towards the left. In all these years not only did votes for Communists and Socialists increase—although not spectacularly—the CGIL, the trade-union organization, increased its strength and many Catholic voters revealed a strong desire for social progress. Technological and economic progress intensified and created a heightened consciousness in millions of workers. The Southern peasants who were brought into the indus-

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trial process quickly abandoned their old prejudices. The new generation of workers, peasants and students clearly indicated that they felt a certain intolerance toward the contrast between technological progress and existing social conditions. The popular and sizable move to the left may ultimately cause a split of the Catholic party into two groups, one on the right, the other on the left. In the organ of the Christian Democratic left wing which calls itself *Renewal* one reads the following, "We no longer want to be the radical wing of a bourgeois or inter-class party." The strength of this popular move to the left is clearly indicated by the change in the Vatican's policy. The pro-Fascist Pius XII has been replaced by the "pro-Socialist" John XXIII, and within the College of Cardinals the supporters of the Fascists have been reduced to a minority.

The new viewpoint of the masses cannot be contained or harnessed by a Center or pro-Fascist policy. The only effective weapon available to the Italian bourgeoisie is, in fact, a Center-Left coalition which allows the masses to function within the framework of its system and corresponds to its need for rationalization, for the division of the labor movement and the stabilization of the system.

Finally, at the root of the new policy lies the evolution of Western capitalism, particularly of American policy: the new approaches linked to Kennedy's name and to the unification of the Western capitalist market, to neo-colonialism, to the end of ultra-NATOism.

All I have said so far should not leave the impression that the new policy is developing without bitter resistance, not only over international affairs, but within the Vatican and among industrial and agrarian interests as well. Nevertheless, this new policy shows every promise of success.

As a result of the Center-Left coalition the Italian Socialist Party is divided into two wings—the right wing constituting 56%, the left wing 44%—which, despite certain tactical similarities, manifest opposing attitudes. The Socialist Party right under Pietro Nenni has pushed the prospects of socialist power to the very distant future. Because the system may now prove attractive to Italian workers seeking to gain from its reforms, Nenni sacrificed political collaboration with the Communists for the sake of an alliance with Christian Democrats. Nenni concedes that as a result of this new policy the Communist Party will grow stronger, the Socialist Party weaker; but he is convinced that the Communists will be adversely affected once the Center-Left consolidates its power. Nevertheless, the strong tradition of unity among Italian Socialists induces the right wing to remain in the same trade-union organization as the

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Communists and to establish local governments with Communist majorities in traditionally "red" municipalities.

In practice, the Socialist Party right wing owes much of its ideology and propaganda to the French, English and German Social Democracy in the immediate postwar period. Social Democratic parties in Western Europe have since gone much farther along the same road. The right wing of the PSI is only at the starting point. What is still remarkably significant to me is the fact that most of the leaders of the Socialist right were until a few years ago fervent Stalinists (Nenni himself received the Stalin Prize). Both in their old and new policies they share a basic lack of confidence in the autonomous struggle of the Italian labor movement.

FOR ITS PART, the Socialist left wing resulted from the merger of diverse groups. The major group, during Stalin's day, was led by Rodolfo Morandi. Some of the other groups come from the traditional autonomous sectors of the Party. Today, Lelio Basso, who led the opposition to Stalinists when Stalin was alive, has gravitated to the left wing.

The Socialist left takes into account the objective and positive elements in the Center-Left policy. It does not long for more conservative center governments in the spirit of "the worse, the better." In fact, the Left long ago predicted the developments now taking place as against those sections of the labor movement which denied the possibility of the dynamic evolution of Italian capitalism. But recognition of the positive elements in the Center-Left policy does not mean acceptance. Neither the economic evolution of Italian capitalism nor the policies of the Center-Left coalition eliminates the inherent contradictions of capitalism, but raises them to a new, higher level. The class struggle is not overcome; it is accelerated as the division and conflict between capital and labor is now more closely discernible.

TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS need to be asked: What roles are state capitalism and the trade unions expected to play? State capitalism is very important to the Italian economy. The further development of public ownership in industry and the complicated mechanism of subsidies, fiscal incentives, and public investments in the structure of the economy depend on it. The right wing of the Socialist Party is moving ever closer to the view that the development of state capitalism not only changes the balance of Italian society but also changes the nature of the state. In the tradition of classic revisionists the state is represented as neutral toward capital and labor. This eases the integration of labor into the system and justifies the magnitude of state capitalism. The Socialist left rejects this conception. In its view the development of state capitalism fails

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to change the class character of the state and fails to create a new economic power free from the logic of profit.

Modern capitalism divides into two sectors. The private, which exercises a dominant function, and the public, which exercises a subordinate one. This naturally causes a contradiction between public and private industry—and here precisely the labor movement must assert itself. State capitalism can be a positive force provided that the working class fights against the hegemony of private monopolies and so builds up an antagonistic or alternative power within the structure of production. It is here that left Socialists present their demands for workers' control. For example, the Center-Left government intends to nationalize the electric power industry. An argument is developing within the Italian labor movement between those who are content only with nationalization and those, such as the Socialist left and a large proportion of the Communist Party, who consider nationalization an empty box which the monopolies can easily fill unless accompanied by an energetic policy of workers' control over production and distribution.

A sharp argument also is in progress over trade unions. Part of the Catholic left, the entire bourgeois democratic left and certain sectors of the Socialist Party accept the idea of collective bargaining between the unions and the state. Under this kind of bargaining the state would offer economic planning inspired by the need for a more balanced development if the unions would accept limited autonomy on matters of wages and working conditions. The Socialist left maintains that the unions cannot accept these terms. Even in a socialist economy should the unions forfeit their function to become a vehicle for state planning they are on the way toward bureaucratic degeneration.

I HAVE SAID THAT FOR THE SOCIALIST LEFT, defense of the labor movement's unity is of decisive importance. The history of the labor movement is one of deep ideological and political conflicts. To stifle these differences under the cloak of some dogmatic unity is detrimental, often impossible. The right of each tendency to express its opinions and to exercise its freedom to criticize guarantees the ideological progress of the class movement. But an even greater handicap than artificial labor unity arises when ideological differences between parties and groups within the labor movement turn into full-fledged political conflicts which take precedence over the class struggle. The labor movement as a whole is no less set back when one of its sections, hostile to the rest of the movement, accepts alliances or associations with the class enemy and its political parties. These problems cannot be ignored if one knows the history of social democracy. In Italy, the question of class unity confronts the Socialists in a particular way. I have already noted that Italian

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capitalists seek to divide and counterpose the Socialists and Communists. At the recent convention of the Christian Democratic Party this question was the most important one discussed. Even the right wing, led by Mario Scelba, declared itself willing to come to terms with the Socialists, provided the latter broke all relations beforehand with the Communists and with the unions in local governments and in the cooperative movement. However, the majority at that convention, led by Moro and Fanfani, refused to present such an ultimatum to the Socialist Party. Moro and Fanfani maintained that the break between Socialists and Communists would come as the natural consequence of the Center-Left coalition. Moro argued quite lucidly that the tradition of unity in the PSI would prohibit creation of a Center-Left coalition if a complete break with the Communists depended on it, while an outflanking tactic held a greater promise of success.

It is indispensable for the bourgeoisie to divide the labor movement. Given the strong move to the left by the masses, it will be impossible to confine Italy to a capitalistic form of society should the labor movement remain united. Whoever knows the Italian situation must recognize the great role which the CGIL, containing both Socialist and Communist workers, has played and still plays in our society. Division of the CGIL would prove the end of unity in the Italian labor movement. It would deprive the working class in our country of its main weapon.

The Italian Communist Party today is the strongest class party in our country. It numbers 2 million members and 7 million voters. When the old Socialist party split in 1921 the great majority of young revolutionary workers joined the new-born Communist Party. That split was produced not only by sympathy with Leninism and the Russian Revolution, but also by a violent reaction against the impotence of reformism and of the old maximalism. The Socialist split of 1947, which gave birth to Giuseppe Saragat's Social Democratic Party, drove the labor movement one step further in this direction. It is not accidental that since 1947 the Communist Party has become the largest workers' party. A further drastic separation of Socialists from Communists would make the Communists the only revolutionary and Marxist party in Italy, increase its num bers and push the Italian Socialist Party toward the traditional

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pattern of European social democracy. Obviously, Italian capitalism, in order to enfeeble the labor movement, is prepared to pay the price of a stronger Communist Party today in the expectation of conquering it through isolation. Marxists must clearly resist this effort.

THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY has always been, even during the Stalinist years, one of the least dogmatic Communist parties in the world. Its greatest thinker, always honored as its founder, was Antonio Gramsci (whose works until 1960 were banned by Maurice Thorez and the French Stalinists). The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the accompanying explosion of de-Stalinization, even if they produced only a partial change in leadership, nevertheless opened a wide ideological and political debate within the Communist Party which reached its peak after the 22nd Congress. The Communist youth newspaper, *New Generation,* started a public debate on the personality and attitudes of Trotsky which, among other things, provoked a strong reaction among French Communist leaders. Even within the Italian Communist Party some essentially reformist tendencies are evident, although their importance is marginal. One is not, then, confronted with a monolithic block dominated by rigid dogmatists, but with a class party, articulate and deeply bound to Italian reality, within which the tradition of so-called democratic socialists exercises considerable influence. The Socialists who reject Social Democracy and at the same time, having fought against Stalinism, intend to work toward a renewed and vigorous labor movement, have nothing to gain from a break between Socialists and Communists. In practice they would find themselves as prisoners of Social Democratic tendencies in the PSI while within the Communist Party the dogmatists would garner new strength. The total split between Socialists and Communists in Italy is a demand in the interest of the monopolistic bourgeoisie and of the truly Social Democratic wing of the labor movement.

Translated from the Italian by Virginia Brown and Valerio Agostinone.

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Italo Viglianesi

General Secretary of the Italian Labor Union, member of the Directorate of the Italian Social Democratic Party and member of the National Economic Council.

IF ONE CONSIDERS the Italian socialist movement as a whole, in all the complexity and heterogeneity of its political and economic groupings – the Democratic Socialist Party of Italy (PSDI) and the Socialist Party of Italy (PSI), the democratic socialist majority in the Union of Italian Workers (UIL) and the minority tendency in the General Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL)—then one is confronted with an accurate reflection of all the contradictions of the movement's dramatic postwar history. And yet, thanks to the crisis of Stalinism, the masses are turning again, and with renewed vigor, toward the socialist movement, despite all its contradictions and paradoxes.

Since 1956, there has been a growing sentiment among the Italian working class for a new political program. Though this political ferment has not, as yet, resulted in increased electoral or organizational strength of the socialist movement, it has nevertheless brought the movement back to the foreground in Italian politics. The socialist movement has become, along with the Christian Democrats (CD), the decisive force for opening a new political course for the nation.

The restlessness of the masses is largely the product of the crisis of "centrism"—the pattern of government by coalition that has dominated Italian politics since the war; a coalition traditionally composed of the four parties of "democracy": the Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats, the Democratic Socialists and the Republican Party. The centrist alliance inaugurated a program of industrialization without precedent; a process being carried out at the same rate as that of the most rapidly expanding economies in the world today. Nevertheless, it has not been able to solve the traditional economic ills of the country: continued unemployment, under-employment, illiteracy, a depressed and backward economy in the South. In fact, it has created new inequities.

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This economic expansion, optimistically dubbed "the Italian miracle," has, in fact, increased the distance between classes in society, rendering the antagonisms between the most advanced sections of the country and the poorer regions even more acute. The "Italian Miracle" has also revealed the total inadequacy of the school system on the university as well as the secondary level; a failure not only to conquer illiteracy, but even to produce the skilled technicians and workers required to meet the needs of a technologically advanced industrial system.

Furthermore, this same economic transformation has set in motion a whole series of new social gears which are transforming the face of Italian society. Italy, of all the nations of western Europe, still maintains the largest proportion of its population (33%) in agricultural production. However, only seven years ago the peasantry was even larger, constituting 41% of the total population. Large numbers of peasants and other workers—above all, young workers—are abandoning the South and other depressed areas and flocking, at a growing pace, toward the cities and the industrial North.

Even though they enjoy a better standard of living today in comparison even with the recent past, the people feel the need for a new kind of politics in the country, one which safeguards, even accelerates economic expansion, but also controls it with the aim of eradicating old and new social inequities. In Italy, everybody knows that such a political program cannot be carried out by a centrist coalition which, under the influence of the Liberals and the right wing of the Christian Democrats, subordinates political and economic life to the interests of the private monopolies. At the same time the masses are becoming increasingly aware that the Communist Party, with its permanent loyalty to the politics of the Soviet bloc, is incapable of contributing to the progressive social evolution of the nation.

Consequently, the conviction has grown among Italian workers that a new political program is possible, but only if the socialist movement as a whole is capable of forcing the Christian Democrats, the largest single party in Italian politics today, into a center-left alliance, which will exclude the Liberals, rein in the right wing of the CD and carry through a plan to overcome the imbalances created by economic expansion. Thus, the socialist movement is a force and, despite its internal problems, holds the balance of power on the Italian political scene. Its responsibilities have increased in the realm of politics as well as in the area of trade-union struggle, where economic growth and diversification pose complex political and organizational problems.

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

However, at this historic turning point in Italian society, the socialist movement suffers from organizational weaknesses that can no longer be ignored. If we are to bring the movement to a point where it can measure up to its new tasks and responsibilities, these problems must be discussed with courage and frankness.

Actually, today, all the objective conditions are present for the socialist movement to win the leadership in the political and trade-union struggles of the working class. And yet, it is incapable of doing so because it has failed to resolve the serious contradictions of its past, as well as new contradictions which reflect the evolution of Italian society in the last few years.

The Italian socialist movement is an old movement; old in tradition, old in ideology, old in structure. The movement, in both its branches, goes back to a glorious tradition of proletarian struggle, which had its starting point with the formation of the Socialist Party in 1892. A tradition of 70 years of struggle, rekindled by the resistance, by the fight for the republic, by the internecine struggles of the labor movement, by the social initiatives of the post-war period; a tradition of struggle that, no doubt, reveals the weight of years in its symbols, its language, its propaganda forms, in its dependence on general principles, many of which are now outmoded and no longer have any impact on new generations of workers.

The ideology of the movement in formal statements and official acts is still Marxist, that is, the reformist interpretation of Marxism, popularized in Italy by Turati and *Critica Sociale*. There have been no important contributions on the part of prominent cultural or political personalities to enrich the arsenal of scientific socialism. Only in recent years has socialist thought begun to take account of the realities of modern economic thought, sociology, philosophy, science, the most advanced conceptions of art and social psychology, that is to say, with the culture boom in a newly modernized mass industrial society.

Instead, the political patterns of Italian socialism, which crystalized in large part in the immediate post-World War II period, continue to echo either the themes of a catechetical Marxism, learned from agitational pamphlets, or a Marxism corrupted by the dogmatic interpretations diffused far and wide by the highly active editorial and cultural organs of the Communist Party. Since neither

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source is of much use to someone who must lead a mass organization in political and economic struggles on the level of real daily problems, the result is that, with a few praiseworthy exceptions, the cadres and leadership of the socialist movement accept Marxist ideology only formally, as a ritual obligation and a means of covering over a pragmatic activism which is incapable of producing anything fruitful, even on an organizational level.

This unfamiliarity with the social and cultural problems attendant to a developing industrial society has produced a ruling stratum of the socialist movement that is barely aware of what is general knowledge even to the most superficial and removed observer of political reality. Thus, the parties and trade unions as now constituted are incapable of politically training and mobilizing the workers, peasants and middle classes for struggle. This inadequacy has historical origins because it derives from the inherent tendency toward maintaining organizational models born in a different political period; models which were the most advanced in relation to the needs of the period in which they arose but which are now the most backward given the needs of the present period.

The organizational structure of the socialist movement is, in fact, founded almost entirely on the criterion of the territorial organization. This criterion corresponded to the basic need to organize political centers in a country like Italy which, at the turn of the century, had a predominantly peasant population and was therefore honeycombed by many small urban centers. The section corresponded, furthermore, to the municipal struggle for the conquest of the small communes in a period when the pressure for the conquest of state power was out of the question.

But even then, the territorial organization was integrated by the trade-union organizations of the workers and by the peasant leagues which were exclusively controlled by a socialist leadership.

After the last war, with the defeat of fascism, socialist organizations were rebuilt along the same old organizational pattern, without taking into account that the social realities of the country had already changed and would continue to do so. Italy, the country of agriculture, was becoming an industrial nation. The conglomeration of small cities was being replaced by large urban metropoli. Instead of a largely illiterate or, at best, semi-literate, working class, a class of skilled workers, technicians and experts in the service industries is arising. A class wherein, among its younger ranks especially, one finds an ever widening diffusion of culture, albeit of the mass variety. In place of the old rustic forms of propaganda, new mass means of communication (radio, TV, movies, large mass circulation dailies) have sprung up.

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This whole complex of developments should have created an awareness of the need to modify organizational models in keeping with the new reality. Especially because the leadership and control of the mass organizations, the unions, the cooperatives, the peasant leagues, the direct cultivators—which had held the territorial organizations together in pre-fascist times—had passed from the socialists to the Communists and the Christian Democrats, leaving socialists without the direct roots in industry necessary for the organization of workers on the job.

Only one group of socialist trade unionists who, with other trade-union elements of the lay democracy, founded the Italian Workers Union (UIL), realizes that the need for a socialist presence in the world of labor means that the political movement must maintain some organic connection with the working class.

To understand the importance of the problem of organizational structure in any general perspective for Italian socialism, one must recall the attempt of the Communist Party to use the "left wing" faction of the PSI as a means of infiltrating the trade unions and other mass organizations, to put a brake on the democratizing influence of the socialists in these organizations, an influence which was devoted to freeing them from the heavy yoke of the Communists and their subordination to the policies of the Soviet bloc.

WE HAVE SAID THAT OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS are ripe today for socialists to win the political and trade-union leadership of the Italian working class. But this is possible only if the socialists are capable of overcoming their present schism, if they can face the problems of a new organizational approach to deal with new social conditions in Italian society, if they take cognizance of the importance, today more than ever, of the presence of an independent and effective socialist movement in the world of labor. Only in this way will we take advantage of the historic occasion which the socialist movement has before it, to make socialism the force most capable of expressing the growing democratic will of the masses for a radical transformation of the social and governmental order in Italy.

Fortunately, there are strong currents in both parties which promise to overcome the schism. In the PSI there is the Autonomist commitment of the majority and in the PSDI the firmness of the party in pursuing the objective of new political relations as a means of revamping the whole socialist movement and making it more responsive to popular control.

Translated from the Italian by Bob Brown

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Vittoria Foa

One of the Secretaries of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, member of the Directorate of the Italian Socialist Party and a Deputy in the Italian Parliament.

THE RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION of Italy since 1953 has profoundly affected the structure of the working class and the politics of the Socialist movement. Only once before in Italian history—the period between 1896 and 1913—did industry significantly expand (we leave aside the brief spurts of the post-World War I period and the Fascist deflation during the depression of 1927). During these periods of vastly increased productivity, the numbers of migrant laborers moving from country to city and the degree of economic concentration and development of state capitalism increased correspondingly.

The Socialist Party and the trade-union movement grew considerably between 1896 and 1913. Labor reacted to the industrialization of this period in syndicalist fashion and the industrial unionism which followed, supported by scarcely qualified workers of recent rural origin, exhibited the influence of political ideology. In the first decade of the century, the Socialist Party split into reform and revolutionary factions. Immediately, a new union based on revolutionary principles broke off from the majority General Confederation of Labor (CGL). At the end of the First World War, Catholic or "white" unions (as distinct from Socialist "red" unions) arose in conjunction with the rise of a large Catholic political party. The Fascists, during their reign of destruction, suppressed all unions regardless of ideology. When political freedom returned twenty years later the character of the various unions had greatly changed. But before examining this change, let us first inquire into the economic and political developments which preceded it.

ITALIAN CAPITALISM MADE a great leap forward in the first decade of the century (known in Italy as the "Giolittian" decade, from the name of the liberal politician Giovanni Giolitti who struggled against the government almost uninterruptedly in those years) the State. An elaborate banking system, consisting of banks which

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dealt simultaneously in ordinary credits of short term duration and in credits of medium and long duration, and which acted as a political clearing house for such industries as steel, naval dockyards, cotton, sugar, chemicals, etc., was a decisive factor in the creation of monopolies and in the growth of state capitalism.

Protected industry, concentrated mainly in the northwest, possessed a sufficiently large surplus to allow relative stability in employment and a relative increase in earnings; accordingly, in this region there developed a moderate and reformist socialism (and hence also a trade-union movement) more interested in securing material advantages within the capitalist system than in overthrowing it by revolution.

Although the working class of the North succeeded in participating, albeit in rather small measure, in the benefits of expanded production, a fairly large proportion of the Italian proletariat and sub-proletariat employed in the most retarded sector of the economy remained the most oppressed segment of society employed. It is here, above all, that the leftist trend of the socialist movement, generally known as the Maximalistic, found support.

At that time, the agrarian question was, as it still is, of prime importance. Large numbers of agricultural day laborers formed class organizations in the Val Padana and Puglie, while in Southern Italy under the sysem of latifondo, or large absentee land holdings, a variety of seigneurial-feudal contracts produced incredible conditions of starvation and misery. The bourgeois government, giving up its policy of protecting grains, on the one hand, created obstacles of its own to the development of more specialized agricultural industries (such as livestock breeding, orchard growing, truck farming, and so forth), but on the other formed a conservative political alliance of financiers, Northern industrialists, and large Southern landholders. The sharp differences within the working class, the split within the socialist movement and the strength of the reformist sect, for a long time prevented the Socialist Party from understanding the true nature of its enemies and from devising a strategy of struggle that was adapted to reality.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR radically transformed Italian socialism. (Let it be recorded at this point that the Italian Socialist Party was the only one among the European Socialist parties which refused to vote war credits, and maintained throughout a coherent anti-war position.) At the end of the war, socialism increased its strength through the addition of many peasants after the bourgeoisie defaulted in its war-time commitment to give them land. Italian socialism also benefited from the example of the Russian Revolution which exalted the hopes of the masses.

The revolutionary wave exhausted itself rapidly between 1918 and 1920 with the counter-revolution taking the offensive through-

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out Europe. In Russia, the NEP phase began. In Italy, capitalism struck with Fascist squadrons, tossing its own constitutional guarantees to the wind. Meanwhile, the Socialist Party, instead of providing firm, united leadership to the working masses, split into diverse factions. The Labor Confederation, whose reformism prevailed, proved impotent.

Besides the right and left wing Socialist parties, there was a Communist Party, founded in 1921 on strict adherence to the Third International. Only in later years, after Fascism had triumphed, did Italian Communists develop a political line more closely attuned to the political problems of Italian society.



FOR TWENTY YEARS FASCISM annulled every trace of political freedom and unionism in Italy. The purpose of fascist political economy was to reduce the workers' yearly income while stabilizing the economy at a low level of development: between 1900 and 1915 productivity rose by a yearly average of 3.8%; under twenty years of Fascism the annual average rose only 0.8%. At the same time, Fascism greatly increased the degree of industrial and financial concentration and the rapport between state and capitalism, the corporative economic system being in reality a joint enterprise consisting of the big capitalists and the Fascist bureaucracy. Industrial wages, which reached a maximum in 1921 of 127 (1913 = 100), declined for the next twenty years; not until 1949 did wages return to the level of 1921.

With the fall of Fascism in 1945, political parties came out into the open again. New problems, more complex than before, now challenged the parties to overcome the burdens of the past. During the War of Liberation, the Socialists had ended their old schism, but not with the Communists. Nonetheless, the new Socialist Party, containing all the old tendencies, the left being strongest, favored continuing the collaboration with the Communists which had matured in the fight against Fascism and war.

The Communist Party emerged as a large mass party. It now enjoyed prestige thanks to its militancy in the Resistance. It presented itself to the country as a national and democratic party which respected and even defended bourgeois democracy. It played down the class struggle that had been central to the Socialist tradition in the labor movement. Instead, it tried to present the class struggle in modern terms as the conflict between socialist and capi-

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talist countries, that is, between the USSR and America. This international version of class struggle strongly counter-balanced Communist influence in the country at the beginning of the Cold War.

Collaboration with the Communist Party was one cause of the splits in the Socialist Party in 1947 and 1949. The Socialist right, headed by Giuseppe Saragat, opted for Western politics, accusing the Communists of expressing only the Soviet political position. The majority of the left, headed by Pietro Nenni, refused to join with the West, the embodiment of capitalism, and continued its policy of united action with the Communists.

But the Cold War and collaboration with the Communist Party were not the sole causes of the split within the Socialist Party. During those years, a controversial question was the direction of post-war economic reconstruction and development. What was to be the role of the working class in the economy? The capitalists wanted a completely free hand to enable them to establish direct ties with American capitalism. Italian capitalists also wanted to exploit the divisions and weakness of the Socialist Party in order to reduce the power of unions and isolate the Communists. This plan succeeded at least in the early post-war years. The Socialist Party suffered political losses, while the big Catholic party, the Christian Democrats, emerged in 1946 as a third party that would have no truck with the Communists. Since 1952, however, socialism has continued to gain strength. But there have arisen new problems and new sources of discontent within the Party.

SINCE THE FIFTIES, Italian capitalism's second leap forward has greatly diminished the historical differences between Italy and other Western countries. Some data are indicative of this change. In 1936 the aggregate ratio of the agricultural labor population to the population as a whole was 48.6%; today it is about 28%. The number of workers dependent on wages increased markedly: in 1936 it was 51.6%; today it is 64%, with the major increase having come within the last five years. In other words, we are in the presence of a powerful process of absolute proletarianization. This process has effectively subordinated classes of autonomous labor, such as artisans and peasants who own small property, to the status of what might be called a relative proletariat.

Even more relevant are the changes in the output of various sectors of production in relation to total gross production. Between 1896 and 1900 industrial production constituted 19.1% of total production, in 1921–25 it rose to 31.1%; in 1936–40, to 34.2%; in 1956–9 it reached 47.8%; today it is undoubtedly over 50%. Correspondingly, agriculture, which constituted 50% of total production in 1896–1900, went down to 22.7% in 1956–9 and is today only about 20%. From an agricultural-industrial country Italy has be-

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come, particularly within the past several years, an industrial-agricultural country.

Industrial production in Italy has risen by a higher rate than that of any other capitalist country. Between 1950 and 1960 the total value of national production has increased nearly threefold; in the same period average wages have more than doubled; the number of workers has increased by half while output per worker has doubled. The proportion of wages to gross national income has decreased from 31.5% to 28.9%. The rate of income, in other words, has risen far less rapidly than the rate of productivity.

Accumulation has reached the point where, it is calculated, 80% of investments in industry are today self-financing. The rate of accumulation naturally depends upon the nature of the enterprise and the extent of its control over distribution. Concentration, having grown greatly in the past ten years, has become a part of the nexus of international finance. An examination of 15 of the most important corporations discloses that between 1955 and 1960, while national income increased by 44%, their income increased by 52% (and for some by 80–90%). Italian industry, hitherto an importer of capital, today actually exports capital—and to an increasing degree from year to year.

Capitalism has also made significant progress in agriculture. The workers' struggles of the post-war period, which resulted in the distribution of land to the peasants, destroyed the latifondo; modernization of agrarian contracts also achieved partial success. There has been a marked exodus from the countryside in recent years. Entire agricultural areas have become transformed; others have been abandoned and are in a disgraceful state. The yearly per capita income of agricultural labor, particularly of direct owners or tenants, has been much lower than that of other groups. Socially and politically, the crisis produced by agricultural reform remains acute.

In the past decade the role of state capitalism has been reinforced. More than 50% of the investments in agriculture are financed by the state; the remaining 50% consist of private investments which depend on public subsidy. The state is responsible for the major share of the production of steel, cast iron, naval construction, naval armaments, petrol and methane and a sizable share of the mining, chemistry, metallurgy and cotton industries. The state's gross investments in industry are about 30% of the total.

Because industrialization came late to Italy, the technological level of her factories, private and public, is among the highest in the world. In efficiency, Italian industry is comparable to that of West Germany and to the highest of France; without doubt it is superior to the average level of Belgium and England. The effects of this are evident in the intense competition offered by Italy's

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continually rising rate of exports to other advanced capitalist countries.

Capitalist expansion has benefited greatly from economic integration, particularly in the European Common Market, from technological development, from the initiative, taken above all by state industries, to help underdeveloped countries, and from the large reserves of unskilled labor gathered from the pre-capitalist sector of society. But these reserves of labor are today rapidly being exhausted and the tensions are felt in the labor market. If, however, the prospects of economic integration and aid to underdeveloped countries are far from exhausted, Italian capitalism faces new, deep contradictions.

The most obvious contradiction is derived from the inability of capitalism to resolve the problems posed by absolute or relative proletarianization of labor. The experiment in "human relations" having failed, a fearful void is opening between the progress of the capitalist economy and the subordination of the working masses, skilled or unskilled. Furthermore, when wages are relatively high, as they are for recently arrived workers from the agricultural South, who now earn in a month what they used to earn in a year, it becomes impossible to institute long-range peaceful relations between capitalism and labor. Class-consciousness has matured rapidly among workers in large urban centers, above all among the young, and has manifested itself in a growing intolerance of their subordinate position. They have been protesting their exclusion from control of their living conditions and from any control over production which capitalism has socialized. In short, they are protesting the contrast between the more social character of production and the uncontrolled and arbitrary decisions of management. And the protest extends to the social and political life of the country as well. If Italy enjoys a relatively free political life, including freedom of press and association, the life of the industrial worker is that of a pawn. He is aware that the capitalist has political power comparable to the industrial power of a factory director and that economic life is determined to a large extent by these decision-makers who are not responsible to popular control.

It is important to note that the workers' protests, which result from an awareness of their subordination and instability, are only partially expressed in ideologies and organizations of a socialist or Communist character. The workers' movements do not seem able as yet to gather and express these protests in new and adequate terms. They find partial expression in union struggles, but these protests can be more fully expressed only through working-class political organizations. Industrial struggles often will not provide political opportunities for their development and will therefore deteriorate into anarchist illusions.

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OF THE TWO FACTIONS into which the Socialist Party split in 1947–49, the right, led by Saragat, has nearly lost its class character. Worn out by long collaboration with the bourgeois parties (and not only with the Christian Democracy, but also with the Conservative Liberal Party—the spokesman of the large financial interests), compromised by years of adherence to the Cold War in support of the Western military alliance, clearly outmaneuvered by the Catholic Left of the Christian Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party of Italy (PSDI) has very little to say today to the workers. The actions of the PSDI are not guarded by any analysis of society or its dynamics. It is agitated like a leaf in the wind by parliamentary vicissitudes and the ephemeral battles for political position.

The Italian Socialist Party (PSI), led by Nenni, after having carried on a long and tenacious opposition fight, has for the past several years followed a policy of rapprochement with the Christian Democracy, or detachment from the Communists, and of moderating its polemics against Western policy. But once it adopted this new policy, which tends to substitute an alliance with the Christian Democrats for that with the Communists, there reappeared within the Socialist Party the two currents—right and left.

At the last Congress of the Party held in Milan in 1961, the right, led by Nenni, attained about 60% of the votes and today governs the Party. Nenni holds that capitalist expansion has a long future in Italy and that this may be accompanied by a marked development of democracy if the Socialists are represented in the government, if they succeed in advancing an economic program which limits the power of monopoly, controls the disequilibrium of capitalist development and gives the workers a share of the benefits of the general economic progress. Along these lines, the Socialist majority has recently entered into collaboration with the Christian Democratic government of Signor Fanfani, finding in the nationalization of electricity and the abolition of pre-capitalist conditions in agriculture a temporary excuse for avoiding its larger and more permanent obligations.

The left minority holds various opinions. It charges that the anti-democratic and tyrannical nature of modern capitalist production cannot be effaced by a temporary alliance with the government. Though numerous instances of pre-capitalism remain, the primary task today, especially for labor, is to control, by gradual and piecemeal means if necessary, the sources of advanced capital-

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ism, its means of production. A fight for democracy effected only on the parliamentary level risks being nullified if political decisions are referred back to the centers of production, where wealth is created and the ultimate decisions made. For the Socialist left, the fundamental political problem is finding rapport with a Catholic movement that does not express the interests of capitalism but that joins in rebelling against capitalist monopoly over production, distribution and political power.

In international politics, all Socialist factions are neutralist, all favor peaceful co-existence. But while the right seems to interpret this mainly as an attempt by Washington and Moscow to resolve the problems of peace and war at the summit, the left sees in co-existence a condition for emancipating the masses, particularly the people engaged in the fight for independence and revolution. On the question of the European Community, the right stresses the need for cooperation between the various economies while the left, concerned with the importance of the motives behind such cooperation, stresses the need for an alliance of European workers and trade unions for the purpose of engaging in a common struggle against the amassed power of capitalist monopolies.

On these as well as on the more specifically economic questions, differences between right and left are not rigid. For the rapidity of change is bypassing their fixed positions.

For its part, the Communist Party has kept on the job. After a period of uncertainty its leadership seems today to accept state economic planning. Acknowledging that such planning can only be capitalist inspired, the Communist Party feels it can, by exerting pressure from the masses, move it in a democratic direction. Contrary to other Communist parties, then, the Italian CP is open to political discussions. The discussions are as heated as they are varied, as open as they are significant. Such questions as the nature and development of contemporary capitalism, the real meaning of the new political formulas which the Christian Democratic and Socialist alliance has prepared, the role of the labor movement in the fight for peace—whether it should be satisfied with merely an auxiliary role or assume a primary role in fighting to emancipate the working classes throughout the world; such questions are today clarifying and vivifying the policies of the Italian Left.

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Giorgio Galli

An Independent Socialist, Author of "History of Italian Communist Party," Contributor to Critica Sociale, Avanti, Tempo Presente.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) finds itself today in a particularly difficult situation, one which involves and calls into question not only its post-war political activity but probably also its whole history as a class movement. After 15 years of opposition (which began in 1947 when the Christian Democratic Party excluded the Socialists and the Communist Party from the government) the Party today favors the Center-Left government presided over by Fanfani and composed of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Republicans. The support takes the form either of abstention or of positive vote as in the recent case of the budget discussion.

This government, which should enact some reforms during the current legislative period (ending in April 1963) such as nationalization of the electrical industry, the preparation of regional administrative decentralization and the constitution of agencies for the development of agriculture, was created by the convergence of varying social and political forces. These include those Christian Democrats who favor public intervention in economic life, democrats of the Rooseveltian type—such as the Republican Ugo La Malta—and reformist socialists of the PSDI. These tendencies tend to reinforce state capitalism and to realize reforms long ago enacted in other industrial countries of the West. For diverse reasons they have converged in an attempt to pose a clear political alternative to that section of big business and their political representatives (the Liberal Party, the right wing of the Christian Democrats and also, to a degree, the Monarchists and the Fascists), which, while accepting a limited rationalization of capitalism, oppose the extension of the economic power of the state.

In supporting this experiment the PSI contributes to a progressive evolution of Italian society. But what specific role should the working class play in this evolution, and what role can be played by the PSI as a representative of the working class? The problem

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was clearly stated in one of the recent official Party publications:

> If it succeeds in keeping the situation in constant flux by bringing attention, at any cost, to one problem after another and thus pushing the Christian Democrats to desired positions, the PSI will increase its prestige in the working class in spite of the fact of collaborating with the Christian Democrats and will thus exercise a strong pressure upon the PCI [Communist Party]. On the other hand, if after two or three reforms of some importance, the government should limit itself to a good but normal administration, as is certainly the intention of the Christian Democratic leaders, the split between the PSI and the PCI will grow. This division will not be as spectacular as that which took place, for example, in an earlier and profoundly different international context with the PSDI on one side and the PSI and PCI on the other. Our concern is with the more realistic possibility that the PSI will appear to the public as the governmental party and the PCI as the opposition party, although both collaborate in the CGIL and in some local administrations. Today the PSI is not an opposition party, but is not as yet a government party; therefore, it can still communicate popular sentiments to both the parliament and the government.
>
> But if tomorrow the PSI becomes firmly ensconced within the government majority, it will forfeit to the Communists the opportunity of maintaining the social tension within the nation, although the PCI will not be able, as it is not able at present, to direct this tension into concrete actions. (*Mondo Operaio,* April 1962)

The author of the article just cited, Professor Domenico Settembrini, is an intellectual who left the Communist Party after Hungary and after an exchange of views with Togliatti. He proposes as the solution "the unification of the working class as the prime strategic objective of our activity." But, in my opinion, the unity of the working class in one party (the unity about which Saragat and Togliatti have spoken in recent weeks), would present enormous difficulties for the Communist Party, especially in view of its relations with the Soviet Bloc.

I think that before the PSI thinks about increasing its prestige it should increase its presence within the working class. A political action which would accompany the attempt to exercise influence from the top upon the government and at the same time reinforce the class position of the Party (both these attempts being agreed upon by all wings of the Party) presupposes an organized force which the PSI does not have.

A recent work by a member of the Rome Committee of the PSI and contributor to *Critica Sociale,* Antonio Landolfi, published in the review *Tempi Moderni* (January–March, 1962), emphasizes certain data of great value. Landolfi shows that the PSI has about 1400 shop branches, these being organized in not more than 10% of existing Italian firms, counting as firms also state and semi-state agencies and public utilities. Besides this the PSI has branches in about 5000 communities (the community being the smallest organized unit in Italy). This means that the Party does not have an organization in about half of the small Italian communities, that

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is, those with less than 5000 inhabitants, located mainly in agricultural and mountain regions. The PSI gets votes, however, in 8000 communities—in 3000 more than it has organized groups. Among approximately half a million members the PSI has about thirty to forty thousand lower echelon activists and about 4000 officials at the higher level. Among the latter, as was shown in 1960 by Giacomo Mancini, "the percentage of younger people is too low—10% under thirty years, 41% above forty."

These data permit us to make the following generalizations: the PSI is absent from too many places, factories and firms which constitute the dynamic section of Italian society. It is absent also from the small agricultural and mountain communities. Its organizations are mostly geographical rather than being based on units of production and are situated in large urban centers and in middle-sized communities. It is from these organizations that the majority of Party activists are recruited. The majority of higher Party officials are middle aged. Thus the PSI has a certain "middle-class" character which partly explains its absence from many factories and the low number of young leaders. The Party, in spite of the efforts of the last years, does not have a structure capable of recruiting and organizing the dynamic elements of Italian society. At the same time, not having organizations in those mountain and rural zones from which the peasantry are moving to become part of the working class, the Party cannot follow the immigrants into the larger agricultural communities or into the city suburbs (as, in a certain measure, both the Christian Democrats and the Communists do).

This incomplete presence within the social body presents the PSI with the danger that the political experiment of supporting the Center-Left coalition, be it at the national or local levels (the Party participates directly in the administration of some larger cities: Milan, Genoa, Florence, and Venice, besides participating in the regional government of Sicily), will assume predominantly an elitist character. That is, its activities would be led by cadres with only limited ties to the working class. Landolfi calculates that among 1500 top Party leaders approximately 100 are parliamentarians, another hundred union officials, approximately two hundred local administrators, five or six hundred Party officials. The rest are predominantly employed as professional people and union and co-op representatives.



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THIS SITUATION HAS GIVEN RISE to fears that the application of the new political line by the present-day leadership might modify the class character of the Party. This fear is stressed by such PSI minority leaders as Basso and Vecchietti. The following two factors must be considered, however, in order to evaluate the actual condition and the future possibilities of the PSI.

The first is that the failure of the party to develop deeper roots within Italian society was due to internal schisms in 1947–49 and then to the close collaboration with the Communists. The schisms deprived the PSI of a large number of cadres, many of whom have become totally politically inactive. The collaboration with the Communists forced the PSI to become organizationally subordinate to the PCI with consequences which can easily be imagined both as far as the nature and quality of cadres and as far as the contact with the popular masses is concerned. Thus, the present organizational situation of the PSI is not the result of the new political line but is the consequence of conditions reaching back approximately a decade.

The second factor we must remember is that the new political situation inspired an awakening of interest and an increase of political participation which are manifested in various sectors of Italian society. The long stagnation of the fifties, in which an integrated conservative political force was counterposed to the immobile left opposition, has been replaced by a dynamic situation within which the lack of agreement among the ruling class permits a resurgence of political activity by the working class. There is a feeling in the suburbs of the great cities as well as in the greater provincial centers, among various types of workers, from teachers to metal workers, that social and political relations in Italy are in motion. The new line of the Christian Democrats, with its opposition to a government supported by Fascists, culminated in the struggles of July 1960, in which young people especially participated in the resurgence for the first time in many years of mass demonstrations. It is significant that even the right realizes this new dimension of political struggle and organizes, for example, committees of small rentiers to prevent the nationalization of the electrical industry.

The new situation has brought about more intensive union activity (especially in Milan) and the appearance of left tendencies

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generally classified as anarcho-syndicalist within the PSI and partially also within the PCI. These tendencies have their main support within the relatively autonomous reconstituted Young Socialist Federation and in some sectors of the CGIL (especially in Turin).

Under these conditions the possibility exists that the PSI can attract to itself new cadres and new social forces, galvanized by the dynamics of the new political situation. For that which really prevents the renovation of the socialist movement, prevents it from increasing its role within the country and among the workers, is a kind of stagnation in which politics is only an activity for the initiated. Thus, while it is correct to be preoccupied with the inadequate influence of the PSI within the social structure, and with the characteristics of its cadres, the fact that the new political line of the Party has created objective conditions for the extension of its own actions and for a more intensive recruiting, cannot be ignored. It has contributed to putting the whole situation into motion.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF, in the future, continuing the political experiment which has recently been initiated, the Party is capable of transforming these favorable objective conditions into concrete actions to increase its power. This is the task which faces the Party leaders at all levels. They are confronted with a problem that has been always difficult for the socialist movement to solve: how to reconcile the partial assumption of responsibility both at the national and local levels with the development of the Party and its apparatus as the representative of the workers' interests. For these interests remain more or less sacrificed as long as the social structure is based on control of the means of production by restricted groups, be these the expression of traditional or new state capitalism.

Translated from the Italian by Antonio Gucciono and Marcus P. Raymond.



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Discussion and Controversy

The Cold War

To the Editor:

I am sorry to find that in the symposium American Socialism and Thermonuclear War (Spring 1962) Julius Jacobson makes some comments about my book *May Man Prevail?* which distort it rather drastically. He quotes the sentence: "the basis [for an American-Russian understanding] is the mutual recognition of the status quo, the mutual agreement not to change the existing balance of power between the two blocs" as proof for his assertion that I propose a "chemically pure imperialist solution" and he speaks of "the cynicism of this plan" because it leaves East Germany, the Balkans, etc. in Russian hands. Jacobson might at least have been fair enough to mention that my proposal is made from the standpoint that peace can not be preserved without the recognition of the existing borders. (This has been the de facto policy of the Western governments thus far as the example of Hungary and the American concern not to let things in Berlin come to a boiling point where a rebellion against the Ulbricht government would take place shows.) His implication that I have a cynical attitude toward the fate of the East Germans is contradicted by the whole book and my other writings. But Jacobson goes further: he simply misrepresents the ideas of the book. I propose that the balance of power between the two blocs should not be changed, but I point out that internal changes which may occur in various countries should not be used by either bloc to draw such a country in its sphere of influence. How can Jacobson ask whether I mean that the neutral nations should give up their neutrality—by force if necessary —if one of the main thesis of the book is precisely the demand that a strong neutral, non-aligned bloc has to play an important part in the world if peace is to be preserved? Of course this falsification is necessary to support the misrepresentation that I propose that the two blocs divide the world among themselves.

Jacobson says that socialism is not possible without freedom, with which I agree. But I believe socialism is also not possible without peace. Eventually I would like to add that socialism is not possible without objectivity and that the kind of treatment Jacobson gave *May Man Prevail?* is not even commensurate with the standards of non-socialist liberalism.

ERICH FROMM

Julius Jacobson Replies:

1. Erich Fromm, in my opinion, just does not understand the nature of the Cold War. For example, in *May Man Prevail?* he tells us that "Khrushchev's main aim is the ending of the cold war with the United States, . . ." That is not Khrushchev's main aim; it is not even his subordinate aim. And Fromm is no less wrong when he describes the West's "projective-paranoid attitudes toward communism." There is nothing "paranoid"—projective or otherwise—about capitalism's fear of Communism.

Both of these quotations—such thoughts are legion in his book and other political writings—reveal a misunderstanding of the irrepressible nature of the conflict between Communism and capitalism. The Russian ruling class *needs* the Cold War, it thrives on it; and capitalism has no choice but to resist the forward surge of Communism—a resistance which inevitably takes forms which are wholely unacceptable to socialists. Certainly the Cold War carries the threat of mutual physical destruction of all contending forces. This is known

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to Kennedy and to Khrushchev, to Fromm and myself. This awareness tempers the actions of Washington and Moscow but it does not and cannot eliminate the basic sources of conflict which carry with them the permanent threat of nuclear disaster.

In my article I went into a little detail on what I consider to be the dynamics behind the expansionist drives of the Kremlin. I developed, though briefly, the idea that the relaxation of terror within the framework of the Russian totalitarian system generates additional imperialist impulses. It is a pity that Fromm did not see fit to come to grips with this idea which contradicts his assertions that "Khrushchev's main aim is to end the cold war" and, as he writes in the same book, "There is no evidence that the Russians want to incorporate West Berlin into the Eastern Zone" or dozens of like statements about the Kremlin's pacific potential.

2. In his letter, Erich Fromm writes that his is the "standpoint that peace cannot be preserved without the recognition of the existing borders" (in East Germany, the Balkans, etc.). In the same letter, he claims that I falsify and misrepresent his position because I equated it to an old fashioned imperialist division of the world. If the preservation of peace depends on recognizing Russian control over East Europe and American influence in the West, what does this mean in real life if not dividing the major portion of the world's population between the two large power blocs? Are neutral nations permitted to win, say, Bulgaria away from the Russian bloc? Surely, it follows from his proposals that no matter what the Bulgarian people want to do, whether it be to join the Western bloc, the neutral nations or strike out on their own, they are condemned to the Russian bloc. It is unnecessary for me to argue that this is what Fromm's solution means. He says it explicitly in *May Man Prevail?* On page 218, he writes:

> It is a fact that the majority of the inhabitants of East Germany are living under a regime that they do not want, and that this regime is obnoxious to all those who love political freedom. Hence, the decision to reconcile oneself to the continuation of Communist rule in East Germany is a hard one for those who truly cherish freedom.

If this is a "hard" decision for Fromm to make, imagine how much harder it is for the German people. It is such attitudes I find cynical.

3. Fromm may feel that "internal changes which may occur in various countries should not be used by either bloc to draw such a country in its sphere of influence," but as the quotation above amply demonstrates, he is prepared to reconcile himself to the continuation of Communist rule. His proposal, then, implies that internal changes cannot break the bondage of national oppression.

4. Washington's paralysis before the Hungarian revolution was due less to its de facto policy of recognizing existing borders to preserve the peace, as Fromm would have it, than to capitalism's repugnance at the sight of an entire people engaged in revolutionary, socialist combat.

Suppose the Hungarians won their freedom and joined, not the West but the neutral nations? Regardless of whether Fromm and/or the West should recognize existing borders, those borders would have been changed and the balance of power seriously affected. Not that the West would have grown stronger, but the East immeasurably weaker. Would this not justify, within Fromm's framework, the judgment that the Hungarian people engaged in a dangerous adventure that could be appreciated but *not* supported. I am sure that Fromm does not make such a frightful retrospective judgment, but that is what his solutions imply to me.

5. I believe that the realistic struggle for *peace* is intimately related to the struggle for *democracy*. A strong democratic socialist movement in the West would be the greatest obstacle to Western military adventures, and a powerful resistance movement in the East offers the most effective counterforce to Communist imperialism.

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Israel

To the Editor:

I was very interested by the announcement in your first issue that you would publish an article on Israeli socialism and I eagerly looked forward to reading it. The article which appeared in the Spring issue was a great disappointment. It was glib, superficial, shallow, and, worst of all, contained so many factual inaccuracies that I shall not have space to list all of them.

First, let me write about some of the distortions of fact. The first World Zionist Congress and the founding of the Bund did not occur in 1893 as Mr. Jacobs said but in 1897. Of course, in the sweep of history a few years are not terribly important but a misstatement such as this indicates a basic unfamiliarity with the subject. If a writer on the Russian Communist Party stated that the revolution occurred in 1921 he would be marked as a dilettante in the area. 1897 in the Zionist movement is certainly the equivalent of 1917 in the Communist movement.

Mr. Jacobs writes that when Mapai was founded in 1930 by a merger of Hapoel Hatzair and Poale Zion "the bulk of the Poale Zionists had gradually moved from a Marxist view of the world to one not precisely identifiable in such terms." This is only partly true. It neglects to mention that the Poale Zion split in 1920 with the more Marxist wing constituting itself as the Left Poale Zion. This group continued in existence until it merged with Hashomer Hatzair and "Faction B" of Mapai to form Mapam in the mid-40s. Until the split-off of "Faction B" in 1944 there was a large Marxist element in Mapai.

It is just not true to say that "On most domestic questions, Achdut Ha'avoda is hardly distinguishable from Mapai." There are vast differences. Even within the coalition with Mapai, Achdut Avoda manifests these differences. After the recent devaluation of the currency Achdut Avoda forced the government to adopt new policies to protect the wage earner. Achdut Avoda militantly opposes Ben-Gurion's plan to nationalize the Histadrut's health organization. If one reads the Israeli press one could never get the idea that these two groups are similar on domestic policy.

When it comes to Mapam, Mr. Jaobs writes with the veracity of someone who has been "briefed" by an individual who did not know what he is talking about. He says that "Almost all of Mapam's strength comes from its kibbutzim, which were settled in the 1920s and 1930s." It is impossible for all of Mapam's strength to come from its kibbutzim. The number of residents there equals only a small fraction of the total votes Mapam received in the general election. I looked up the founding dates of Israeli kibbutzim and it appears that more than two-thirds have been founded since 1940. (This is not a minor detail but is a basic point in Mr. Jacobs' thesis that Israeli youth are not socialist any more.)

The relationship between religion and the state in Israel is an enormously complicated one. It cannot be approached with the attitudes of American Protestants. Dogmatic attitudes cannot be automatically applied to a culture where they have no meaning. It is patently absurd to speak about "separation of church and state" in regard to a Jewish state. The Jewish nation was always a unique instance of a combination of the two. This is not to say that there are some aspects of the relationship between state and religion in Israel which cannot be changed.

Mr. Jacobs' statement that "It is maddening that a society conceived in high ideals should treat its Arab members as shabbily as has Israel in the past" is certainly open to dispute. I think an objective evaluation of the subject would reveal conclusions vastly different. The educational and economic standards of Israeli Arabs are higher than those in neighboring Arab countries. There is certainly no Arab country where the vote is as free as it is for the Arabs of Israel. Israel was

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also the first Middle Eastern country to allow Arab women to vote.

Mr. Jacobs' description of the man who told him "please don't write that Israel is a socialist country. We need to attract outside investments and that kind of talk just frightens people away" is a piece of nonsense that could arise only out of someone who intended to injure the subject he is writing about. There are more public manifestations of socialism in Israel than in any other country. (I do not consider the Eastern European countries as socialist.) On May Day the country is closed down. What if this person did say those words? Is it fair to give this as a typical attitude to open up an article? Most Israeli socialists would be as disgusted at the speaker of those words as is Mr. Jacobs.

Mr. Jacobs' article comes to its *reductio ad absurdum* in the last paragraph when he makes the incredible statement that "It is conceivable that if the present young generation in Israel continues to display as little interest in ideology as it does at the moment, socialism might someday become a dirty word there." This sounds like a typical Communist attack on Zionist socialism which the Communist movement has been making for years. In truth nothing could be more inaccurate. In no country is the percentage of all youth enrolled in socialist youth movements equal to that of Israel. Most of the younger intellectuals are oriented to Mapam or Achdut Avoda. This statement ignores the collective educational system of the kibbutzim which trains a considerable number of youth. Proof of the attachment of Israeli youth to socialism is contained in the results among soldiers for the voting in the last parliamentary election. Since the army contains almost all youth, male and female, from ages 18–21 its election results are irrefutable verification of political trends among youth. The left-wing parties, especially Achdut Avoda received considerably more votes among soldiers than they did among the general population. Mapai received about the same percentage.

Even the many true things in Paul Jacobs' article are written in such a superficial and simplified way that they border on the old observation that the half or three-quarter truth is frequently worse than the whole lie.

HARRY LIPSET

Paul Jacobs Replies:

Oh my. I had almost forgotten there were people like Mr. Lipset still around. His attack on my article as being "like a typical Communist attack on Zionist socialism," his remark that "the half or three-quarter truth is frequently worse than the whole lie," and his statement that I write "with the veracity of someone who has been 'briefed' by an individual who did not know what he is talking about" leads me to conclude, reluctantly, that he doesn't like what I wrote.

Let's push aside, in the interests of saving space, Mr. Lipset's nitpicking quarrels with me over such miniscule questions as "Faction B" of Mapai and concentrate instead on questions like Arab-Jewish relations and church-state differences in Israel. Mr. Lipset says that my description of the "shabby" treatment given by Israel to Arab citizens is open to dispute and that an "objective evaluation would reveal conclusions vastly different." Let me quote what Professor Norman Bentwich, the eminent Zionist and first Professor of International Law of Peace at Hebrew University, wrote in June 1962 about how relations developed between Jews and Arabs in the mandate period. He says that the Jewish National Fund, *"which became the chief instrument for acquiring land for settlement of Jewish immigrants on the soil adopted a regulation prohibiting leases to any non-Jews and requiring Jewish tenants not to employ any non-Jewish workers. Land sold by the Arabs to the Fund was thereafter barred to Arabs. The powerful Federation of Labor (Histadrut) likewise made it a rule to employ only Jewish labor in all the enterprises which they conducted or which were affiliated to them. This exclusiveness and separatism of the responsible Jewish leaders*

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and bodies were bound to frustrate the fulfillment of the idea of the bi-national Arab-Jewish state which was the declared aim of the mandatory policy and which was upheld by Dr. Weismann, the president of the Zionist organization."

And, fortunately, there are in Israel many, many labor Zionists who, unlike Mr. Lipset, do not defend Israel's present policy toward the Arabs. Such men as Pinhas Rosen, Martin Buber, joined by war heroes like Yigal Allon and Moshe Carmel have for a long time opposed the treatment given the Arabs by the Israeli establishment. In November, 1961, *Ma'ariv*, the paper with the largest circulation in Israel, published an article by Shmuel Shnitzer on the Arab problem which, in language far more harsh than any I used, raised questions typical of those being asked by thoughtful Israelis. . . . *"Our Arab policy or what is called by that name has reached a crisis or even bankruptcy. . . . Consciously or unconsciously, we have created the ugly reality of discriminating against a national minority in the state of Israel. . . . The Arab does not participate in the cultural life of the country and he cannot cultivate a culture of his own. . . . He cannot attain any real position in public service. . . . Not a little courage will be required to try a new path. But the old one led us to a dead end, to hopelessness and the trampling of the moral principles of our renaissance movement."*

Now to church-state attitudes. Here I am not so clear about Mr. Lipset's whining. He says the problem is complicated in Israel. Of course it is. It's also complicated in the United States. But, fortunately again, there are people in Israel who admit the existence of this grave problem and are trying to solve it there, rather than minimizing it or automatically defending the present status. Although Mr. Lipset does weakly concede that "this is not to say there are some aspects of the relationships . . . which cannot be changed," he seems satisfied with what is happening in Israel. But since I wrote my article, the tension in Israel over this question has increased rather than diminished, especially because of the refusal of some rabbis to perform marriages involving members of an Indian Jewish sect which emigrated to Israel. One need not be a "dogmatic Protestant" to be critical of the rabbis' domination of Israeli civil law; even non-dogmatic Jews are deeply disturbed by the situation.

However, Mr. Lipset is correct about one item. Of course the Bund was founded and the first Zionist Congress held in 1897, not 1893. I have no idea whether the typographical error was in my original copy or in the proofs, but in either case I should have caught it. Such mistakes do happen, however. Finally, I think Mr. Lipset's letter could only have been written by a Zionist living in the United States, since Zionists living in Israel are not nearly so defensive about the country, nor so offensive, either.

PAUL JACOBS

COMING

We have received for publication a number of very interesting letters taking issue with the views expressed by Herbert Hill in his article, "Organized Labor and the Negro Wage Earner: Ritual and Reality," (Winter, 1962) and with the comments made by Mr. Hill, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Gomberg in their subsequent exchange on "Negroes and the Labor Movement" (Spring 1962).

These letters will be printed in our next issue along with replies and comments by Hill, Lipset and Gomberg.

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Frank Allaun, M. P. and Walter Kendall are English socialists whose articles have been widely printed in the European socialist press.

Common Market Debate Continued

Frank Allaun, M.P.

NEW POLITICS, which is providing a most valuable forum for American socialist opinion, should be congratulated on the debate on the Common Market.

It so happens that, although I strongly agree with the case against Britain's entry into the European Common Market so well presented by Michael Barratt Brown in the Spring issue, his opponent Eric Heffer is a personal friend of mine. He is one of the few on the Left of the British socialist movement who support the ECM. It is often said that the Left and Right inside British Labor are divided on this issue. That is not my experience. I can think of only two Left M.P.s who say Britain should go in. The remainder are against it. It is the Right wing of the Labor Party which is divided.

Last week my own Constituency Labor Party met and decided, without opposition, to put down a resolution for the annual conference of the Party to be held this October. There can be little doubt that this will be the big issue before that conference, though it would be hard, at this moment, to predict the outcome. It is fairly certain, however, that the leadership will no longer be able to persuade the rank and file that the Party should sit on the fence, as it did in October, 1961.

A reliable national poll of public opinion, it is worth mentioning, has just revealed a sudden swing against the Common Market. For some reason the 43% to 26% point support for Britain's entry has in the last few weeks been almost exactly reversed.

My own opposition to Britain's entry is not based mainly on economic arguments. There are some industries which would be advantaged and others which would suffer, though even the Common Market enthusiasts have admitted that the British housewife would have to pay higher food prices. My reason is that the prospect for peace would be worsened if this country went in.

The threat to human survival springs from the division of the world between the American and Russian governments. Neither wants war, but both are so frightened of the other that they are aiming at military superiority in a nuclear arms race which is taking humanity to the precipice. The two giants are so clinched that only a neutral third force can keep the peace. The non-aligned nations are growing in numbers. If Britain joined them they would receive a tremendous accession of strength. On the other hand, if we could be forced into a Western economic bloc this would prevent Britain from taking the neutral line and force several other neutral and potentially neutral nations into dependence. In other words, the Common Market is to provide an economic base and accompaniment for the NATO military alliance.

I thought Michael Barrat Brown put it excellently when he wrote: "Britain's association with EFTA, whose members are either neutrals or have growing neutralist movements (with the exception of the ineffable Portugal) and Britain's association with a Commonwealth that includes Mr. Nehru and Dr. Nkrumah must have seemed a fatal weakness in the

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Western front. What better than to push Britain into the Common Market behind Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle and at the same time open the British Commonwealth to easier penetration of United States' goods and capital."

I feel certain that this was Mr. Kennedy's main motive when he told Mr. Macmillan in his talks in America about a year ago to get inside. I feel equally certain that this private instruction was the reason why Mr. Macmillan, who had been wobbling for several years on the issue, decided to take the plunge. (For the Prime Minister knew well enough how the decision would antagonize important sections of the Conservative Party, notably M.P.s representing farming constituencies, those with strong Empire ties and others who are against any form of international organization.)

Strangely enough it is precisely because Eric Heffer *is* an internationalist that he is falling into the trap of thinking that *any* international link is progressive. Yet he is against NATO. I suggest it is illogical to be against NATO and for the ECM. And if he wants a British Labor government to influence the European Economic Community countries toward neutralism, surely to move in an anti-neutralist direction is a strange way to go about it. As for his argument that we should link up with, and provide leadership for, the socialist and trade union movements of the Six, that is possible whether we are inside or outside the Common Market.

Walter Kendall

Socialist politics comprise the art of estimating historical trends, judging their force and direction, finding ways in which to utilize their power to speed forward the drive towards social ownership and working class power.

By that test very few of the Common Market combatants emerge with distinction. On each side the vanguard adopts a highly schematic political position and proceeds to chop about reality until bruised and bleeding it begins to approximate its own preconceived position. In the outcome Lord Beaverbrook finds himself ranged alongside Konni Zilliacus, on one side, while the British Communists link hands with Clement Attlee on the other.

Confronted with these facts, claims that the Labor movement is divided left and right over the issue is plainly absurd.

Capitalism by the turn of the last century had effectively united the whole globe into one vast international market. From that moment forward the national divisions which emerged with the birth of bourgeois society, and without which its enormous economic growth and libertarian political development would have been impossible, became obsolete. The history of our times, the agonies of blood and war which it tells, is in large measure the account of society's efforts to resolve its own savage international contradictions. International production and national accumulation have become barriers to human progress in the same sense that social production and private accumulation characterize the capitalist system as a whole.

The pace, scope, breadth, expense and complication of modern science, technology and production, whether military or civilian, is plainly such that only the monsters can expect to survive. All the others live in imminent threat of forcible or peaceful assimilation.

Great Britain, five decades ago, was the center of an Empire comprising 410 million people on which the sun truly never did set, with a navy which still exceeded (or very nearly so) that of all other nations in the world combined. Now shorn of most of her imperial possessions, she is reduced to the role of minor partner in a world dominated by two giants who, 50 years ago, were merely on the fringes of international destiny.

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There are limits to that trend. There are no reasons for presuming that it will not continue.

The British Empire was based on armed force, naval strength, national oppression and imperialist exploitation. In the absence of these factors it seems to me that the Empire (read Commonwealth) must increasingly disintegrate and each section drawn off by centrifugal forces will enter into fresh orbit of its own. Africa toward Continental Unity, the Caribbean countries towards Latin America. Australia and New Zealand first toward the United States and possibly later toward the emergent nations of Asia. I can envisage no reason why, over the coming decades, the Empire (Commonwealth) or other ex-colonial territories should wish to perpetuate a paternalistic relation of the type envisaged by Barratt Brown. The whole experience of ex-colonial territories suggests otherwise.

When the Common Market is examined against this objective background the arguments fall into proportion. It is true that the American Committee for a United Europe, with such luminaries as Allen Dulles and General MacArthur among its sponsors, has been for some 15 years a major proponent of the European Unity Campaign. It is equally true that the Common Market proposes to unite at the very most one half of geographical Europe and to exclude for political reasons that other half which stretches eastward as far as the Urals. It is also true that one of its aims is to strengthen the existing imperialist NATO alliance against the "East." Yet if all this is true we cannot fail to observe that the unity of Europe is a response to pressure of economic developments which, as Comecon illustrates, applies equally both to "East" and "West." In relation to the historical, economic and political objectives of the socialist movement its progressive character is beyond challenge. The unity of Europe is taking place in spite of us and Britain, whatever one wishes, remains an island alongside Europe which cannot be towed by some giant Queen Mary to off the coast of Africa or beyond.

Thus, the question of for and against the Common Market is for me largely a false one. Historically the issue is decided. All that remains are the terms and the arrangements. Britain, neither capitalist nor still less socialist, cannot survive in isolation. The fate of a socialist Britain is inevitably linked with that of the socialist revolution in Europe and it is time the British working class movement shed some of its insularity and came to terms with the fact.

I am therefore in favor of directing British socialist and trade union opinion and action along lines which correspond to the realities of historical development. As a first step the T.U.C. should convene a conference of all genuine trade unions in Europe irrespective of political or religious coloration to discuss and organize action in relation to Common Market and all common problems. The Labor Party needs to turn outward and accept the duty which falls upon it as the largest and most powerful social democratic party in the world and exercise its true role as a force for the socialist transformation of Europe. European labor is divided by national, language, trade, and religious barriers, while against it capital in Europe is effectively unified. Unification of the European labor movement will move the balance of class forces in Europe in the direction of the working class. It is toward the aim of a socialist and independent Europe and not to sterile opposition or equally sterile support of bourgeois plans that Labor's thought and action ought to be directed.

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Free Djilas Campaign

To the Editor:

The campaign to dramatize the imprisonment and plight of Milovan Djilas achieved its greatest success on August 16th. Norman Thomas, America's 77 year old socialist and civil libertarian, joined 75 pickets in protest before the Yugoslav Consulate on Fifth Avenue in New York. Mr. Thomas previously sent a personal letter to Marshal Tito requesting the release of Djilas. After Tito rejected the letter, Thomas agreed to dramatize his position by joining us in public protest.

Last June several individuals, indignant over the jailing of Djilas, decided to act. These people represented various political viewpoints. It was agreed that no organization would be asked to endorse the line. To date, the organizers secured the cooperation of individuals from the democratic left. Socialists, Liberals, Reform Democrats, trade unionists, pacifists, freedom riders, etc. have volunteered to picket in order to free the author of *Conversations with Stalin* and *The New Class*. The Djilas issue has succeeded in gaining the support of Norman Thomas, Sidney Hook, Ben Davidson, James Peck, as well as Harry Golden, Sam Bottone, Julius Jacobson, Max Lerner, Solomon Schwarz, Luigi Antonini, David McReynolds, Bentley Kassal, Moshe Decter, Herbert Muller and Dorothy Day.

At first the Yugoslavs reacted to our picket line by sending their officials out to talk with the picketers. In fact, one day during the early weeks of our picketing, Mr. Bogoljub Popovich, consulate chief, came out and spoke with Rudolf Pakalns, a spokesman for the pickets. He presented the typical Tito line that Djilas was guilty of a state crime because he revealed state secrets in his book *Conversations with Stalin*. He even stated that Djilas did not write the other books for which he was given credit in the West. According to Popovich, public relations men wrote *The New Class* while Djilas was in New York. (Actually the essays which later became *The New Class* were first published in *Borba*.) The consulate chief angrily asked Pakalns why we did not protest racism in Alabama or picket before the Spanish offices in New York. Mr. Pakalns immediately introduced him to James Peck, a well known Freedom Rider, and several members of the Confederated Spanish Societies.

We are all given an opportunity to aid Djilas, a man who has deliberately given up his privileges as a member of "the new class" for a prison which he occupied once before because he was a foe of the pre-war reactionary regime in his native land. He could have chosen either silence or exile to a Western country. Instead he proved to be more of a revolutionary than a Communist, more a lover of justice than a seeker of power.

Future plans call for once a month picketing before the Yugoslav Consulate, a proposed letter-ad to *The New York Times* signed by the academic community and letters of appeal to overseas socialists, liberals and trade unionists urging them to start their own Djilas protest movements.

We believe that readers of *New Politics* can wage their own free Djilas campaign as follows:

1. Write the Yugoslav ambassador, Mr. Marko Nikevic, 2410 California Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. asking for Djilas' release.

2. Talk to your friends and, where possible, write to out-of-towners or overseas contacts urging them to start their own protest movement. More detailed information may be received by writing either of the two names listed below.

3. New Yorkers, in particular are urged to send their name and address to either Rudolf Pakalns, 780 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N.Y. (AU 3–7912) or Marvin Maurer, 37–80 81st Street, Jackson Heights 72, N.Y. (IL 7–3862), making themselves available for future efforts.

MARVIN MAURER

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Books in Review...

A Significant Contribution

WOLFGANG LEONHARD, WHO MADE such a deep impression on so many of us with his *Child of the Revolution*, has written a second book, *The Kremlin Since Stalin*.* Leonhard's new book is as complete a presentation of the facts of changes in Russian life in the last ten years as any volume of similar length produced in the various institutes of Russian studies. But Leonhard has more than facts; he has a "feel" for his subject. His facts are not disembodied quotations and statistics, they are related to one another and to an intelligently presented theory of the nature of Russian society and the significance of the post-Stalin reforms. Leonhard informs his subject with a degree of political sophistication, a knowledge and understanding of socialist theory, that is sometimes conspicuously absent among American scholars. He could never write as did recently one highly respected Kremlinologist of the "thesis of 'socialism in one country,' adumbrated by *Lenin* . . . " (my emphasis).

One of the academicians' frequent assumptions is that the fount of all that is malevolent about Communism is Lenin's "concept of the Party"—a concept that is usually misinterpreted, and sometimes misquoted, so that any resemblance to Lenin's views becomes purely accidental. It is also becoming fashionable to trace the genesis of Stalinism further back: the crimes of Stalin are not only the logical extension of Lenin's controversy with Martov and Plekhanov, but have their roots in Marxist thought.

This is a pitfall that is avoided by Leonhard. In his book there are no simplistic assumptions with standard quotations (which in their distorted form have become accepted as the real thing) to prove that Stalinism flows from Leninism, and that if you want to understand the doings of Khrushchev, read what Lenin wrote in 1903.*

Another generalization that is becoming almost ritualistic is to assert that the rapid industrialization of Russia will bring about its self-democratization. Leonhard comes to grips with this mechanistic economic determinism. He shows what the limits to the reforms have been in actuality, pointing to the period immediately after the XXth Congress as the high point in Russian de-Stalinization with the process first checked, then reversed and an attempt made to normalize the situation.

Much of the conflict and purge in Russia from 1953 to 1957 is traced to the struggle for supremacy between the Party-men led by Khrushchev and those who wanted to strengthen the authority of the various governmental and administrative agencies. The purge of the so-called "anti-Party bloc," of men like Zhukov and the economist, Pervukhin, as well as the economic decentralization of 1957 were part of Khrushchev's campaign to establish the unquestioned primacy of the Party in all spheres of life, and to substitute the cult of Khrushchev for that of Stalin. This is not intended to deny that there have been major and welcome reforms, according to Leonhard, but it does indicate the limits to which "democratization" can go under the Russian class system. And Leonhard does consider Russia as dominated by a new social class. He writes:

> It can hardly be denied that the new élite in the Soviet Union

* THE KREMLIN SINCE STALIN by Wolfgang Leonhard, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962. 403 pp., $7.75.

* While Leonhard does not examine the relationship between Stalinism and Leninism in his book—at least in its English edition—he has a most interesting article on the question in the Summer 1962 issue of *The Review* (published in Belgium by the Imré Nagy Institute).

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shows some characteristics of a class in a full Marxist sense. It possesses power over the means of production, it determines the direction and the course of economic events, and distributes the national wealth. . . . Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the ruling class of the USSR lacks important characteristics of a Marxist class. The privileges of a member of this élite depend not on his private ownership of the means of production but on the functions he performs in the hierarchy of the system.

That such a new ruling class is going to permit itself to be reformed out of its class power and privileges is not a tenable thesis and flies in the face of the wealth of information in Leonhard's book about the various reforms and changes (not all changes are reforms) in Russia since 1953.

His book is actually an updated and shortened English edition of his *Kremlin ohne Stalin,* published in Germany three years ago. Unfortunately, in the abridgement the American publisher omitted his entire last section of the original edition which summarizes his "12 conclusions" about the significance of the changes since 1953.

JULIUS JACOBSON

A Tangled Vision

In spite of his new role as critic of civilization in *The Tangled Bank,** Stanley Edgar Hyman forgets not his first calling. He is still the literary critic. Consequently, everything becomes "imaginative literature." Concepts are "myths," descriptive terms are "metaphors," explanations are "visions." Darwin is seen as only incidentally concerned with biological observation; fundamentally he was composing a great naturalistic tragedy. Marx was only incidentally concerned with a critique of political economy; fundamentally he was describing a great social drama. So were Frazer and Freud. "Our four thinkers," concludes Hyman, "produced four vast dramatic works for us, four dynamic visions of evolution, that is, of struggle, adaptation and triumph. . . . " In a sense they were presenting the same vision: "a vision of the thin veneer of civilization over savagery." This, in Frazer's terms, was "the volcano underfoot"—which Freud saw as the id, Darwin as the struggle for survival, Marx as the revolution. They often, moreover, expressed this vision through common images, especially "the key metaphoric progression of Darwin's *Origin of Species,* the development from chain to tree to tangled bank." Finally and most important, they were all great literary artists. Thus they were able to capture, for a time, the fancy of European civilization, almost (at least in the case of Marx and Freud) to found a humanistic "religion." Indeed, all four of these mythmakers performed a quasi-religious mission of revelation, of enlightenment.

Mr. Hyman has written a provoking and presumptuous book, offering new insights into four disparate fields, a possible solution to C. P. Snow's problem of the "two cultures" and even a philosophy of science. We need not take Hyman seriously when he claims not to be interested in the "history of ideas." True, his main object is the pursuit of myth and metaphor, but then, as he later suggests, "ultimately the language of ideas is metaphor and essentially metaphor"—or more rashly, "perhaps *all* science is metaphor." Such a view, reducing theory to "imaginative design," raises literary criticism to the level of philosophy. It also, by divorcing science from the objects of its concern, replaces metaphysics with aesthetics. "Truth" is no longer very relevant. "The ideas of Darwin, Marx, Frazer and Freud are as true as any ideas that explain our world to our satis-

* THE TANGLED BANK; DARWIN, MARX, FRAZER AND FREUD AS IMAGINATIVE WRITERS, by Stanley Edgar Hyman, Atheneum, New York, 1962.

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faction"—as true as any myth once was. In fact, accepting Karl Popper's criterion for a scientific proposition, that it state the conditions for its own refutation, their works "are not scientific at all; one cannot refute a vision, although one can replace it by another vision, as we now see the universe through Einstein's eyes rather than through Newton's . . ." This may be all we know on earth, but is it all we need to know? Certainly it is not a view likely to satisfy the less amphibious members of either of Snow's "two cultures." For, beneath the sophisticated imagery of Hyman's all-devouring humanism there lurks a naïve and debilitating solepsism. The "master metaphor" which he has taken for his title might also be applied to his own notions. In keeping with his encyclopedic interests and his conception of literary criticism (which he elsewhere defines as "the organized use of non-literary techniques and bodies of knowledge to obtain insights into literature"), Hyman has made a methodology out of rampant eclecticism. Committed to the inverted logic of Freud and the hybrid terminology of Burke, he has indeed produced a "tangled vision."

DON KELLEY

The Need to Say NO

AS A NOVELIST, a middle class man of the mid-century, a Jew and a socialist, Harvey Swados is that wonderful rarity in the United States today, a committed human being. His recently published collection of essays written over the last ten years, *A Radical's America*,* reveals his deep sense of disturbance about the quality of contemporary American life, its cant and corruption.

Unwilling to accept the latest wrinkle in sociological interpretations of the manners and mores of the American working class, Swados has written a number of essays on the nature of work, exploitation, leisure and cultural backwardness which do an enormous amount to destroy the Madison Avenue image of the American worker as a member of the middle class. "But there is one thing that the worker doesn't do like the middle class: he works like a worker," Mr. Swados writes in an essay entitled "The Myth of the Happy Worker." "The steel-mill puddler does not yet sort memos, the coal miner does not yet sit in conferences, the cotton mill-hand does not yet sip martinis from his lunch-box. The worker's attitude toward his work is generally compounded of hatred, shame, and resignation."

In "Labor's Cultural Degradation" he gives voice to the complaint that it is the man at the bottom of the heap, the man who does the dirty work, who is the particularly exploited victim of the mass media, not given an honest possibility of developing an individual taste for individual works of the human imagination, not having the range of cultural choice available to members of the middle class. "I for one think that the working class—regardless of whether it is envied by other proletarians who would like to drive cars instead of riding bicycles, or would like to ride bicycles instead of walking—is being cheated, swindled, and degraded as ferociously as ever its English counterparts were a century ago when Marx and Engels were anatomizing them. The fact that it may not be aware of its exploitation does not alter the reality of its situation."

The very nature of work, its boredom, frustration, lack of personal fulfillment is probed in the essay "Work as a Public Issue" in which questions are raised about the possibility of those working in factories, participating in decision making affecting their own working lives; the decentralization of productive facilities to the point where their management can be at least partially controlled by the workers themselves. If he has no definitive answers to many of the problems he raises, his suggestion that "the mean-

* A RADICAL'S AMERICA by Harvey Swados, Little, Brown and Company, 1962, 437 pp., $5.00.

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ing of work be brought forth from the philosopher's study and placed where it belongs—in the political arena—as a public issue" is both valid and welcome.

Harvey Swados' concerns encompass Jewishness and alienation in "Certain Jewish Writers," the plight of the contemporary American woman in "The Dilemma of the Educated Woman," the special problems of the young in "Work and the Professions," "Popular Taste and the Agonies of the Young," and "Why Resign from the Human Race?"

Lest we forget, he reminds us of the misery of the unemployed in "The Miners: Men Without Work" and the acute problems faced by striking workers and their unions in "The Myth of the Powerful Worker."

These are not the writings of a detached, objective onlooker. *A Radical's America* is a passionate indictment of contemporary values by an intellectual who is an active participant in American life, who holds that "a socialist attitude is at least as firmly in the American grain as a liberal or an absolutist stance" and who clearly differentiates himself from those intellectuals drawn to the Washington orbit, as well as those drawn to Moscow, or more recently, Belgrade, Peking or Havana.

The essays are required reading for the young and idealistic, for the old and disenchanted. They offer evidence "that those of us who persist in saying No to a society built on worship of the buck for the things and people it can buy, those of us who persist in dreaming of a society built on mutual respect, have just as much right to consider ourselves as representative of an essential corpuscular element in the American bloodstream as do the Luces, the Nixons, the Kenedys, and all those who, in appropriating for themselves even the rhetoric of our common dream, have turned it into a nightmare." For Harvey Swados, that dream still holds a large measure of enchantment.

PHYLLIS JACOBSON

MORE BRIEFLY NOTED

SOCIALISM IN THE NEW SOCIETY. By Douglas Jay. Longmans, London, England. 414 pp.

DOUGLAS JAY'S BOOK, though concentrating on Britain, should be of enormous interest to American liberals who are serious about their liberalism. Jay, one of the chief theoreticians of the dominant right-wing of the Labor Party, explains why in a laissez-faire economy the gap between the rich and the rest of society must widen. This results not only in a wretched moral condition of inequality and unfreedom, but in a serious contradiction within the system itself of the sort to which Marx referred (Jay, incidentally, thinks little of Marx). Since the end of the Korean War productivity has risen slowly, if at all, and recessions occur more frequently.

Jay is a Fabian who believes that the wrongs of capitalism can be rectified by the state. He proposes that a socialist government use a multiplicity of devises to take over corporate wealth so as to insure its adequate production and distribution. For example, he would have the state purchase, on the open market over a twenty- or thirty-year period, a controlling share of corporation stock. This is not a bad idea, though it is an expensive one, if the owners of the corporations—the prepotent 1%—stood by insouciantly and watched their wealth get appropiated. In fact the trouble with Jay's book is that he never bothers to intelligently guess the reactions of his capitalist opponents. But he deftly criticizes his socialist opponents on the left—R. H. S. Crossman, et al.

As the condition for the Labor Party's return to power, Jay proposes that it unwed itself to any particular class or group or section. To his view, no party can take power unless it draws on the support on the growing numbers of white-collar workers. Jay's Labor Party would, in essence, ap-

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proximate the American Democratic Party: it would be pragmatic and all-inclusive. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such a broad, latitudinarian party if there is no other way of taking power short of revolution. But does it correspond to the social philosophy which Jay professes? Can it, under the calm and equable conditions foreseen by Jay, restore to the public the wealth and power which the rich has taken from it?

A. F.

THE COLD WAR: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT. By Frederick L. Schuman, Louisiana State University Press. 104 pages. $3.50.

IN THIS BRIEF BOOK composed of three lectures delivered at Louisiana State University, Professor Schuman deplores the "stereotypes" that are used to distinguish the United States from the Soviet Union. Among such "stereotypes" he cites the customary reference to America as a democracy and Russia as dictatorship.

As the author sees it there is a more meaningful explanation in the "cultural convergence" between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. Schuman finds that "Russia and America alike in our time are societies of Big Cities with similar problems of urban planning, slum clearance, traffic jams, and suburban commuters." He believes that "we and the Russians" also have similar aspirations; since he doesn't seem to be referring to the ordinary people of both countries this conclusion might be startling to the respective élites.

This book can be added to many others by Schuman as apologies for Soviet totalitarianism. It is a tribute to the difference between democracy and dictatorship that these books are printed and these views are freely discussed—in a democracy, that is.

J. C.

FENOLLOSA AND HIS CIRCLE. WITH OTHER ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY. By Van Wyck Brooks. E. P. Dutton & Co. 321 pages. $5.00.

THE VIRTUES OF THESE biographical sketches is that they whet the appetite. Readers will want to learn more about Fanny Wright, John Lloyd Stephens, Randolph Bourne and some of the others. Ernest Fenollosa was the man from Salem who became Commissioner of Fine Arts in Japan. His life as told in the long introductory essay of this collection is, as Ezra Pound described it, "the romance par excellence of modern scholarship."

It is good that Fanny Wright comes through in Brooks' essay as the fascinating woman she was, as fighter for American working men; as friend of Jefferson and Lafayette; as pioneer in the effort to emancipate the slaves; as co-worker of Robert Owen at New Harmony; as utopian socialist and opponent of capital punishment; as an advocate of birth control and who also lectured about the advantages of turning "your churches into halls of science."

John Lloyd Stephens deserves the tribute of the essay which tells of his contributions to discoveries of Mayan civilization in Mexico and Guatemala. George Catlin is described not only as painter of Indians but as a friend of these victims of "the unprincipled part of civilized society." Lt. Charles Wilkes led naval explorations in the South Sea Islands and emerges as the man who followed the Antarctic coastline for sixteen hundred miles, enough to show it was the seventh continent. Charles Godfrey Leland was the student of folklore and Maurice Prendergast the artist who helped usher in the age of modern American painting.

The concluding essay on Randolph Bourne is about a beloved radical and one wishes that Brooks, who knew him well, as fighter against war and as personal friend, could have devoted just a bit more to this remarkable and prophetic figure.

J. C.

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THE SHARE OF TOP WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH, 1922–1956. By Robert J. Lampman. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1962. 286 pages. $6.50.

MARX WAS WRONG in predicting that under capitalism the rich get richer and the poor poorer. Both get richer. However, the distance between them remains constant or continues to widen. Evidence for this is contained in Professor Lampman's study which should be read by anyone interested in the true meaning of affluence in America. Despite the affluence, class distinction has not changed since the halcyon days of the 1920's. In 1922, the richest 1% of the adult population in the country held 31.6% of the total equity; in 1956 it held 26%. The rise since 1949 (when the top 1% was at its nadir, 20%) has been steady and inexorable.

Do widowers and pensioners and the other small people own the great corporations of the country? In 1956 the top 1% owned 70% of corporation stock. The degree of concentration in corporate wealth has actually grown since the 1920's. This fact makes the President's telecommunications give-away all the more reprehensible. To offer the "public" (which is only a euphemism for the top 1%) shares in the new corporation is an insult to the real public's intelligence.

Professor Lampman shows that in savings and income the distance between the top 1% and the rest of the country has drastically diminished over the past 30 years. But this is only part of the truth. Savings and income are transient forms of wealth: no one among the poor and few among the middle class will create permanent estates from their income. If I have inherited a million dollars in 4% government bonds I will have less income than, say, a night-club entertainer. But I will be much richer than he. In other words, the income and savings gap bears no necessary relation to the decisively important gap in the possession of permanent wealth. That gap has scarcely closed over the past 30 years.

It should be clear, then, that the liberal formula has, on the whole, failed. Thanks to the welfare state and to labor unions, the majority has been able to gain some measure of independence from the controlling 1%. But the majority is static and passive. Only catastrophes, such as depressions and wars, stimulate it to action. Over the long pull the rich constitute the dynamic of American society. And their power has burgeoned in the eight fat Eisenhower years. The dry, abstract truths of Professor Lampman's study will help explain better than a thousand exhortations why President Kennedy and his only modest liberal bloc in Congress have been impotent.

A. F.

THE OTHER AMERICA. By Michael Harrington. Macmillan, New York. 1962. 191 pp. $4.00.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON HAS RESTORED meaning to the Biblical truth that poor men are dead men. He tells us that more than a fourth of all Americans—some fifty millions—have been left behind, discarded, irrelevant, forgotten, in the great surge of post-depression prosperity. His book consists of a series of compassionately-written essays illustrating the different forms which poverty takes in America. It thus severely qualifies the assumption, now turning into a cruel myth, that America today enjoys uniform and incontrovertible affluence.

It is worse to be poor today than ever before. Added to poverty is the consciousness of defeat, the feeling of despair and bewilderment. Previously in this country, and still in most other countries, one could be poor and still hope. The immigrants who settled in the United States had cultural solidarities to sustain them; uncowed, they struggled for a future. But today anonymity and loneliness accompany the poor. Harrington breaks

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down this "other America" into its component parts: the chronically unemployed, the pathetically underpaid, the aged, the ill, the retarded, the derelict, even the bohemian and the beatnik. Mostly they are people who were born poor and have had less than high school education. They include a disproportionteal high number of Negroes. They tend to live either in small towns or in the slums of large cities.

The poor are a blight and a bother in our tidy middle-class world. The welfare state, a middle-class institution, does not embrace the poor. From the equality of all men, the motto of America, even of liberal America, has become: if you can't help yourself and if you can't earn your own welfare step to the rear and wait for charity. Harrington proposes a more extensive welfare state—housing, comprehensive medical care, etc.—on a scale sufficient to wrest fifty million Americans from soulless poverty. He keeps clear, however, of the inevitable political question: How and by whom will this task be carried out?

A. F.

The Bureaucratic Revolution: The Rise of the Stalinist State. By Max Shachtman. Donald Press, New York. 1962. 355 pp. $2.95.

Although not the first to consider Stalinism a new society—"bureaucratic collectivism"—and the antithesis of socialism, Max Shachtman developed it in a theoretical manner from a Marxist point of view.

His book is a valuable collection of articles, mostly from the mid and late 1940s, which are most useful to an understanding of Stalinism and as a reaffirmation of the central place of democracy to the conception of socialism.

The polemical edge is directed toward the related theories that Russia is a degenerated worker's state (a form of socialism), and that there is something inherently progressive about nationalized industry.

If the social rule of the capitalist class is exercised through its ownership and control of private property, Shachtman argues, then how is the social rule of the working class exercised in a collectivized economy. Since no one "owns" industry in Russia, then those who "own" the state hold social power. If there is no democracy then the working class has no power or control over society. Power is held by that class which controls the state. Under Stalinism, it is a totalitarian bureaucracy.

A brief introductory essay brings the collection of articles up-to-date and discusses the limits of reform after Stalin's death. The book, valuable and of great interest in its present form, would have been strengthened if specific reforms were discussed in detail and if it included sections analyzing recent developments in the Russian economy, imperialist drives under the new conditions since Stalin's death, etc., and related the theory to the Yugoslav and Chinese experience.

S. B.

The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics. By Arnold S, Rice. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. 150 pp. $3.25.

Grass roots politics receive short shrift from American historians these days, and this book is not of the calibre to change matters. Yet, at a time when Nevins dismisses the rise of the Know Nothing Party with a few poetic flourishes and Hofstadter ridicules the Populists, the appearance of a straightforward monograph on the KKK is a relief and perhaps a help.

Arnold Rice traces the rise and the splintering of the knights of the nighties from the vision of their founder some fifteen years before the Stone Mountain genesis in 1915 to the various recent flurries: after World War II, after the Brown decision of 1954, and during the 1960 election. For many thousands of Americans in

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the twentieth century the Klan and all it stands for in terms of violence, hatred, and farcical cretinism often became the only avenue of escape from a world filled with abstract dangers of immorality, of decline of the race, of enslavement from the Jews, the Pope, and then by the Communists and the CIO.

Most of the book deals with the twenties and the political involvement of the Klan on a local level, a state level, and finally on the national level in the elections of 1924 and 1928. What stands out most in this cataloging is not the strength of the Klan once it decides to toss its "hoods in the ring" but the victorious fights of anti-Klan politicians, even in the deepest South.

J. K.

Russia Under Khrushchev. By Alexander Werth. Hill and Wang. 342 pages. $5.00.

This book covers familiar ground; it's the return of an old Russia hand to Khrushchevland and it describes the many changes that occurred since the old tyrant died. But the ground has been covered much better by Harrison Salisbury, Maurice Hindus and others.

The numerous interviews and conversations with Russians should be the most fascinating aspect of the book. Somehow they don't come off. At least one reader found it difficult to believe that a Russian would complain of Western comments about Khrushchev as a "Rooseveltian liberal." Where? Who? When?

In justice to Werth it must be said that everything he sees in Russia is very much colored by the terrible things he saw during the war. Indeed this experience so affected him that throughout the book he indicates his repugnance at the denigration of Stalin as a war leader after he was safely dead. Most Russians with whom Werth talks, and somehow Werth himself, seem to resent Khrushchev's attacks on the dead Stalin.

This reader found it difficult to understand Werth's easy acceptance of Soviet explanations for dispersion of entire people, such as the Kalmuks and Crimean Tartars on grounds of "disloyalty." It almost seems at times as though Werth has more compassion for the perpetrators than the victims of injustice.

J. C.

Communist China in Perspective. By A. Doak Barnett. Praeger Paperbooks. 88 pages. $1.35.

Professor Barnett's slim book shows that even a collection of lectures—these consist of three delivered at Washington University, St. Louis—can make a useful booklet.

The Chinese revolution didn't begin with the Communists, Barnett shows, but goes back more than a century to the Western penetration of China in the early 1840's. The Chinese Communists were able to seize hold of this revolution because there were no other forces within China capable of leadership in transforming China from ancient to modern foundations.

The author dispels the notion that "crude coercion" is the only means enabling the Communists to assume revolutionary leadership. He cites other important elements: their revolutionary dynamism, their remarkable techniques for *positively* mobilizing people and resources, and their ability to use organized social pressures.

In a balanced presentation Barnett shows the notable accomplishments of the Communists, especially in industrialization, and also their equally spectacular failures in agriculture and the breakdown of planning and administration. While it appears certain to the author that the Chinese Communists will resume their industrialization progress he is equally certain that the difficulties they encounter will multiply. He notes the irony in the success of the Communists during the revolution when they won peasant support through highly successful land reform policies while "communization" has made the peasantry the major victims of the program.

J. C.

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NEW POLITICS

A Journal of Socialist Thought

1961–1962

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BR: Book review
NA: Notes from Abroad
C: Correspondence
W: Winter
Sp: Spring
Su: Summer
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